AN EXPOSITION OF INFERENCE IN

DHARMAKĪRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

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I hereby declare that the data presented in this Dissertation entitled, **"An Exposition of Inference in Dharmakirti's Philosophy"** is based on the results of investigations carried out by me in the discipline of Philosophy at the School of Sanskrit, Philosophy and Indic studies, Goa University under the Supervision of **Dr Walter Menezes** and the same has not been submitted elsewhere for the award of a degree or diploma by me. Further, I understand that Goa University or its authorities will not be responsible for the correctness of observations / experimental or other findings given the dissertation.

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School of Sanskrit, Philosophy and Indic Studies

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This is to certify that the dissertation entitled **"An Exposition of inference in Dharmakirti's Philosophy"** is a bonafide work carried out by **Mr Jomon Joy** under my supervision in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Arts in Philosophy** in the Discipline Philosophy at the School of Sanskrit, Philosophy and Indic Studies, Goa University.

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INTRODUCTION

There were discussions happening about Buddhist logic for a long period of time both on Western and Indian soil. Many systematic works had been done by the time in this field by great interpreters like Hattori, R.S.Y Chi and others. In the Indian tradition presently Prof. Ghokale's works are very much important and helped me so much to do this work. Buddhist logic begins right after the first council. But a systematic Logic or formal logic begins from the works of Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Both were academic geniuses at Nalanda and Mithila. My work mainly focuses on the notion of inference put forward by Dharmakirti in his work called Nyaya Bindu.

Acarya Dignaga is considered as the father of medieval formal logic in Indian philosophy. This was said by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan in his work called "*A History of Indian Logic*". Both matter and in manner, his works marked a distinct departure from those of his predecessors. Historians believe he was born in a Brahmin family somewhere in Kancheepuram, presently in Tamil Nadu. At a very small age only he converted to the Hinayana tradition of Buddhism and later he studied under Vasubandhu both Mahayana and Hinayana principles. Soon after he was called to Nalanda where at that time all the Naiyayikas were dominant in Tarka. With his immense knowledge and critical thinking, he was known in Nalanda as a "fighting bull" or a "bull in discussion". He became more popular When the Pallavas, a Buddhist kingdom came into power in the southern coastal area of the Andhra region of present India. He had done many important works in Buddhist logic. Among them, Pramanasamuccaya, Hetuchakra- damaru, and Nyaya Mukha are called magnum opus. Unfortunately, we lost all the Sanskrit originals of these three. We are getting

knowledge about this mainly from their Tibetan translations and the last one also survived in Chinese translation.

Dharmakirti on the other half followed what Dignaga said not completely but almost. His works including Nyayabindu were either correcting Dignaga's work or a detailed explanation of it. In Nalanda Iswarasena was Dharamakirti's teacher. Iswarasena was the direct pupil of Dignaga. He says that Dharmakirti understood Dignaga more than he understood. There are mainly seven works done by Dharmakirti namely, *pramana vartika, pramana viniscaya, Nyaya Bindu, Hetu Bindu, Sambandha pariksa, Codana prakarana, and Santanantara siddhi*. In my work I mainly focused on his *Nyaya Bindu*. Through this work I tried to examine what Dharmakirti told about perception and inference in general. But my main point is based on his concept of *Yogi perception*. I tried to critically evaluate his concept of *yogi perception* in depth. Through the first and second chapters, I covered almost every topic that dealt with the Nyaya Bindu in a very short form. Because such great work needs so much time to examine in deep. The concept of Buddhist philosophy was totally different for me before and after doing this work. I never thought that Buddhists will go this far and depth in logic. The major realization is that Indian logic is not just Nyaya. But which includes Buddhist, Jain and other systems of Indian philosophy. With this general introduction let me start my work.

CHAPTER ONE:

INFERENCE IN DHARMAKIRTI: A GENERAL NOTE

Dharmakirti's point of view on inference is something that needs a basis for what Dignaga said on inference. so I start with Dignaga first and then will move to Dharmakirti. In the Tibetan version of Pramanasamuccaya written by Acarya Dignaga which is edited and translated by A Wayman, chapter one says that;

/ mnon sum dan ni rjes su dpag /

/ tshad ma'o mtshan iiid giiis gial bya /

/ de Ia rab sbyor phyir tshad rna /

/ gian ni yod pa rna yin no //[1]

This means there are only two means of cognition namely, perception and inference (pratyaksam anumanam ca pramane[2]).

1.1 General terms and their meanings

For a clear-cut analysis, we need some terms to be explained.

Paksa	Object of discussion
Sadhya	Predicate to be proved
Sapaksa	Similar cases
Vipaksa	Dissimilar cases

[1] A millennium of Buddhist logic, Alex Wayman, Motilal Banarsidas publishers, 1999, p.155
[2] Dignaga on perception, Masaaki Hattori, Harvard university press, 1968, p.76

Hetu	Reason, mark
Dristanta	Example

1.1.1 Hetu or probans is the element that plays the most significant role in inference. Based on the perception of a probans in the locus(dharmi), one can know the probandum in the inference. For example: "The house is on fire because a gust of smoke is coming out of the house. Where smoke is seen fire also is seen like in the kitchen". In this inference smoke is regarded as hetu because only when the person has perceived smoke in the house which is the dharmi, does he infer the existence of fire there, otherwise not. In the English translation of Pramanasamuccaya by Richard P Hayes we can see that "The statements of credible persons are inference insofar as they have the common character of not being false. Present in the object of inference and in what is similar to it, and absent in their absence"[3]. Through this Dignaga put forward the major three characteristics of hetu. They are 1. Existence in the locus 2. Existence in other instances similar to the locus and 3. Non-existence in those cases where the probandum is absent. This we will explain detail in later.

1.1.2 Sadhya(major term) is that which is going to be established in the inference. Sadhya stands for the object as possessed of the property (*dharmavisissta dharmi*) which is to be established. In a secondary sense, Sadhya stands for mere dharma. In this sense, Sadhya has invariable

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[3] Dignaga on the interpretation of the sign, Richard P Hayes

concomitance relation with the probans. The sadhya does not have a status independent of paksa.

1.1.3 Paksa(minor term) stands for the particular case where the probans are found and the probandum or the Sadhya is to be determined. Generally, a paksa (often regarded as anumeya, though the term has other denotations also) is defined as a property-possessor that is qualified by a property (that is the property of the probandum). According to Nyayapravesa, the paksa is a commonly known property possessor that the proponent wants to establish as being qualified by a commonly known property. For example, when a person proceeds to infer the existence of fire in a house based on his observation of smoke coming out of it, there may be a doubt as to whether there is a fire in the house or not, but the existence of the house cannot be doubted. However, since probandum is not known to be the property of the property bearer at the time of the inference the anumeya cannot be defined as dharmavisisto dharmi (property bearer qualified by the property). The term paksa is also used as a part of sadhana (proof /argument). In this sense, it is analogous to what is called pratijna in Nyaya.

1.1.4 Sapaksa means similar to paksa. Sapaksa means similar to the locus in respect of the possession of the property to be proved. Sapaksa stands for all the instances similar to the locus in respect of possessing the property of the probandum in general and not the property of the probandum specific to this inference. By the expression 'in general' what is meant is the property common to all the instances of fire. The specific fire which is found in this particular mountain at this particular moment will be regarded as the probandum specific

to an inference. Dharmakirti says that homogeneous instances are similar to the locus or paksa in respect of their having the common property, the probandum.

1.1.5. Vipaksa is defined by Dignaga in very simple terms as that where the probandum does not exist. It is also known as asapaksa. In that respect, it can be described as not the co-member of the locus. In other words, it is a class that is incompatible with the probandum. Dharmakirti himself defines a heterogenous class or asapaksa as that which is not the homogeneous class that which is other than the homogeneous class, that which is contradictory to the homogeneous class, and that which has the absence of the homogeneous class. Accordingly, some logicians held that vipaksa is of three kinds- the simple absence of the probandum, what is just different from the probandum and what is opposed to the probandum.

1.1.6 The term drstanta derived from the expressions 'drsta' and 'anta' means that which is being observed carries the point at issue to the conclusion. In Nyayamukha Dignaga has defined an example as one which expresses that the reason is followed by the probandum and that wherever the probandum is absent the reason also is absent. This definition contains two types of dristanta. 1.anuveyadristanta(homogenous) and 2. Vyatirekadristanta(heterogenous). In the positive instance, hetu and Sadhya are copresent. In Vaidharmya dristanta hetu and Sadhya, both are absent. Anuveya dristanta is also called homogeneous. Vyatireka dristanta is called heterogeneous. Homogeneous is based on similarity or sadharmya. Heterogeneous is based on dissimilarity or vaidharmya. In the inference mentioned above kitchen is the homogeneous example while the lake is the heterogeneous example.

Dignaga is known as the father of formal logic in the Buddhist tradition. Dignaga reduced Pramanas into two namely, perception and inference. This was a very much debatable move from Dignaga at that time because Naiyayikas were so strong and argued for four types of pramanas namely, perception, inference, comparison and testimony. However, for him, perception and inference were the only pramanas rest can be included in these two or maybe can reject as a pramana. He also tries to distinguish between svarthanumana and pararthanumna. According to him, both were part of the same aspect only the difference is that svarthanumana is in the mental level or propositional and pararthanumana is the sentential level which needs clear-cut syllogism to prove. This does not mean that svarthanumana doesn't have any rules to follow. A very deep analysis of svarthanumana and pararthanumana can be seen in Dharmakirti's work which I will discuss in the next chapter.

It is also important to note that Dignaga's tairupa or the three characteristics of hetu is so relevant to know more about his and Dharmakirti's logic. The first characteristic is that hetu should be present in paksa. Secondly, it should be there in similar cases(sapaksa) and lastly, it should not be there in dissimilar cases(vipaksa). A more detailed version of these three characteristics can be analysed in Dharmakirti's work.

1.2 Wheel of Reasons

One another important aspect of Dignaga's work is the wheel of reasons. By using the three characteristics of hetu he developed nine possible reasons. This is only when hetu is present not when it is absent. Among these possible reasons,

only two are valid one rest seven are fallacious. I will describe very shortly what are the nine possible reasons in Hetuchakrdamaru. (CHI, 1969)

In the first case (Sound is permanent – the probandum, It is knowable- the probans, Space- similar cases, Pot- dissimilar instances, Presence in sapaksa, Presence in vipaksa, therefore Inconclusive too broad)the probans "being knowable" is present in similar instances like space and dissimilar instances like jar/pot. So it is too broad and hence, being overly inclusive, the probans is uncertain.

In the second case(Sound is impermanent- the probandum, It is produced-the probans, Pot- similar cases, Space- dissimilar cases, Presence in sapaksa, Absence in vipaksa, therefore valid) the probans "being a product" is present in similar instances like pot. Moreover, it is absent in dissimilar instances like lightning or space. Hence it is a good probans.

In the third case (sound is produced by effort- the probandum, it is impermanent- the probans, pot- similar cases, lightning, space- dissimilar cases, presence in sapaksa, both presence and absence in vipaksa, therefore inconclusive too broad) the probans "being impermanent" is present in similar instances like pot. It is absent in some dissimilar instances like space but is present in other dissimilar instances like lightning. So here also the probans is inconclusive.

In the fourth case (sound is permanent- the probandum, it is produced- the probans, space- similar cases, pot- dissimilar cases, absence in sapaksa, presence in vipaksa, therefore contradictory) the probans "being a product" is absent in all similar instances like space and is present in all dissimilar instances like a

pot. So the probans is exactly the opposite of what it is claimed to prove. Hence it is a contradictory one.

In the fifth case(sound is permanent- the probandum, it is audible- the probans, space- similar cases, pot- dissimilar cases, absence in sapaksa, absence in vipaksa, therefore inconclusive too broad) the probans "being audible" is absent in all similar instances like space and absent in dissimilar instances like pot. So the probans being existent in the locus only too narrow and hence inconclusive.

In the sixth case(sound is permanent- the probandum, it is produced by effort- the probans, space- similar cases, pot, lightning- dissimilar cases, both presence and absence in vipaksa, therefore contradictory)absence in sapaksa the probans "being produced by human effort" is absent in similar instances like space but is present in some dissimilar instances like a pot though it is absent in other dissimilar instances like lightning. Hence the probans is contradictory.

In the seventh case(sound is not produced by effort- the probandum, it is impermanent- the probans, lighting, space- similar case, pot- dissimilar case, both presence and absence in sapaksa, presence in vipaksa, therefore inconclusive too broad) the probans "being non-eternal" is present in some similar instances like lightning but is absent in other similar instances like space; it is, however, present in dissimilar instances like a jar. So being too broad, it is inconclusive.

Casee number eight(sound is impermanent- the probandum, it is produced by effort- the probans, pot, lightning- similar cases, space- dissimilar cases, both presence and absence in sapaksa, absence in vipaksa, therefore valid) is valid. In this, the probans "being produced by human effort" is present in some similar

instances like a pot, though it is not present in other similar instances like lightning.

In the ninth case(sound is permanent- the probandum, it is incorporeal- the probans, atom, space- similar cases, action, pot- dissimilar cases, both presence and absence in sapaksa, both presence and absence in vipaksa, therefore inconclusive too broad) the probans "being incorporeal" is present in some similar instances like an atom, but absent in other similar instances like space. Again it is absent in some dissimilar instances like a pot but present in other dissimilar instances like action. Hence the probans, being too broad, is inconclusive.

One another important notion put forward by Dignaga and clarified in detail by Dharmakirti is Sadhanabhasa. From this wheel of reasons, we can find the fallacies which Dignaga put forward through Nyayapravesa. In Nyayapravesa Dignaga classifies fallacies into three types, namely paksabhasas (fallacies of the pseudo paksa), hetvabhasa (fallacies of the pseudo probans and drstantabhasas (fallacies of pseudo illustration. Buddhists in general and Dignaga, in particular, accepted these three different types of incorrect or fallacious inferences as sadhanabhasas. (Guiseppe) before going into detail account of fallacies I would like to explain what is the three characteristics of hetu in detail.

1.3 Three characteristics of Hetu

1.3.1"*Pakse sattvam eva*"(definite existence in the locus): in the statement of the first characteristic of the probans the word existence(sattvam) is given to avoid the fallacy of unproved probans(asiddha). In the argument 'word is eternal

because it is visible' the probans is visibility. Such probans neither exist in the locus 'word' nor any member of the class of words. Hence this is not a proper probans. Haribhadra Suri comments that ("paksadharma eva, na tu paksasyaiva dharmah") it is a property of the locus no doubt, but not the property of the locus alone. The position of 'eva' is important. In this eva is after sattvam. This means hetu should exist in paksa. And this excludes something that is unrelatedness. Hetu should not be unrelate with paksa and does not exclude other relatedness.

1.3.2 *"sapakse eva sattvam"* (existence only in homogeneous instances): in the statement of the second feature of the probans the word "existence" is used to avoid the fallacy of incompatible probanses (viruddha) as, for instance, in the following inference – "sound is eternal because it is a product". In this inference being a product is hetu and sapaksa will be eternal things other than sound for example akasa is an eternal thing other than sound. it is sapaksa. So being a product does not exist in sapaksa or akasa. So here there is a fallacy called viruddha. The word 'eva' is used to avoid the fallacy of being overly inclusive as in the inference " word is eternal because it is an object of knowledge". Here 'eva' stands for hetu and should exist only in sapaksa not in vipaksa. Here the existence of vipaksa is excluded by using 'eva'.

1.3.3 *"vipakse asattvam eva"* (definite non-existence in heterogeneous instances): the third characteristic of the probans says that the probans must be non-existent in all the instances heterogeneous to the locus, that is, in all the instances which do not possess the probandum. This characteristic of the probans is designated as vyatirekah or negative pervasion. Here also the word "absence (asattvam) is used to avoid the incompatible probanses (viruddha

hetu). The word 'eva' is used to exclude over–inclusive over–inclusive hetu) probans like "sound is produced immediately after human effort because it is impermanent like a jar". It should be noted that according to the third characteristic, a sound probans should be absent from all dissimilar cases where, that is, from cases where the probandum does not exist. But such universality is not needed in the case of the second characteristic of the hetu. That is, sound probans don't need to be found in all the sapaksas or similar instances. For example, the hetu 'being produced by human effort' in the inference "words are non-eternal, because they are produced through human effort" is absent from the whole of vipaksa (class of eternal things) but it exists only in a part of sapaksa.

We have seen a great development in the logic from Dignaga to Dharmakirti in this section. This statement will be more powerful when we analyse the two types of anumana namely, svarthanumana and pararthanumana.

CHAPTER TWO

TWO TYPES OF INFERENCE IN DHARMAKIRTI

We have seen a clear viewpoint of Dharmakirt's inference in general. In this, we will focus on Dharmakirti's theory of two types of inference. Actually, Dharmakirti did more on inference even though it is some sort of addition and clarification to what Dignaga said. Also, we can proceed with Dharmakirti only after understanding Dignaga. In Dignaga we can find a distinct opinion on svarthanumana(inference for oneself) and pararthanumana(inference for others) from that of Naiyayikas. Later Dharmakirti is the one who gave full form to Dignaga's theory. So in this chapter, we mainly give more attention to the svarthanumana and pararthanumana of Dharmakirti.

2.1 Svarthanumana

In the opening line of the chapter Inference of Nyayabindu, Dharmakirti is not trying to define what is inference or anumana. Rather he says that inference is of two types svarthanumana and pararthanumana (anumanam dvidha svartham parartha ca[4]). According to Dharmottara, Dharmakirti does not define inference because of the distinction. Those two kinds are absolutely different things, so no inclusive definition is possible. Svarthanumana is said to be the kind of inference in which one infers draws a conclusion from a set of premises for his own knowledge. Svarthanumana is thus an internal process of reasoning conducted by the person who does that in the privacy of his mind. It is something

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[4] A millennium of Buddhist logic, Alex Wayman, Motilala Banasidaas publishers, p.45

that gives knowledge to the inference maker. For example "Here is fire, because here is smoke".

2.1.1 Three aspects of hetu

Svarthanumana is that which is produced indirectly through a mark that has a three-fold aspect.[5] Here Dharmakirti says that hetu should possess three characteristics. They are, *anumeya sattvam eva, sapaksa eva sattvam and asapakse casattvam eva niscitam.*[6] Which means its necessarily present in the paksa, its existence in sapaksa and its absence in vipaksa. The use of the term "eva" is introduced by Dharmakirti. All other characteristics are the same as in Dignaga. In the first characteristic, the position of 'eva' is important. In this eva is after sattvam. This means hetu should exist in paksa. And this excludes something that is unrelatedness. Hetu should not be unrelate with paksa and does not exclude another relatedness. Every word of the statement is important because that aims at precluding some logical fallacy.

The second characteristic of hetu says the necessary existence of hetu in similar cases. Here the word 'eva' (necessary) is used to avoid the fallacy of being overly inclusive as in the inference " word is eternal because it is an object of knowledge". Here 'eva' stands for hetu and should exist only in sapaksa not in vipaksa. Here the existence of vipaksa is excluded by using 'eva'. But this does not mean that it must present in every similar case without exception. rather it says only that it must be present in similar cases not in dissimilar cases.

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[5] Nyayabindu tika, Dharmottara,, p.48
[6] A millennium of Buddhist logic, Alex Wayman, Motilala Banasidaas publishers, p.46

The third characteristic says the complete absence of hetu in dissimilar cases with necessity. the word 'eva'(necessity) is used to exclude over–inclusive (sadharana hetu) probans like "sound is produced immediately after human effort because it is impermanent like a jar". It should be noted that according to the third characteristic, a sound probans should be absent from all dissimilar cases where, that is, from cases where the probandum does not exist. But such universality is not needed in the case of the second characteristic of the hetu. That is, sound probans don't need to be found in all the sapaksas or similar instances. For example, the hetu 'being produced by human effort' in the inference "words are non-eternal, because they are produced through human effort" is absent from the whole of vipaksa (class of eternal things) but it exists only in a part of sapaksa. If any of these characteristics is lacking the inference will be fallacious.

2.1.2 Three types of logical mark

We have seen that there are three aspects to hetu. This three-aspected hetu is of three types, namely, Anupalabdhi hetu, Svabhava hetu, and Karya hetu (trirupani ca trini eva ca lingani, anupalabdih svabhavakarye ceti)[7]

2.1.2.1 *Anupalabdhi hetu*: *Anupalabdhi* literally means noncognition. According to Dharmakirti, there are two types of cognition namely, perception and inference. So the Anupalabdhi here means the non-perception. It cannot be non-inference in the sense it is an inference by itself. Anupalabdhi hetu is the non-cognition of a perceivable object used to infer the non-existence of the object. Anupalabdhi hetu, therefore, means non-cognition of a thing which,

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[7] Ibid

subject to the thing's satisfying a set of conditions, functions as a logical reason, or warrant, for inferring the non-existence of that thing.[8] In Nyaya Bindu Dharmakirti gives an example;

Thesis: On some particular place there is no jar.

Reason: Because it is not perceived, although the conditions of perception are fulfilled.

This says that even though all the conditions to perceive a jar is present still if we are not perceiving a jar means the jar is not there. It should clearly noted that by non perception of thing at a particular place Dharmakirti does not mean that that thing is not existing. Principally, there is only one kind of anupalabdhi, that is svabhdvanupalabdhi, but in the Pramana Vartika[9] it has been classified under the following four kinds: 1.Viruddhopalabdhi, 2.Viruddha karyopalabdhi, 3. Karananuplabdhi, and 4. Svabhavanupalabdhi. In the Nyaya Bindu[10] seven more kinds are added to them, thus making them eleven in number. These seven are as follows:

1. *Svabhavaviruddhopalabdhi,*

2. *Karyaanupalabdhi,*

3. *Viruddhavydptopalabdhi,*

4. *Vydpakaviruddhopalabdhi,*

5. *Karanaviruddhopalabdhi,*

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[8] Dharmakirti's theory of inference, Rajendra prasad, Oxford University press,p.50
[9] Pramana varttika,p.260
[10] A millennium of Buddhist logic, Alex Wayman, Motilala Banasidaas publishers, p.49

6. *Karyaviruddhopalabdhi,*

7. *Karanaviruddhakaryopalabdhi.*

The first one Svabhava anupalabdhi is based on the drisyanupalabdhi(visual non-perception). The other ten types of Anupalabdhi are essentially non-different from the first one. Or it can be reduced to the first type of Anupalabdhi. actually, their difference is only in the verbal sense. Svabhava Anupalabdhi basically says the inference of the non-existence of a thing by non-perception of the existence of a thing. In Karyanupalabdhi we are inferring the non-existence of a cause from the non-existence of an effect. for example, "There is no cause here with an unobstructed capability to produce smoke because There is no smoke here." There are many criticism against this type of Anupalabdhi because they say that it cannot be considered a real Anupalabdhi. but more logical good reason can be articulated by explaining Karya anumana. In Karya Anumana we infer the presence of the cause from the presence of an effect. The third type of Anupalabdhi is called vyapaka Anupalabdhi. This type can be explained by using an example. If one person is non-perceiving a banyan tree in the barren land because he is not perceiving any tree there. So this type of anupalabdhi is possible by inferring the non-existence of the banyan tree from the class of tree. The fourth kind of Anupalabdhi hetu called Svabhaviruddhopalabdhi, is that in which the non-existence of something(cold) is inferred from the perception or cognition of something else(fire) on the ground that the presence of cold is incompatible with the presence of fire. The fifth kind of Anupalabdhi hetu is called Viruddhakāryopalabdh.it is the cognition of the incompatible effect which is similar to Svabhaviruddhopalabdhi. In this case, the person can infer the absence of the sensation of cold from the presence of smoke because the

presence of smoke implies the presence of fire, smoke being the effect of fire, and the presence of fire implies the absence of the sensation of cold, which is denied in the conclusion. The sixth kind is written in Nyaya Bindu is like this: "viruddhavyap topalabdhirayatha na dhruvabhavi bhutatasyapi bhavasya vinaso hetvantarapeksanak iti' it is called Viruddhavyäptopalabdh.[11] The seventh type of Anupalabdhi hetu is called Kaayaviruddhopalabdhi. It is the non cognition of something by the cognition of the effect of other thing. For example There is no x Because There is y and y is the antagonist of z, an effect of x. Here we are cognizing that there is no x because we perceived y which is the antagonist of the effect of x. The next type called Vyapdkaviruddhopalabdhi is that when we infer something is not there by cognizing another thing which is antagonist of some another thing which included the first thing. For example we infer that there is no x by cognizing y which is the antagonist of z. here x is included in z. so anything antagonist to z is also antagonist to x. so both x and y cannot be together. therefor x is not there. Dharmakirti in Nyaya Bindu gives example to this type of Anupalabdhi : "Here there is no touching of any cold thing, because there is a fire." The Karananupalabdhi is that inferring non cognition of a effect by non cognition of cause. For example "There is no smoke Because There is no fire". Here we can see the absence of cause is making the absence of effect. An effect without a cause is impossible . Karya hetu anumana and this type of anumana is just opposite to each other. In Karya hetu we are inferring the cause from its effect. But in Karana hetu anumana we inferring the non existence of cause from the non existence of effect. The tenth type of Anupalabdhi hetu is Karana virudhopalabdhi which is the perception of the opposite of the cause.

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[11] Nyayabindu, dharmakirti

The effect of something is non cognized by cognizing the opposite cause of that thing. If we infer that there is a person whose teeth is not chattering by cognizing that there is fire is the example to this type. Karanaviuddha-Karyopaldbdhi is the last type of Anupalabdhi hetu which similar to previous one. Here we infer that there is a person whose teeth is not chattering by cognizing smoke which is the effect of fire. So Karanaviruddha- Karyopaladbdhi is the Cognition of the Effect of the Contrary of the Cause of What is Denied.

2.1.2.2 *Svabhava hetu*: This type of hetu can be explained through an example. "This is a tree, because this is banyan". Here being banyan is hetu and being tree is Sadhya. So Svabhava hetu is that which is we inferring something from the very nature or existence of other thing. Dharmakirti does not detail this type hetu very much. Some kind of obviousness we can see in this type of inference as like Indian mathematicians are mathematicians. But there are two main problems with this type of inference. First if someone who don't know the meaning of banyan then it is impossible for him to infer that is a tree. Secondly according to Dharmakirti inference is something which gives you new knowledge. Here any kind of new knowledge is not there. But also we cannot exclude this type of inference from the three classification. Because in practical reason it is compulsory to include this type.

2.1.2.3 *Karya hetu*: This type of inference is that when we infer the existence of a cause from the cognized effect. As like Svabhava hetu Dharmakirti does not explain this type of hetu in detail. It seems to be obvious for the Buddhist that an effect does not happen without any cause. Here the experiences as in example are empirical in nature. So one can infer this type in future if he have a previous experience. In simple terms Dharmakirti also define two types of causes.

Effective cause which can produce n effective effect and non effective cause which can produce an obstructed effect. Here also there is problem. Some critics says that this type of inference also not giving any new knowledge. Because the knowledge about the cause is already contained in the effect. That is why we can infer the cause.

2.2. *PARARTHANUMANA*

In a simple sense, Pararthanumana is the Anumana for others. Also, it is the logical-linguistic form of Svarthanumana. In order for this to happen Pararthanumana, and Svarthanumana is necessary. they both are necessary for the field of inference. In NyayaBindu Dharmakirti says that inference for others is consisting of the communication of three characteristics of hetu. The main purpose of Pararthanumana is communication. Dignaga define Pararthanumana as Pararthanumanam tu svadrstartha prakasakanm[12] while Dharmakirti in his Nyaya Bindu says it as trirupalinga akhyanam pararthanumana[13].

Dharmakirti classifies Pararthanumana into two. The first one is based on similarity-based (sadharmyavat) and the second one is dissimilarity-based (vaidharmyavat). These two kinds of division are based on verbal formulation and agreement and disagreement. To agree means to possess the same attribute and to disagree means to possess different. Dharmakirti clearly states that this type of similarity and dissimilarity-based inference is only applicable to Pararthanumana but not to Svarthanumana. In the section of Svarthanumana, we

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[12] Fragments from Dignaga, G. Tucci, p.381
[13] Nyayabindu, dharmakirti, p. 1.186

have seen that there are three kinds of hetu or logical marks namely, Anupalabdhi, Svabhava and Karya. In Pararthanumana we can classify them as both Sadharmyavat and vaidharmyavat namely

1. inference with similarity-based, anupalabdhi as its logical reason

2. inference with similarity-based, svabhava as its logical reason

3. inference with similarity-based, karya as its logical reason

The first one will be Sadharmyavat inference with Anupalabdhi as a logical reason. This kind says that anything which is not perceived even if all the necessary conditions is to be perceived and then it is articulated through language to convey the message then it is called the first type of Sadharmyavat. According to Dharmakirti Svabhava hetu is of two types namely, Suddha or unqualified and visista or qualified svabhava hetu. When the inference is based on similarity and its logical reason is of svabhava hetu which does not qualified or neat then it is called suddha svabhava hetu. If the hetu is qualified then it is visista. In Sadharmya Karyahetu Inference, the hetu is an effect, a Karyahetu, and the vyāpti asserts the universal, or unexceptionable agreement in presence between the effect and its cause, that wherever exists the thing which is an effect, there invariably exists the thing which is its cause.[14] Dissimilarty-based pararthanumana in all these forms are need not to be defined because in that inference vyapti is the transposed form of the vyapti in the correspondence similarity-based pararthanumana.

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[14] Dharmakirti's theory of inference, Rajendra prasad, Oxford University press,p.138

Dharmakirti's classification of svarthanumana and pararthanumana is a legitimate one because of several reasons. Firstly it was a classification based on formulating an argument and of its communication. Secondly, while it speaks us that even a non-social setting is enough for our coming to frame an argument, a social context is essential for its being transferred. Thirdly, since an argument that comes to be transferred is already formulated, unless an argument is formulated the question of its communication just does not arise. Fourthly, since formulating an argument is former to its communication and since the terms of forms assure and guarantee it's being able to be considered an argument at all, mere communicability of it could neither be considered to be prior to its being fashioned and formulated nor could it be said to guarantee its argumentativity. This is why Dharmakirti begins with Svarthanumana. Fifthly and most importantly the distinction between svarthanumana and pararthanumana need not be considered as one is for oneself and another is for others. Even though Dharmakirti distinguishes them into two they both are two parts of the same process.

2.2.1 Based on the three characteristics of hetu there are three types of Sadhanabhasa namely, paksabhasa, Hetvabhasas, and Dristantabhasas. Paksabhasa: Dignaga defines paksa as svayaṁ Sadhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddharthanirakṛtaḥ (Guiseppe). In the Pramāṇasamuccaya the thesis has been defined as that which the proponent himself intends to state just according to its nature and which is not refuted by perception, etc.[15] According to Dignaga, a thesis should not be refuted by any other pramana. If it is refuted then it is called paksabhasa. Dignaga in Nyayamukh reckons five types of Paksabhasa, namely

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[15] Dignaga and Dharmakirti on fallacies of inference, Bhima Kumar Kukkumalla, Journal of ICPR

svavacanaviruddha, āgamaviruddha, prasiddhiviruddha, pratyakṣaviruddha and anumānaviruddha.

1. Svavacanaviruddha: when a thesis is 'opposed by itself' or 'opposed by its utterance' then it is called svavacanayiruddha. In the first case, the thesis would be self-falsifying, whereas in the second case, it would be a pragmatic contradiction. For example, when we say 'All words are false,' it does not convey any meaning. Instead, it must in fact 'All sentences are false.' If the thesis, namely "All sentences are false," is true, then the thesis being a sentence must be false. In this way, the thesis is self-falsifying.

2. Agamaviruddha: when a thesis is one, which is contradicted by some other thesis accepted by oneself then it is called agamaviruddha. For example, 'Sound is eternal.' One who is proposing such a 'pseudo-thesis' may not be presenting a false thesis but he is said to commit the fallacy. This is because he is inconsistent with himself while presenting the thesis.

3. Prasiddhiviruddha: when a thesis is one, which is contradicted by some commonly accepted linguistic synonymy then it is called prasiddhiviruddha. For example, 'śaśī is not Candra'. In this example, śaśī and Candra are synonyms meaning 'moon.' While explaining in English the statement would have explained, as 'Luna is not the moon.'

4. pratyakṣaviruddha: If a thesis is one, which is falsified by our experience then it is called Pratyaksaviruddha. For example, 'Sound cannot be heard.' That is to say, our experience shows that sound can be heard. Hence, the thesis, namely sound cannot be heard, is falsified by our experience.

5. Anumānaviruddha: when a thesis is one, which is contradicted by the conclusion of some sound inference then it is called anumanaviruddha. For example, 'the pot is eternal.' In this example, a sound inference, which proves that the pot is non-eternal, is available to us.

Dharmakirti's work on paksabhasa is not different from that of Dignaga. In Nyayabindu, Dharmakirti more focusing on hetvabhasa because that is the only type of fallacy which is purely logical. Rest can be included in it. This is why Stcherbatsky did not even consider paksabhasa and Dristantabhasa as a separate logical fallacy from hetvabhasa. Hetvabhasa is the most significant one among all three. If any sort of defect is there in hetu then there is the possibility to happen hetvabhasa. According to Dharmakirti, there are three types of hetvabhasa namely, Asiddha, Anaikantika and viruddha.

Dignaga classified Asiddha into four types only in his Nyayamukh namely, ubhayasidha, anyatarasiddha, sandigdhasiddha and asrayasidha. In ubhayasidha, the probans is unestablished about the minor term both according to the respondent and the opponent[16]. For example, 'sound is non-eternal because it is perceived by the eyes.' In this fallacy, neither the disputant nor the opponent is supposed to accept the given hetu "being perceived by the eyes: in the context of the subject "sound". In anyatarasiddha the probans is unestablished either for the respondent or for the opponent, but not for both.[17] For example, 'sound is non-eternal because it is a product,' for a person while arguing with a philosopher who believes in the eternity of sound. In this example, the opponent is supposed to believe only in the manifestation of sound,

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[16] The concept of logical fallacies, Nanditha Bandyopadhyay, Sanskrit pustak bhandar, p. 193
[17] ibid

but not in its creation or production. Therefore, he 'because it is a product' cannot consider the hetu, as existent in the subject. Therefore, it is known as anyatara-asiddha hetvābhāsa[18]. In sandigdhasiddha the term that is posed as the probans is itself doubtful. When the existence of the hetu in locus is itself doubted then the inference cannot be go forward. suppose somebody looking at a smoke from a distant hill and inferred that there is fire. But his partner asks him, ' How can you be so sure it is smoke? It can be something else like vapour. So here the existence of hetu in locus itself is doubted. Asrayasiddha is when the minor term itself is questioned when the respondent thinks it is all correct. for example, if the respondent says to a Carvaka or Buddhist that 'ether is a substance'. Then they will challenge the minor term itself and the direction of the debate will be then turned into another direction.

When it comes to Dharmakirti he classifies asiddha hetu into six types very systematically. For Dharmakirti, asiddha hetvābhāsa arises when hetu does not satisfy the condition of pakṣa-sattva[19]. The six are; ubhayasidha, prativadi asiddha, vaadi asiddha, sandeh asiddha, asrayasiddha and sarvāgat asiddha. The first one is when both the participants in an argument do not accept the existence of the hetu in the paksa then it is called ubhayasidha. Dharmakirti provides the

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[18] Dignaga and Dharmakirti on fallacies of inference, Bhima Kumar Kukkumalla, ICPR Journal
[19] Dharmakīrti's, Nyāyabindu, (with Dharmottara's ṭīkā) Shastri; Acharya, Chandrasekhara, (ed.); Chowkhamba (The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 22), Banaras, 1954, p. 22.

following example of an inference that exhibits the error of a logical reason that both parties in the discussion believe does not exist in the locus:

Sound is non-eternal

Because It is visible. (STCHERBATSKY, 1962)

The second type is called prativadi asiddha. It is happening when the opponent considers hetu to be false of the locus. For example;

Trees are animate beings

Because they die when the entire bark is taken off.

The opponent may consider death as an extinction of sensations, sense-organs and life. So such a kind of death does not occur in trees. Vaadi asiddha explains Dharmakirti by using an example of a Samkhya philosopher who tries to prove that pleasure, pain etc are unconscious. But for him itself pleasure is not said to have an origin or not to be eternal. So this type of asiddha happens when the vaadi itself is contradicting his inference by his beliefs. Sandeh asiddha happens when the hetu is itself under doubt. In Nyayabindu Dharmakirti says that "if the reason itself is subject to doubt or its localization uncertain, it is unreal as a reason". For example, if something is considered to represent vapour (not smoke) and it is taken as proof of the presence of fire, it will be unreal because of uncertainty. (STCHERBATSKY, 1962). Asraya asiddha occurs when the locus itself is under doubt. And finally, sarvagat asiddha happens when the paksa itself is unreal or non-existent.

Another type of hetvabhasa is called anaikantika asiddha. The anaikantika hetu happens when the second and third characteristics of hetu are violated. If the

absence of hetu in dissimilar cases is under doubt or its presence in similar cases is under doubt then the hetu will lose its exclusivity. Therefore, it then becomes fallacious. This type of non-exclusive hetu fallacy is called anaikantika hetvabhasa. This non-exclusivity of hetu happens because of its presence and absence in sapaksa and in vipaksa become under doubt. There are mainly in four ways this kind of fallacy can occur. Firstly this anaikantika of hetu can come from its disconfirmed absence in vipaksa. Dharmakirti says for example in an inference where hetu is present in similar cases but also in dissimilar cases. He gives four examples in Nyayabindu for this type of anaikantika hetu.

1. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is knowable like a jar and the sky

2. Sound is not a product of effort

Because it is non-eternal like lightning, the sky and a jar

3. Sound is a product of effort

Because it is non-eternal like a jar, lightening and the sky

4. Sound is eternal

Because it is formless like the sky, an atom, an action and a jar (Prasad)

In the first example, hetu is present in similar cases but also in dissimilar cases. But in the second one hetu is absent in similar cases but present in dissimilar cases. In the third example, we can see that hetu is present in similar cases but is not absent in all dissimilar cases. In the last example, hetu is absent in both similar and dissimilar cases. In all these four examples the absence of hetu in

dissimilar cases is disconfirmed. Therefore these all are called anaikantika hetvabhasa.

The second type of anaikantika happens when the non-exclusiveness of the reason is coming from the doubtful absence in any vipaksa. The difference between this type and the previous one is that in doubtful non-exclusive hetu, we don't know whether hetu is present or not. But disconfirmed nonexclusive hetu we know whether it is present or absent. The third type of non-exclusiveness of the reason is coming from the disconfirmation of one and doubtfulness of the other, of its two features, presence only in similar and absence in all dissimilar (Prasad). When the disconfirmation of the hetu in its presence of all sapaksas and its doubtfulness of the hetu in its absence in all vipaksa then this form of anaikantika occurs. The last kind of anaikantika occurs when the hetu is coming from the doubtfulness of its presence in sapaksa and of its absence in the vipaksa. A hetu will be definitely anaikantika when the second and the third feature of hetu, that is its presence in sapaksa and necessarily absence in vipaksa is under doubt.

The next type of hetvabhasa is viruddha. A hetu is by statement is a premise for proving the conclusion. The conclusion asserts the presence of the Sadhya in the paksa (Prasad). When the hetu instead of proving a conclusion disproves it then the viruddha fallacy occurs. Dharmakirti explains this by giving two similar examples.

Sound is eternal

Because it is an effect.

In this example, the sound is the paksa. Its similar instances should be other eternal things and also its dissimilar instances will be other than eternal. The rule says that hetu should present in similar cases and should be absent in dissimilar cases. Here being an effect hetu is not an eternal thing. So it broke the basic law and became contradictory to the conclusion. The second example that Dharmakirti gives is not different from the first case.

Sound is eternal

Because it is produced after someone's effort

Here being produced itself proved that sound cannot be eternal. So instead of proving the conclusion hetu disproved it.

Another important Sadhanabhasa provided by Dharmakirti is about instances or Dristanta. Dharmakirti divides Dristantabhasa into two broad categories namely, fallacies occurs in respect of homogeneous feature and fallacies occurs in respect of heterogenous feature. The first kind is called sadharmyeṇa dṛṣtantadoṣaḥ and the second one is called vaidharmyeṅa dṛṣtantadoṣaḥ.in Nyayabindu Dharmakirti gives an elaborative discussion about it.

Sadharmyena dristantadosah	Vaidharmyena drstantadosah
Sādhya-vikalaḥ	Sādhya vyatireka
Sādhana-vikalaḥ	Sādhana vyatireka

Ubhaya-vikalaḥ	Ubhaya vyatireka
Sandigdha-sādhya-dharma	Sandigdha-sādhana-vyatirekaḥ
Sandigdha-sādhana-dharma	Sandigdha-sādhya-vyatirekaḥ
Sandigdhobhava-dharma	Sandigdhobhaya-vyatireka
Ananvayaḥ	Avyatireka
Aparadarśitānvayaḥ	Aparadarśita-vyatireka
Viparītānvayaḥ	Viparītā vyatireka

Sadhya vikalah is when the property of the Sadhya is lacking. In sadhana vikalah the property of the hetu is lacking. Ubhaya vikalah occurs when the property of both Sadhya and hetu is lacking. In the fourth case, sandigdha Sadhya dharma happens when the property of Sadhya is under question. The next one happens when the property of hetu is under question. Sandigdhobhava dharma occurs when the property of both hetu and Sadhya is under question. Ananvayah dristantobhasa occurs when hetu and Sadhya will occur together but there won't be any proof for their invariable concomitance. Aparadarisitanvayah occurs when the invariable concomitance is there but their relation is not shown. Finally, viparitanvayah occurs when the invariable concomitance is stated in reverse order. Sādhyā vyatireka occurs when there is no negative concomitance

with the Sadhya. Sādhana vyatireka happens when there is no negative concomitance with the hetu. The third one happens when there is no negative concomitance with either hetu or Sadhya. When the negative concomitance of Sadhya is questionable Sandigdha-sādhana-vyatirekaḥ happens and if it is of hetu is questionable Sandigdha-sādhya-vyatirekaḥ occurs. When the negative concomitance of Sadhya and hetu both are questionable then the next type will occurs. Avyatireka dristantabhasa happens when the negative concomitance of hetu and Sadhya is not established but if it is not exhibited then Aparadarśita-vyatireka occurs. The last type called Viparītā vyatireka dristantabhasa happens when the contrary of the negative concomitance between hetu and Sadhya is established.

CONCLUSION

In his significant work called *Pramamasamuccaya* Dignaga states that *"pratyaksam anumanam ca pramane"* [20]

which says that the means of cognition are of two only namely, *pratyaksa (perception) and anumana (inference).* The number and kinds of means of cognition recognized by schools of Indian philosophy are different and always under gone to discussions and debates. some have only one means of cognition (Carvaka: perception), but some have more than three (Naiẏayikas: perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison).

In Dignaga's system *sabda* and upamana are not independent means of cognition. According to him, the cognition derived from *sabda* indicates its object through the "exclusion of other objects"[21]. This process of excluding other objects is the function of *anumana*. In Pramanasamuccaya he states that,

"na pramanataram sabdam anumanat tatha hi tat

  Krtakatvadivat svartham anyapohena bhasate"[22]

As considering *upamana*, Dignaga gives the following arguments: if the cognition identifying an object with its name is derived from hearsay, as, for example, from hearing the words "a *gavaya* is similar to a cow", then the process of cognizing is just the same as in the case of *sabda*. If, on the other hand, the identification of the object with its name is made by the cognizant himself, then

[20] Dignaga, on perception, Masaaki Hattori, Harvard University press, 1968, p.76
[21] Ibid, page no.78
[22] Ibid

it must be admitted that he relates two things separately perceived through the operation of the mind. This process of cognizing through the operation of the mind is *anumana*. Hence *upamana* cannot be recognized as an independent means of valid cognition. In this way, Dignaga includes *sabda* and *upamana* in *anumana* and admits *pratyaksa* and *anumana* as the only two means of valid cognition.

When we consider the number of *pramanas*, accepted by the Vaisesikas are in accord with Dignaga. However, there is an inconsistency in the Vaisesika theory of two *pramanas* according to Dignaga. The Vaisesikas claim that determinate perception (savikalpaka-pratyaksa in later terminology), which results from the association of a determinant with an immediate sense-datum, is a kind of pratyaksa. On the other hand, they regard sabda, the apprehension of an object using words, as a kind of anumana. Dignaga bases his theory of two *pramanas* on a radical distinction between two *prameyas*. His consistently logical theory may be clearly distinguished from the Vaisesika theory.

In this chapter, we mainly focus on his theory of perception. Dignaga gives the etymological explanation of *pratyaksa* in Nyayamukh as follows:

"aksam aksam praiti vartata iti pratyaksam"[23]

Dignaga bases his etymological explanation upon the Abhidharmic doctrine that perception, athough caused by sense and object, is named after the sense, which is its specific cause but not after the object. in Nyayapravesa he states that

"pratyaksam kalpanapodham"[24]

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[23] Ibid, page no.77
[24] Ibid, page no.82

This is the main definition of perception put forward by Dignaga. Dignaga is not the first to describe *pratyaksa* as free from *Kalpana*. But he is the first one who provides a logical basis for this definition by sharply distinguishing *sva-laksana* from *samanya-laksana*. According to the Vaisesikas and the Naiyayikas, every existing thing, with the exception of the extreme universal (para-samanya) and the extreme individual (antya-visesa), possesses both generality (jati=samanya) and individuality (vyakti). In perceiving a thing, one perceives it, at the first moment, vaguely, without differentiating jati and vyakti (nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa), but later on, determinately, conjoining differentiated jati and vyakti (savikalpaka-pratyaksa), Dignaga does not assent to this view. He makes an essential distinction between sva-laksana and samanya-laksana, the former being the particular individuality that can never be generalized or conceptualized and the latter being universal which is conceptually constructed by the mind through generalizing from many individuals without regard for their particularity. The former is real, while the latter lacks reality. As each is incompatible with the other, there cannot be anything that possesses both sva-laksana and samanya-laksana at the same time. Corresponding to this essential distinction between two kinds of prameya, there is a radical distinction between the two means of cognition (pramanavyavastha): pratyaksa which grasps sva-laksana exclusively and anumana which grasps samanya-laksana exclusively. This theory is evidently set up in opposition to the Nyaya view of the coalescence of different means of cognition (pramanasamplava), i.e., the view that the same object can be cognized by any of the four kinds of pramana.

The characteristic feature of *Kalpana* is important here. According to Dignaga, a thing, which in itself is essentially inexpressible, comes to be expressed by a

word only when it is associated with a name (naman) and other factors. Conceptual construction (kalpana) means nothing other than this process of associating a name, etc., with a thing. Dignaga classifies the factors to be associated with a thing for the sake of verbal designation into five categories: naman, jati, guna, kriya, and dravya, which respectively function in producing yadrccha-sabda, jati-s., guna-s, kriya-s., and dravya-s[25].

In the following lines of Nyayapravesa, Dignaga states that "*anye tv artha sunyaih sabdair eva visisto rtha ucyate*". Here Dignaga has the intention to make clear his point. The Naiyayikas and other realists are of the opinion that genus, quality, etc., are considered to be the factors of verbal designation, are *padarthas* or real entities. But, according to Dignaga they are simply conceptual constructions denoting no real entities : what is denoted by the genus word "cow" is not any real entity "cowness", but really the "exclusion of non cows". So hereby he cleared that perception is that which is devoid of conceptual construction (*yatraisa Kalpana nasti tat pratyaksam*).

3.1 Types of *Pratyaksa*

All Buddhist thinkers of the Vijnanavada tradition from Vasubandhu onward are unanimous in insisting that pratyaksa is *nirvikalpaka* and hence *kalpanapodha*. Thus, the varient character of every perceptual cognition is to be allowed from all conceptual constructions. In this respect, they are all alike, and they are not to be differentiated under different heads. However, as Dignaga points out, they can be classified if such a differentiation is asked for. Though

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[25] Ibid, page no.83

we have a lumpy classification of different types of pratyaksa in the *Pramana Samuccaya*, a precise and clear classification is available only in Dharmakirti's works. Perhaps, Dignaga is more worried about giving a clear-cut definition of perception rather than about the different types of perception. For him, a classification of perception is logically not significant. Dignaga refers to it, but Dharmakirti feels a need to expound the Buddhist position on the classification of perception in clear-cut terms.

Having stated that all perceptual cognitions are alike so far as they are free from *kalpana*, Dignaga points out that they can be classified into indriyapratyaksa (sense perception), manasapratyaksa (mental perception), svasamvedana pratyaksa (self-cognition), and yogi pratyaksa (mystic perception) (Bhatt, 1939).

3.1.1. *Indriya pratyakya.* So far as the *indriya pratyaksa* is concerned, it is in the form of sensations caused by an external object. Since there are five kinds of cognitive senses, we can talk of five types of *indriya pratyaksa.*

3.1.2. *Manasa pratyaksa.* Besides *indriya pratyaksa* there is also *manasa pratyaksa*, which consists of the awareness of *indriya pratyaksa.*

3.1.3. *Svasamvedana pratyaksa.* The third type of *pratyaksa* is the immediate experience of both *indriya pratyaksa* and *manasa pratyaksa.* The concept of *svasamvedana* has been one of the most significant contributions of Dignaga, and its implications in the context of *prdmanyavada* have been worked out while discussing *svrupya.* The scope of *svasamvedana* has been enlarged by Dignaga to include the awareness of conceptual constructions also. In his own words, "Even conceptual construction when it is brought to internal awareness is to be

regarded as a type of *pratyaksa (kalpandpi svasamvittavistd)*. It is interesting to note here that, according to Dignaga, each cognition has a twofold appearance: the appearance of an object (*arthabhasa*) and that of itself (*svabhdsa*). As such, cognition cognizes itself while cognizing an object. The cognizing of an object through *kalpana* is *anumana*, not *pratyaksa*. But whether it is anumana or pratyaksa, the essential nature of cognition is the same; that is, it is self-cognized (sva-prakas'aka).

3.1.4. Yogi pratyaksa : Besides the previous three, the fourth type of pratyaksa accepted by Dignaga is yogi pratyaksa. The intuitions apprehended by a yogi are also nonconceptual and hence are to be placed under pratyaksa. Here Dignaga draws a distinction between yogi jnana and agama jnana. The cognition derived from the agama (scripture) is Kalpana, but the yogi jnana is not so.

3.2 Dharmakirti's types of perception

When we come to Dharmakirti, we find that the problem of types of pratyaksa seems to have been crystallized. Both in the Nyaya Bindu and in the Pramana Vartika we have clear statements that pratyaksa is of four types, namely, *indriya* pratyaksa, *manasa* pratyaksa, *svasamvedana* pratyaksa, and yogi pratyaksa.

3.2.1 Indriya pratyaksa. So far as the *indriya* pratyaksa is concerned, it is the most primary and at the same time the most pervasive type of pratyaksa. Such knowledge consists in the presentation of an object to consciousness through the medium of senses. The cognitive senses being five in number, can further be classified under five heads. This fivefold classification is based on the different cognitive senses, which serve as a medium. The cognitive senses are only a

medium, not an agent. Their function consists only in creating a sort of link between the subjective consciousness and the objective reality lying outside. This function is over when the object is presented to consciousness and does not continue thereafter. Since in the Buddhist tradition perception has been defined as nonverbal, a question arises as to whether there can be anything like auditory perception. The question is based on an assumption that an auditory perception that cognizes words cannot be free from word association, and if word association is *kalpana* and not pratyaksa, how can auditory perception be a genuine perception? Moreover, like light and consciousness, a "word" has a dual function of revealing itself and revealing its object. Because of this also an auditory perception must be associated with verbal expression. The answer given by Dharmottara and Santaraksita is that when a word is cognized, it is not the same word that is expressive of some concept. It is cognized only as a sound, which is *svalaksana* and which does not have the previously referred- to double character. Even if no distinction is drawn between a sound and a word, the object of auditory perception is said to be having a twofold character. In auditory perception we are concerned only with its first character, namely, sound, and only in conceptual cognition are we concerned with its second character, namely, meaning.

3.2.2 *Manasa pratyaksa (Mano vijnana)*. The second type of pratyaksa accepted by Dharmakirti is Manasa pratyaksa. It is a pratyaksa that immediately follows the *indriya pratyaksa*. It is, in fact, the element of attention when an *indriya pratyaksa* arises. That is why Dharmakirti in the Nyaya Bindu defines it as a "mental sensation which follows sense perception, which is its immediately preceding homogeneous cause". The *manas pratyaksa* is generated by the

indriya pratyaksa, which acts as its immediately preceding homogeneous cause. If *manasa pratyaksa* is to be regarded as different from, and as an effect of, indriya pratyaksa, then a question arises as to what its object is. Does it grasp the same object that is already grasped by the concerned indriya pratyaksa? If it does, then it will not be a valid cognition because it will no longer be "*ajnatarthaprakdsa*" (awareness of an object not hitherto known). On the other hand, if it grasps what is altogether ungrasped by the concerned indriya pratyaksa, then any *manasa pratyaksa* can be related to any *indriya pratyaksa*, or even the blind would perceive colour. To this, the reply given by Dharmakirti and Dharmottara is that the objects of the two are different, and yet the two perceptions are interconnected insofar as the indriya pratyaksa along with its object gives rise to the manasa pratyaksa and its corresponding object at the immediately succeeding moment.

The need for the acceptance of *manasa pratyaksa* over and above *indriya pratyaksa* can be questioned, and justification of its acceptance can be asked for. To this Dharmottara replies that it is a necessary postulate of the system, and no proof need be adduced for its postulation. Stcherbatsky, however, gives some justification, which is not very unconvincing. He opines that after having made a radical distinction between the role of indriya and *Kalpana*, Buddhist thinkers are in need of some connecting link between the two insofar as pratyaksa has to lead to Kalpana. This connecting link is established by postulating manasa pratyaksa. There is some basis in Dharmottara for the suggestion given by Stcherbatsky. Dharmottara argues that manasa pratyaksa has to be postulated as a link between indriya pratyaksa and kalpana because indriya pratyaksa, being momentary, cannot directly give rise to conceptualization unless and until it is

first attended to in consciousness, and if manasa pratyaksa is not accepted, not only will there be a difficulty in accounting for a transition from indriya. pratyaksa to Kalpana, but there will also be a flaw of indriya pratyaksa being invalid because it will then not have generative efficiency (*arthakriyakaritva*). The *manasa pratyaksa*, which is sensory on one side and mental on die other, has die psychological necessity in order to link two heterogeneous types of knowledge, namely, perception and conception. In fact, the acceptance of manasa pratyaksa in the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition can be traced back to the *Abhidhamma* literature, where we have a clear acceptance of manovijnana and manovijnana dhatu in the list of seventy-five categories into which the whole sphere of knowledge and reality is reduced. In the Nyaya Bindu Tika Tippani, it is stated that the conception of *manovijnana* as a type of pratyaksa was a necessary deduction from the import of a scriptural text that declares, "Colour is cognised, O monks, by twofold cognition, the sense perception and the mental perception induced by it." Another question may demand our attention concerning the temporal location of indriya pratyaksa and manasa pratyaksa. It can be asked whether some other indriya pratyaksa can operate even at the time when we are having manasa pratyaksa in the second moment. Both Dharmakirti and Dharmottara reply to this view in the negative. They are of the opinion that if the sense organ were to operate even at a time when we are having manasa pratyaksa, there would be no indriya pratyaksa at all. This point has been further explained and elaborated in the Tippani like this: "If we assume that in the second moment, the outer sense-organ is engaged just as it is engaged in the first moment, then its function will also be the same, i.e., it will make the object present in our ken. Why indeed should then sense-perception not arise in

the second moment also; why should not both moments receive the same name of sense-perception?" Durveka's explanation of Dharmottara's statement is as follows: "The first moment of the cognition series is regarded as dependent upon the sense organ because it is invariably concomitant with the presence and absence of the sense organ. If even mental perception were to have invariable concomitance with the presence and absence of the sense organ, this could not be given as a reason to establish a cognition as sense perception, that is, it cannot be called as sense perception on the ground that it depends on the sense organ. So, even the first moment could not be established as sense perception on the ground that it has invariable concomitance with the presence and absence of the sense organ." It is significant here to point out that the concept of *Manasa pratyaksa* advocated by Dignaga and Dharmakirti is altogether different from the concept of Manasa pratyaksa advocated by Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers. In the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy, *Manasa pratyaksa* stands for the perception of the qualities of the self, but in the Buddhist tradition, it stands for the mental perception caused by the preceding sense perception. Though the object of *Manasa pratyaksa* in the Buddhist tradition is an internal one, nevertheless, it is caused jointly by the external object and its sensory perception. Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers regard the mind as an *antarendriya* (internal sense), but for Buddhists of the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition mind is not an *indriya;* the mind here stands for the consciousness (*citta)* or, strictly speaking, a specific moment of consciousness.

3.2.3 Svasamvedana. The third type of *pratyaksa* distinguished by Dharmakirti is *svasamvedana* or *atmasamvedana.* He defines it as "*Sarvam cittacaittanam atmasaihvedanam*"; that is, all consciousness, cognition (c*itta*), and mental

states (*caitta*) are self-cognizing. Like Dignaga, Dharmakirti insists that the differential character of consciousness as opposed to matter is its self-awareness. The matter is always to be known through consciousness, but consciousness can be known by itself only. This theory is known as *svayamprakasavada*, the self-luminosity theory of consciousness, which is a distinct contribution of Dignaga to epistemology. The doctrine that every consciousness is also self-consciousness has been a fundamental tenet of the Dignaga-Dharmakirti tradition. Every cognition of the object-external or internal is at the same time a cognition of that cognition. Thus, cognition can also be understood as an awareness of awareness. To explain the theory of *svayam-prakasava* of consciousness, the analogy of a lamp is often put forth. As a lamp illumines the objects in its surrounding and its own self at the same time, not being dependent on any extraneous factor for its own illumination, just so is consciousness self-luminous. Commenting on Dharmakirti's definition of *svasamvedana*, Dharmottara writes, "There is no mental phenomenon whatsoever which would be unconscious of its own existence." Further, he writes that such self-awareness is not a construction nor an illusion, and hence it is a type of *pratyaksa*.

Dharmakirti proves the self-luminosity of consciousness as follows. First, he points out that pleasure, pain, and so on are mental states, but they are of the nature of consciousness and they cannot be cognized by other cognitions. From this, it naturally follows that all cognitions and mental states are self-cognized. Dharmottara explains this point with the help of the following example. When a patch of colour is apprehended, we at the same time feel something internally in the shape of some emotions. It is not possible to maintain that a patch of

colour is felt as being itself the pleasure it affords us, because we do not say, "This patch of blue colour has itself the form of pleasure." We do not regard blue and pleasure as identical, nor do we feel them as the same. Therefore, we really are experiencing pleasure as something quite different from the object blue, as something that is not equivalent to blue, and this is no doubt knowledge. Therefore, we do experience our own knowledge. Self-consciousness is essentially a case of knowledge; it makes present to us our own self.

The self-luminosity of consciousness does not in any way mean the bifurcation of consciousness into a subject and an object, which would be absurd. Consciousness and self-consciousness are, therefore, interchangeable terms. In Buddhist writings, the word "Citta" stands for consciousness in general, but the word "caitta" stands for feelings and so on, which are classed apart from cognition on the ground that feelings do not contain "intentionality', insofar as they are purely inward in reference. Barring this difference, they are all conscious states, How one and the same cognition can be both the subject as well as the object has been answered by Dharmakirti by saying that the cognition directly experiences the form of the external object reflected in it and not the external object itself; so only metaphorically is it said that cognition grasps the external object, which, in fact, simply causes the reflection.

3.2.4 Yogi jnana: Besides these preceding three types of perception Dharmakirti, following Dignaga, accepts yogi jnana as the fourth kind of perception. Dharmakirti defines yogi jnana as an intuition of a mystic that is produced from the sub-culmination state of deep meditation on transcendental reality. Buddhists, like other mystics, believe in the fact of intuitive realizations, which are available to some gifted persons like saints. In fact, the acceptance of

yogi pratyaksa is a necessary prerequisite for the acceptance of the sarvajnata (omniscience) of the Buddha. The Buddhistic way of noble life consists of three broad stages, namely, prajna, sila, and samadhi. The experiences acquired in the state of samadhi are perceptual ones because they are vivid, presentational, and direct. Knowledge of the four Noble Truths and so on is an example of such a type of pratyaksa. It is a non-erroneous and nonconceptual contemplation of the real.

In order to explain the phrase "*bhutarthabhavana prakarsaparyantajam*," Dharmakirti describes the three stages of contemplation as follows. First, he states that yogi pratyaksa is generated by deep contemplation, and it is vivid and free from conceptual construction; afterwards, he explains each of these qualifying terms in anticipation of the possible objections that might be urged against them. It might be asked how the cognition generated by contemplation can be vivid. Dharmakirti proves this point by drawing our attention to the fact that the persons possessed of fear, sorrow, and passion vividly see nonexistent things as real because of the repeated thought of those things. Again, someone might ask, "It is conceded that the cognition generated by contemplation is vivid, but how can one accept it to be free from conception?" Dharmakirti answers that the cognition in question has, indeed, vividness, and just for this reason it ceases to be a conceptual construction. Conceptual constructions are never vivid. Dharmakirti again observes that all cognitions born of a deep contemplation on either reality or unreality are vivid and nonconceptual; but the cognition born of a contemplation on reality is valid, while the cognition born of a contemplation on unreality is invalid because the former alone is in harmony with successful activity or is efficient to lead to the attainment of the

object pointed out by it. This, in short, is how the cognition born of deep contemplation on reality is vivid, nonconceptual, and efficient to generate the purposive action, and hence it is a case of perception.

Buddhist logicians identify two sources of knowledge: perception (*pratyaksa*) and inference (*anumāna*). Perception is said to be an immediate contact with particulars without any mediation of conception (which is considered to involve universals). There are two standard examples used to illustrate inference. In one standard example, when we are aware that there is smoke on a mountain, we may infer that there is fire on that mountain. When we become aware of the presence of fi re on the mountain in this way, that awareness is said to be warranted by inference, and, thus, it counts as knowledge. In another example, we may become aware of the presence of a tree by inferring from our awareness that there is rosewood (*simsapā*). Such awareness of the presence of a tree that is brought about by inferential cognition is said to be warranted and, thus, it is ascribed the status of knowledge. Dignāga explains that the purpose of his texts – the foundational texts for the Buddhist epistemological and logical tradition – is to refute his opponents' views on the instruments of knowledge as well as to establish his own view as correct. Once inference is shown to be an instrument of knowledge, it is also shown to serve as an instrument for producing a cognition that can be ascribed the status of knowledge. Hence, inference can be thought to result not only in awareness that inference is an instrument of knowledge, but also in awareness of the truths of Buddhist thought. Buddhist logicians recognize two contexts in which inference can be used as an instrument of knowledge. On the one hand, it can be used as an instrument for becoming aware of soteriological truths, such as the Four Noble Truths, by

themselves. This is called "inference for oneself " (*svārthānumāna*). On the other hand, inference can be used as an instrument in dialectical engagements with opponents. In this context, itserves as a tool for showing that the opponents' views are mistaken and to demonstrate that Buddhists' own views are correct in dialectic practice. This is called "inference for others" (*parārthānumāna*). Thus, inference has a function directed at oneself and a function directed at others.

When we go through the work which I have done one can understand that Dharmakirti actually developed what Dignaga said. The notion of perception and inference both got different level through Dharmakirti's work. One important thing which we need to critically understand is the notion of yogic perception and the importance of reason in Dharmakirti's work.

I explained inference before perception is because of the critical nature of yogic perception. Yogic perception as Dharmakirti says have three stages. Intensity, termination and yogic intuition. Actually the later interpretators says that Dignaga and Dharmakirti introduced this concept itself is because of two reasons. First and most importantly to prove the omniscience of Buddha and secondly to fill the gap between or to answer what is there after sense cognition for a liberated soul. After all Buddhist tradition focus on the four noble truths and Pratityasamudpada for the liberation or nirvana of individual soul.

In my opinion yogic perception was actually an unwanted notion provided by both Dignaga and Dharmakirti. It seems to impossible to have such a perception. Also how someone can validate such a perception. When by basic definition perception is not conceptual then how yogic perception is even possible? Some

answers are it is not conceptual but about real thing. My question to those who says that is if someone have something in his or her mind without perceiving before what else we will call it other than conceptual? These are very important criticisms facing by yogic perception.

My another point was the importance of reason in all other things except direct sense perception. In order to happen manasa pratyaksa and other types of pratyaksa we need reason. But this reason may be something which is without inference interestingly. The reasoning nature is so important in order to gain immediate and mediate knowledge.

So I would like to conclude by saying that there are more scope to analyse the notion of yogic perception in detail from my point of view. Dharmakirti's work were interesting and there are many studies are going on this field both west and east.

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