

THE THREAT OF INSURGENCY TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA: NIGERIA IN PERSPECTIVE

**Dissertation submitted to Goa University in Partial Fulfilment of the Degree of
Master of Arts in International Studies**



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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that, the Master's thesis entitled "**THE THREAT OF INSURGENCY TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA: NIGERIA IN PERSPECTIVE**" submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the degree in Master of Arts in International Studies of Goa University, is my own original research work.

The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree, either of this or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “**THE THREAT OF INSURGENCY TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA: NIGERIA IN PERSPECTIVE**”, undertaken by the candidate Mr. Oyedele Kayode John, is a record of original work carried out in partial requirement of Master’s degree completion in International Studies from Goa University in the year 2021-2022, and that, it has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree elsewhere.

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GLOSSARY

SALWS	Small Arms and Light Weapons
NPF	Nigeria Police Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communication
SARS	Special Anti-Robbery Squad
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
AG	Action Group
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNJFT	Multinational Joint Task Force
PSC	Peace and Security Council
ISWAP	The Islamic States West African Province
APF	African Peace Facility
VGN	Vigilante Group of Nigeria
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps
WNSN	Western Nigeria Security Network
CCL	Center for Coordination and Liaison
NPC	The Northern People's Congress
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
OPC	Oodua's People Congress
NSO	Nigeria Security Organization
SSS	State Security Service
NCNC	The National Council of Nigerian Citizens
SCIID	State Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
UN-OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GNNT	Gendarmes, Army, Customs and the National and Nomadic Guard
EIRU	External Intelligence Response Unit
LCBR	Lake Chad Basin Region

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The major focus of this research is to examine the threat of insurgency to peace and security in West Africa, with reference to one of the countries in the region which is Nigeria. The term insurgency can be defined as a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgency has been divided into five categories¹ namely:

- *Revolutionary* insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely different system, often entailing transformation of the economic and social structures.
- *Reformist* insurgencies do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead, seek to compel the government to alter its policies or undertake political, economic, or social reforms.
- *Separatist* insurgencies seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the region in question spans existing national boundaries.
- *Resistance* insurgencies seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a given territory.
- *Commercialist* insurgencies are motivated by the acquisition of wealth or material resources; political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to the wealth.

For this dissertation, insurgency can be seen as those violent conflicts perpetrated by groups against the government whose intentions could sometimes be to oust the sitting government, divide the country or foster unrest for political gains. And most often, these violent conflicts have transnational implication and influence. For the purpose of this research, this definition will be relevant. Some of the violent conflicts in Nigeria falls within the category of either separatist, commercialist, revolutionary or reformist insurgencies.

Nigeria boasts of the largest economy in Africa, graciously blessed with numerous natural resources but efforts from different government towards revamping the economy and ensuring political stability have been thwarted by various factors such as the pervasiveness of insurgency, intra-state conflicts and transnational crime. The cumulative effects of these have continued to pose a colossal threat to global peace and security. Furthermore, insurgency of different kinds in

¹ Central Intelligence Agency – CIA, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713599>. 2012. Accessed January 27, 2022.

Nigeria is on the increase, which is gradually spreading to other regions in the country. These multifaceted challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, and they have been unable to adequately establish a comprehensive strategy to avoid and combat it.

This research topic is very crucial at the time when the spate of violent conflict is on the increase within West Africa. This will also help to shed more light on the various dimensions of violent insurgent in the country with a view to providing some recommendations. Furthermore, this study aims to bring to bear the impact of insurgency on Nigerians who have been either displaced or their livelihood has been in jeopardy. Nigeria's peace and security has been under attack following the rise of insurgency, this research will look at the implication of this considering the country's location in West Africa.

Research Objectives

In order to give a clear direction to the research process and to carefully examine the broad objective of this dissertation which is the role of insurgency to peace and security in West Africa, Nigeria in perspective, the following are the specific objectives:

- To explicate the nature and character of low intensity intra-state conflicts punctuating the politico-social landscape of Nigeria and West Africa.
- To examine the multifaceted impact of insurgent induced violence on political institutions, socio-economic milieu and security calculus of Nigeria.
- To ascertain the regressive role of externally stoked and internally induced insurgent violence in shaping the terrain and configuration of Human Security, across Nigeria and West Africa.

The above research objectives will specifically delineate the various dimensions of insurgent activities, examine the impact of these on political institutions, socio-economic influence and the security calculus and finally, it will investigate the significant effect of insurgent violence on human security within Nigeria.

Research Questions

Additionally, there are certain questions that this research will attempt to answer. These questions are germane to the understanding of the research scope of topic. Based on the research topic, the following are the research questions:

- What are the various dimensions of insurgent activities ravaging the politico-social landscape of Nigeria and West Africa?

- How does this insurgent induced violence impact the political institutions, socio-economic milieu and security calculus of Nigeria and West Africa?
- To what extent does the numerous insurgent violent activities pose a serious threat for both human security and development in Nigeria and West Africa?

Research Hypotheses

For a comprehensive understanding of the role of insurgency to peace and security in Nigeria, certain research hypotheses have been identified which in the course of the research dissertation will be proved or disapproved. Therefore, the research hypotheses for this research topic includes the following:

- Atavistic insurgent violence constitutes an existential danger to the security calculus and development trajectory in Nigeria and broader West Africa.
- Weak institutional structures and endemic venality exacerbates the threats to beneficent socio-economic governance in Nigeria and West Africa.
- Subversive external interferences, are invariably at the heart of propping up Non-State Actors, perpetrating asymmetric virulence and exercising contraband de facto authority at a sub-national level, within Nigeria and around West Africa.

Research Methodology

Due to the nature of this research, the qualitative research approach will be employed. Through the lens of historical and analytical approach to research, this dissertation topic relies on data from journals, eBooks, literature reviews, Newspaper reports. These sources will provide an in-depth understanding of the research topic, serve as reference material to aid answering the research questions and finally, will provide the basis to draw conclusions and recommendations.

Chapterisation

This research has been divided into six (6) chapters. The first chapter of this dissertation will cover an in-depth understanding of the Nigeria while the later part will briefly introduce the traditional and non-traditional security. The second chapter will directly focus on insurgency and the Nigerian state with reference to various institutions. It will also access the interplay between insurgency violence and sectarianism. The third chapter will emphasize on the impact insurgency on political economy of the country with reference to its effect on foreign direct investment, food insecurity and inflation, and disruption of economic activities. While the fourth chapter will examine the impact of insurgency on human with regards to various humanitarian crisis such as

Internal Displaced Persons and Refugee crisis. Due to the geographical location of Nigeria, the fifth chapter will examine the role on regional actors in the on-going discourse of insurgent violence. The final chapter will basically cover the summary and conclusion based on the findings from the various literature, and it will also make some recommendations based on the findings from this dissertation.

NIGERIA IN PERSPECTIVE

Location

Nigeria is located in West Africa, sharing a border with Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Geographically, Nigeria is situated between the Sahel to the North, and the Gulf of Guinea to the South in the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, Nigeria shares maritime borders with Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, and São Tomé and Príncipe. The map² below gives a description of Nigeria's location within the continent:

Because of its geographical proximity to the Sahel Region and the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria has continued to be subjected to pressures from these two regions. The Sahel region for instance, which is made up of ten (10) countries




with a population close to 135 million inhabitants, encounters serious security threats along with other challenges that includes poverty, hunger, health and environment issues, poor education, corruption, weak governance as well as water scarcity. To a large extent, all these factors have greatly contributed to the worsening security situation, which could consequently fuel conflict and violent extremism in the region. The Sahel is emerging as an area of rising extremism infested with violent terrorist groups and jihadists moving from Iraq and Syria. As a result, countries like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have undergone deadly terror attacks, killing many civilians and

² Kirk-Greene, et. al., *Nigeria. Encyclopedia Britannica*, December 8, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria> Accessed 28 January 2022.

soldiers.³ The recent military coup in Mali and Burkina quickly comes to mind. In the 2020, there was a coup in Mali which led to their suspension by ECOWAS and the Africa Union. Mali has been in chaos since mutinous soldiers overthrew the government in a 2012 rebellion. Similarly, Burkina Faso has a long legacy of military intervention. Since 2014, when longstanding President Blaise Compaore was deposed, Burkina Faso has seen episodes of unrest and armed violence. In 2022, Burkina Faso also report another military coup in the country following the discontent among security forces over ousted President Roch Kaboré alleged failure to adequately support them against militants linked to both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group.

The peripheries of the Sahel are often depicted as ungoverned space, a geographical area characterized by an absence of state control and state sovereignty: a lawless zone, a no-man’s land. The implication is that as state capacity has eroded and collapsed, so large parts of the Sahel have turned into an ‘ungoverned space’ at the mercy of a coalition of forces of transnational crime and global jihad. Between 2015 to 2020, the number of violent attacks increased eight-fold in the Central Sahel and tripled in the Lake Chad basin. Insecurity is expanding to and worsening in the cross-border area between Burkina Faso and Benin, North West Nigeria and Maradi, in Niger.⁴

This crisis within the Sahel region risks further spreading, with non-state armed groups expanding operations, and sporadic incidents already hitting new areas, and Nigeria is also experiencing the spillover effect coupled with the internal problems currently ravaging the country. The figure below attests to the insecurity trends of the Sahel Region between February 2015 to February 2021:



Insecurity trends of the Sahel Region. Source: ACLED.

³ Ndiaye, N. F., Counterterrorism: The G5 Response Efforts to Combat Terrorism in the Sahel Region, 2020.

⁴ Bøås, M., The Sahel crisis and the need for international support. Nordiska Afrika institutet, 2019.

The graph focus on Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, parts of Cameroon (Far North region), Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states) and Senegal. Security incidents include battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians and strategic developments (looting/property destruction). In summary, within the space of seventeen (17) months, four countries namely, Mali, Chad, Guinea and Burkina Faso, all within the Sahel Region has witnessed four coups.

The map⁵ below clearly shows the Sahel Region and how Nigeria is connected to this region:

Nigeria's official relationships with Benin and Niger have been cordial. But her relationships with Chad and Cameroon have not. These poor relationships, the nature of Nigeria's land borders and the fact that these borders are poorly policed have created a favourable environment for cross-border




criminal activities and threats to Nigeria's security. The relatively poor economies of Benin and Niger and of Nigeria's other West and Central African neighbours are also of concern for security reasons. Yet its navy is small and inadequately equipped. Therefore, Nigeria is open to criminal activities and threats to its security in these areas⁶.

Furthermore, Nigeria's strategic position along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea poses security threats for the country. The Gulf of Guinea is currently the most important oil-producing region in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is home to the continent's major oil-producing countries. The Gulf is a major transit route for oil tankers on their way to international markets from Africa's richest oil producing countries including Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Ghana, and Equatorial Guinea. It is these oil tankers that have proved to be rich pickings for pirates, though other cargo vessels are also often hijacked. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, along with illegal oil bunkering, is amongst

⁵Political Map of West Africa. Accessed on February 22, 2022 from <https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/west-africa-map.htm>

⁶ National Open University of Nigeria., *Course material on Geography of Nigeria*. Victoria Island, Lagos: NOUN, 2009.

the few economically rewarding occupations available in a region where the unemployment rate hovers around 70 percent. Below is a map of Gulf of Guinea⁷ showing incidents of Piracy in 2012:



Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea usually operate in the high seas in an area which extends off the Ivory Coast in the West toward Nigeria, down towards the Democratic Republic of Congo. The majority of the attacks take place near the Niger Delta which makes it difficult to neutralize the activities of the perpetrators, mainly criminal groups who have established hidden camps in the mangrove forests of the Delta.⁸ Aside from maritime insecurity, the Gulf of Guinea is also a region known for transnational organized crime, border disputes, and people and drug trafficking. These multidimensional challenges have emerged as a result of weak political institutions, violent conflict, climatic and demographic pressure, lack of economic growth, and the misappropriation of natural resource revenues. In summary, Nigeria is surrounded by conflict regions which make it easier for a ripple effect considering the internal political and social crisis in the country. The porous border management and poor maritime security in this region also makes it possible for this threat to spread rapidly.

⁷James, Bridger. *Pirate Horizons in the Gulf of Guinea*, 2013. <https://cimsec.org/pirate-horizons-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/> Accessed 20 February, 2022.

⁸ Ghosh, P. K., *Waiting to Explode: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*. (Observer Research Foundation, 2013), p. 25.

Political Structure

Nigeria is a federal republic with a presidential system. The constitution provides for a separation of powers among the three branches of government namely the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature. Its political structure is similar to that of the United States, with a bicameral legislature comprising a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. It became a multiparty democracy in 1999, after four decades of military rule punctuated by repeated coups and intermittent attempts to establish civilian government. Nigeria's politics have been shaped by efforts to distribute power and state resources equitably in a country that is home to over 250 ethnic groups and has witnessed recurrent conflict along ethno-regional and religious lines. The "federal character" principle, enshrined in the 1999 constitution, requires that appointments to government posts reflect the country's diversity.⁹ By a de facto system known as "zoning," political parties rotate candidates for elected office on an ethno-regional basis. Perceived violations of these arrangements have led to conflict: in 2011, for instance, frustrated expectations that a northerner would retain the presidency contributed to post-election riots in which hundreds died. Elections often serve as flashpoints for violence as political office at all tiers of government yields access to oil earnings and other state resources.¹⁰ The country Nigeria is presently made up of 6 geopolitical zones, 36 states, 774 local government areas and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, having 6 municipal councils.

For a long time, the political environment in Nigeria has featured severe contestations among the country's diverse ethnic groups. This legacy of contestations has created a multi-layered and multi-faceted political structure that is peculiar to Nigeria. In Nigeria, politics is interspersed by ethnicity, making it a collective means to rights and ownership. Nigeria's political landscape has been inundated with military interventions and unhealthy inter-ethnic competition. To a large extent, these incidents have shaped how we can understand the different forms and dynamics of politics in Nigeria today. Nigeria was first declared a republic in 1963, but after a brutal coup d'état three years later, it fell under military administration. In 1967, a separatist movement established the Republic of Biafra, sparking a three-year civil war in Nigeria. Nigeria was re-established as a republic in 1979, following the adoption of a new constitution. The republic, however, was short-

⁹ Leila Demarest, Arnim Langer, and Ukoha Ukiwo, "Nigeria's Federal Character Commission (FFC): a critical appraisal," *Oxford Development Studies*, 2020.

¹⁰ Tomas Husted and Lauren Ploch, *Nigeria: Current issues and US Policy*. (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2020), p.10-15.

lived, as the military retook power in 1983 and ruled for the next ten-year. A new republic was supposed to be founded in 1993, but General Sani Abacha thwarted it. The transition to the Fourth Republic in 1999 served as a turning point in Nigeria's politics. So far, it has been the longest period of democratic governance in Nigeria, and one that has seen Nigeria's political landscape transition from an embryonic state towards maturity.¹¹ The table below shows the different Nigerian Presidents since 1993:

S/N	NAME	PERIOD SERVED
1	General Sani Abacha	1993 – 1998
2	General Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar	1998 – 1999
3	General Olusegun Matthew Obasanjo	1999 – 2007
4	Umaru Musa Yar'adua	2007 – 2010
5	Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan	2010 – 2015
6	Muhammadu Buhari	2015 – Till Date

Table 1: List of Nigeria's President since 1993 till date.

Economy

The Nigerian economy is structured into five main parts: Agriculture, manufacturing, mining, building and construction and general commerce. Specifically, the Nigerian economy can be classified into oil and non-oil sector. The oil sector involves the group of economic activities surrounding petroleum and gas industry. The non-oil sector of the Nigerian economy can generally be described as those groups of economic activities which are outside the petroleum and gas industry or not directly linked to them. These include the telecommunication services; financial sector services; tourism service; trade; Health services; agricultural activities; mineral activities; power; other manufacturing sectors etc. Each of these activities consists of various businesses which engage a large chunk of the population. The dominance of the non-oil sector by agriculture has led to the neglect of the other sub-sectors making up the sector which has the potential to run second to petroleum in terms of revenue earnings and economic sustainability if properly harnessed.¹² Nigeria has an abundance of energy resources. The country has the world's sixth

¹¹ Farida Funmi, *Reading Nigeria's Political History* <https://republic.com.ng/june-july-2019/reading-nigeria-political-history/>, 2019. Accessed January 22, 2022

¹² Agu, J.C., Rejuvenating the Nigerian Economy: the role of the non-Oil Sector. *International Journal of Current Research 4 (11) 2012: pp.355-361.*

largest crude oil reserve. It is the continent's most prolific oil-producing country, which, along with Libya, accounts for two-thirds of Africa's crude oil reserves.

It ranks second to Algeria in natural gas. Most of Africa's bitumen and lignite reserves are found in Nigeria¹³. The table below shows the energy resources¹⁴ in Nigeria, it also compares it with the three of world's largest energy¹⁵ resources reserve:

Nigeria's national income was mostly based on basic commodity exports such as cocoa, palm oil, rubber, cocoa, and groundnut until the discovery of crude oil. Then about 60% of the labour forces earn their livelihood through farming. Then in the 1980's there was a shift from agrarian monoculture to a dependency on petroleum production and export. The oil sector accounted for 22% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The growth of the oil sector led to the development of the industrial sector. The growth of the industrial sector from early 1970s brought about employment of foreign capital in the domestic production of goods so as to increase the level of industrialization, employment, as well as economic growth.¹⁶ Currently, the oil and gas sector accounts for around 10% of Gross Domestic Product, with petroleum export earnings accounting for 86 percent of total export revenue.¹⁷

Resource	Potential	World Reserves
Crude Oil	36.2 billion barrels	1707 (billions of barrels)
Natural Gas	187 trillion cubic feet	6588 (Trillion Cu. Ft.)
Coal and Lignite	2.7 billion tones	948 (billions of short tons)
Large Hydropower	11,250 MW	
Small Hydropower	3,500 MW	
Solar	4.0 kWh/m ² /day to 6.5 kWh/m ² /day	
Tar Sand	31 billion barrels of oil equivalent	

¹³ Oyedepo, S.O. "Energy and sustainable development in Nigeria: the way forward." *Energy, Sustainability and Society* 2 (1), 2012: p. 1-17.

¹⁴ EGEE 102: Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Accessed on February 20, 2022 from <https://www.e-education.psu.edu/egee102/node/1932>

¹⁵ Ibid. 13.

¹⁶ Metu, A., Nwogwugwu, U., & Okeyika, K. Overview of the Structure of the Nigerian Economy, 2019. Available at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341488570>

¹⁷ Nigeria Facts and Figures. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm Accessed January 21, 2022

With a population of over 200 million¹⁸ people, Nigeria is obviously the largest market in sub-Saharan Africa with reasonably skilled and potential manpower for the efficient and effective management of investment projects within the country. It is well connected by a wide network of motorable all-season roads, railway tracks, inland waterways, maritime and air transportation. Nigeria's economy could be aptly described as one of the most promising in the world. It is a mixed economy and accommodates all corners, individuals, corporate organizations and government agencies, to invest in almost all range of economic activities.

Nigeria is well-positioned to become a global economic powerhouse, owing to its vast oil reserves, tremendous potential in agriculture and services, and a young, rapidly increasing population. Yet corruption, infrastructure gaps, insecurity, and a failure to diversify the economy away from petroleum production have constrained economic growth and development. The economy is poised to enter a deep recession in 2020 its second contraction in five years amid a global oil price collapse and disruptions linked to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The International Monetary Fund projects Nigeria's gross domestic product (GDP) to decline by 5.4% in 2020, with severe implications for economic livelihoods and government finances. Nigeria already ranks among the world's least developed countries across a range of indicators: according to some estimates, Nigeria is home to the world's largest population living in extreme poverty.¹⁹ Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, largest economy, and leading oil producer. It plays a major political and economic role in Africa and wields significant influence in regional bodies such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The country's commercial center, Lagos, is among the world's largest cities, with an annual economic output surpassing that of many African countries. By 2050, Nigeria is poised to overtake the United States as the world's third most populous country, with a population projected to exceed 400 million.²⁰

The deterioration in the standards of living, public welfare, social service delivery and infrastructure has been extensive. There are recent macro-economic statistics on economic growth which raise hopes, but the larger impact on development particularly industrialization, production, employment, poverty and social services remain poor. This raises questions about the nature of growth and the level of trickle-down effects on living conditions. For decades of her transitory

¹⁸ Nigeria Population. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NG> Accessed January 26, 2022

¹⁹ Ibid, 10.

²⁰ United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 2019 Revision*, 2019.

governmental arcades (i.e., from the 1st democratic republic of her independence in 1960 to military regime coup d'état inter-switched before the millennium; and till the present 4th democratic republic) the nation has sparingly lacked prospective economic viability and political leadership. Although, excellent policies have been formulated in reviving dwindling economic sectors, but the problem is that only insignificant part of these copious policies are implemented. The policy formulation and implementation are often based on tribe biasness; geo-political zones prioritization that fondles on nepotism by the stakeholders.²¹ This biasness contributes to the rise of violent insurgent because some part of the country feels neglected and they also feel there is no equal representation.

Society

Nigeria is one of the most ethnically diverse countries. Opinions are divided among scholars about the actual number of ethnic groups in the Nigeria state but generally, it is believed that the country has over 250 Ethnic groups with their distinct dialects. Most of these ethnic groups have distinct customs, traditions and languages. The larger and dominant groups include the Yoruba, Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani. The Yoruba people occupy the south western part of Nigeria and they are concentrated in about nine states, The Igbo inhabit the south eastern part of the country and they can be found in about eight states while the Hausa/Fulani is dominant in the northern part of the country and they can be found in about twelve States of the country. These three major ethnic groups have influenced the small ethnic groups within their region to the extent that the smaller ethnic groups have assimilated the culture of the three dominant ethnic groups.²² The two dominant forms of religions in Nigeria include Islam and Christianity. In Nigeria, about 51.1% percent of the population are Muslims, while about 46.9% percent are Christians²³, the other type of religion takes the remaining 2percent

The Hausa/Fulani are predominantly Muslims. Though the groups originated in different parts of West Africa, religion, intermarriage and adoption of the Hausa language by the Fulani

²¹ Lateef Salaudeen., Yauri, Rufai, & Muhammad, Garba., *Nigeria and Its Dwindling Economy: What is the Way Forward?*. Preprint 2020. doi: 10.20944/preprints202008.0151, 2020. Accessed January 23, 2022.

²² Owolabi, A. Ethnic identity, social class and consumption pattern among three major ethnic groups in Nigeria. *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*, 1(5), 2014, pp. 149-159.

²³ *Population data from United Nations*
http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/nigeria#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affiliations_year=2020®ion_name=All%20Countries&restrictions_year=2016 Accessed January 17, 2022.

have unified the groups over time. They have been politically dominant since Nigeria's independence in 1960. Islam is a key component of their ethnic identity and continues to inform their role in modern Nigerian society and politics. Their culture is deeply patriarchal and patrilineal. In recent years, Hausa and Fulani were instrumental in adopting and upholding Sharia, a system of Islamic law. The Igbo on the other hand mainly occupies the Southeastern Nigeria and has represented some of the staunchest opponents of Sharia law. They are predominantly Christians. In many northern Hausa-Fulani-dominated states, minority populations of Igbo claim to have been unfairly targeted by laws that do not pertain to their faith. Under British colonial rule, many Igbo served in government and military roles and were later key players in Nigerian independence. But over the last few decades the group has become less politically dominant. In 1967, an Igbo secessionist movement in Biafra state led to a 30-month war with the Nigerian government, in which hundreds of thousands of Igbo starved to death. After the war, Igbo were reintegrated into Nigerian society, but in a more marginalized role. Despite lingering ethnic tension, they now play an important part in southeastern Nigeria's oil trade. In recent elections, however, they have struggled to coalesce around a single candidate for the presidency. And finally, the Yoruba, over half of them are Christian and about a quarter are Muslim, with the remainder following mostly traditional beliefs. Like the Igbo, Yoruba held important roles in the British colonial government, participating significantly in both political and economic life. Since independence, the group has been overshadowed by the more numerous and dominant Hausa-Fulani. In 1999 a Christian Yoruba named Olusegun Obasanjo became Nigeria's president and first elected head of state. The advent of colonial rule in Nigeria brought the various ethnic groups increasingly into contact with one another. This integrative process was facilitated by the construction of connective infrastructure. This increasing development set in motion a process that led to greater contact and competition among the various ethnic groups for dominance and economic advantage.²⁴ The Nigerian government has developed tentative power-sharing agreements to ensure that the country's diverse ethnic groups have a voice in society. Some States, on the other hand, remain highly separated along ethno-religious lines, and ethnic conflict is prevalent.

²⁴ PBS Newshour. *Ethnicity in Nigeria*. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/arts/africa-jan-june07-ethnic_04-05 2007. Accessed January 20, 2022.

Security challenges

It is important to state that the concept of security within international relations can either be traditional or non-traditional security. The traditional security basically concerns include threats to the state's core ideals of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Weapons, armaments systems, and the military are vital in defining traditional security, but diplomatic mechanisms such as pacts and alliances aimed at establishing special connections between governments for security objectives are also crucial in defining traditional security.²⁵ In traditional security, the greatest danger to a country is from military threats. The non-traditional security is the emphasis for this research. The non-traditional security issues are challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources. They consist of dangers such as terrorism, human rights, global pandemic etc. Similarly, it could also issue such as climate change, resources scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime. These dangers are often transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive political, economic, social responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force.²⁶

Since the advent of democracy in 1999, Nigeria has been plagued by ethno-religious conflicts that have resulted in massive human and material losses. In addition, the religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided a fertile ground for the breeding of the conflicts of different kinds. This security challenges have been aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics and politics of anxiety (and the associated desperation of politicians for political power), and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or only feebly condemned it. These internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around the globe make a highly volatile Nigerian society prone to violence.²⁷ In addition, these issues have escalated due to inability of Nigeria leaders to tackle development challenges, unequal distribution

²⁵ Attinà Fulvio, *Traditional Security Issues*. In: Wang J., Song W. (eds) *China, the European Union, and the International Politics of Global Governance*. (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2016), p.20

²⁶ Caballero-Anthony, M. (ed.). *An Introduction to Non-Traditional Security Studies – A Transnational Approach*. (Sage Publications, London, 2016) <https://rsis-ntsasia.org/about-nts-asia/> Accessed January 20, 2022.

²⁷ Innocent, Eme and Onyishi, Tony. Boko Haram and security challenges in Nigeria. *Kuwait Chapter of the Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, 3(11), 2014, p.1.

of state resources, desperation of political leader to win and remain in office, inadequate funding of security personnel and poor welfare among others. All of these myriad of security challenges raise concerns for the future security implications of the nation, the region and the global security environment in the near future. Therefore, Nigeria is confronted with a number of security issues both internally and externally. For instance, the conflict has destabilized adjacent areas of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in the wider Lake Chad Basin region. In Nigeria's Northwest, conflict between pastoralists and farmers recently has escalated amid a broader deterioration in security conditions involving cattle rustling, kidnapping, ethnic massacres, and emergent Islamist extremist activity. Farmer-herder violence also has surged in the central Middle Belt of the country, where disputes over resource access coincide with ethno-religious cleavages between Christian and Muslim communities. In the south, criminality and militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta have impeded development and contributed to insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea for decades.²⁸ This kind of security challenge falls under the non-traditional threat which is the focus of this research.

The volatile political environment in the country and fragile social settings emanating from multireligious, multiethnic, and regional politics have contributed to security dilemmas, exacerbated by a large contiguous geography, porous borders, and economic problems. The Anglophone and Francophone dichotomy is another security concern, in which Nigeria is surrounded by four major West African countries with a French colonial past, creating a wide gap in terms of communication, external allegiance, and cooperation.²⁹ Both the internally and externally dimensions of these security challenges keep raising concern in the country. Some of these security challenges arise from Boko Haram insurgency, Niger Delta Militancy, Separatist insurgency, Banditry and kidnapping, Clashes between herders and farmers etc. Nigeria is currently battling with security threats such as Boko Haram insurgency leading to terrorism, kidnapping and banditry, herders and farmers conflict, Niger Delta Militancy, and secessionism.

In other to fully comprehend the complexities and the rationale behind this research, it is therefore important to discuss both the traditional and non-traditional security challenges in Nigeria under the following sub-headings:

²⁸ Ibid, 10.

²⁹ Yakubu, Y. A., *Nigerian Foreign Policy from 1999–2012*. Zaria, Nigeria: Ahmadu Bello University Zaria Press, 2012.

Traditional Security:

External Conflicts: Nigeria suffers from external conflict from both the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel region. These two regions have provided a source of threat to the country due to the rising challenges. Within a decade, the Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most dangerous maritime areas in the world. The Gulf of Guinea is in many ways a perfect incubator for piracy, given that it has resources and also acts as a safe haven for criminals. The main tactics of the pirates involve hijacking a tanker, siphoning the oil to another vessel, and later reselling the stolen oil at the local black market. Cargo ships carrying cocoa, minerals and other materials are also frequently hijacked³⁰. Piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea is more than any part other part of Africa. The International Maritime Bureau ranks the Gulf of Guinea as one of the most troubled global waterways. This is not the only threats in the Gulf of Guinea, in addition to piracy attacks, there are heightened cases of poaching, national and trans-national crime, Disputed Boundaries and Environmental degradation³¹.

Piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are severe risk that impedes economic progress in the region, especially Nigeria's shipping industry, thereby deterring prospective investors the opportunity to do business. Piracy, like the slave trade, is thought to have largely disappeared in modern times, or at the very least plunged to levels that would not attract international community attention. This is not the situation in the Gulf of Guinea, which is not only one of the world's top oil and gas exploration hotspots, but also a new and risky maritime area, particularly in the Nigerian littoral zone³². The waters off the coast of Nigeria are the focus of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. Robbers primarily target ships in port or at anchorage in the southwest of the country, ransacking them before fleeing. Meanwhile, kidnappings of crew members are common in the waters near the oil-rich Niger Delta region to the Southeast.

Another source of external conflict to Nigeria is the crisis within the Sahel Region. The Sahel region in Sub-Saharan Africa is home to some of the continent's most serious problems. The Sahel presents a wide range of major difficulties to global policymakers, including fragile states, poverty, refugees and migrants, transnational organized crime (TOC), and jihadist insurgencies.

³⁰ Ibid, 8.

³¹ Gilpin, R. *Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea Strategic Insights*, Center for Contemporary Conflict. Vol. VI, Issue 1, 2007: p. 4-6

³²Nightingale, L. Piracy problem is a threat to Nigeria's maritime economy. <https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1129132/Piracy-problem-is-a-threat-to-Nigerias-maritimeeconomy>, 2019: Accessed on 20 February, 2022.

As a result, the issue of state stability in the Sahel is more prominent than it has ever been on the international agenda, and the scale of international assistance and interventions in various forms is unparalleled. For instance, the ‘perfect storm’ that enveloped Mali in 2012 has since escalated into a protracted and widespread crisis across the Sahel. The region currently hosts multiple, moving threats, which are most active in the three states of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In those states alone, between 2012 and 2019, there have been 1,463 armed clashes, 4,723 civilians killed, at the hands of 195 violent armed groups, in 1,263 discrete locations³³. In 2019, Burkina Faso replaced Mali as the epicentre of the Sahel crisis. Jihadi groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) consolidated their hold on several regions after opening new fronts the previous year. These groups have exploited local ethnic cleavages while self-defense groups, vigilantes, and community-based militias have become increasingly embroiled in counter-terrorism efforts.

As the constellation of armed actors becomes increasingly complex, and the geographies of violence shift, the Sahel crisis is growing, mutating, and becoming more brutal, with civilians bearing the brunt.³⁴ In summary, the Sahel region faces humanitarian crisis, armed conflict ethno-religious tensions, political instability, poverty, and natural disasters.

Territorial Issues of Secession: It may be said that Nigeria’s independence from colonial rule sent the country on a rollercoaster of chaos and destruction, with regionalism, ethnicism, nepotism, thuggery, and political brinkmanship ruling the day. One of such is the advent of secessionist movement in the country. The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a good example. The Indigenous People of Biafra thrives on the grievances of the Nigeria-Biafra war from 1967 to 1970. Many years ago, military leaders of the Igbo people attempted to create the independent Republic of Biafra through the secession of the Eastern region of Nigeria. The attempt failed but the effort was accompanied and preceded by large scale massacres by the Nigeria Military Government³⁵.

The immediate trigger of the recent protests by Biafran separatists was in 2015 following the arrest of Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and director of web-

³³ Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen, ‘Introducing ACLED: An armed conflict location and event dataset’, *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (5), 2010, p.651–660.

³⁴ Raleigh, C., Nsaibia, H., & Dowd, C. The Sahel crisis since 2012. *African Affairs*, Oxford University Press, 2021. 120 (478), p. 123-143.

³⁵Why Study about Biafra? <https://www.historians.org/teaching-and-learning/teaching-resources-for-historians/teaching-and-learning-in-the-digital-age/through-the-lens-of-history-biafra-nigeria-the-west-and-the-world/why-study-about-biafra>. Accessed 20 February, 2022.

based Radio Biafra, on charges of sedition, ethnic incitement and treasonable felony. The IPOB and Radio Biafra are the most prominent and radical proponents of a separate Biafra state currently in existence. The IPOB and Radio Biafra intensified a campaign started by Ralph Uwazuruike's Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in 1999. In 2001 the movement was banned and in 2005 its leader was jailed for treasonable charges. Since 2015, the South East Nigeria, dominated by the Igbo ethnic group, has witnessed demonstrations by Biafran separatists. The persistence of Biafra separatism is particularly noteworthy because it could provide insights into other separatist movements and identity-based conflicts in Nigeria, as it is the country's longest-running separatist movement³⁶. Poor investment, inequitable resource allocation, ethnic marginalization, and military brutality are among the other issues in Nigeria's South-East region.

In furtherance, other separatist agitations have been drowned out by events surrounding Biafra, providing the false impression that Biafra is the only separatist threat in the country. There are other separatists agitation in Nigeria. For instance, among the Yoruba, echoes of separatism come in different forms from a direct call for Oduduwa Republic to those championing a Sovereign National Conference to decide if the federating units of the country still want to continue to live together, and, if so, under what arrangements. Their intermittent demands for Arewa Republic in the north, and some refer to the "North" as if it were a country within a country. In the Niger Delta part of the country, apart from the demand for a Niger Delta Republic, regional activists' demands for resource control³⁷ have shades of separatism ingrained in them. In essence, there is a widespread sense of alienation and dissatisfaction among the Nigerian federation's many parts, a scenario that has exacerbated mistrust and fuelled separatist activity.

³⁶ Ibeanu, Okechukwu, Nwachukwu Orji, and C. K. Iwuamadi. "Biafra separatism: Causes, consequences and remedies." *Enugu: Institute for Innovations in Development*, 2016, p. 2-3.

³⁷ Jidefor, Adibe. Separatist agitations in Nigeria: Causes and trajectories <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/07/12/separatist-agitations-in-nigeria-causes-and-trajectories/> Accessed 20 February, 2022.

Niger Delta Militancy and Insurgency: The Niger Delta is a coastal environment that is located in the Atlantic coast of Southern Nigeria where River Niger divides into numerous tributaries. It is divided into four ecological zones namely coastal Inland zone, Mangrove swamp zone, freshwater zone and low forest Zone ³⁸. The Niger Delta region is made up of nine states namely, Cross River, Edo, Delta, Abia, Imo, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom and Ondo States. The above Map



of Nigeria shows the Niger Delta States³⁹ in connection with the Gulf of Guinea. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is inextricably related to the political dynamics of the Niger Delta and the socio-economic problems that accompany it. Piracy is managed by organised gangs and groups operating out of the Delta, and one of the key reasons of piracy has been noted as the region's turbulent politics.

The conflict by armed groups has primarily been fostered by widespread corruption, environmental destruction and alienation/marginalization of the local population. Complicating the situation further is the bitter ethnic and inter-communal violence between the Ijaws and the Itsekiris in the Warri area of Delta State, fueled by competition over control resources along disputed community borders and claims over compensation paid by various MNCs for appropriated and polluted land. Most of these militant groups sustain themselves through criminal activities, wantonly indulging in piracy, kidnapping, and oil theft. While it is difficult to estimate how much oil has been stolen due to these activities, there are indications that it might be as high as 5-10 per cent of Nigeria's total national production. These are some of the various militant

³⁸ Ike, P. C., and P. O. Emaziye. "An assessment of the trend and projected future values of climatic variables in Niger Delta Region, Nigeria." *Asian Journal of Agricultural Sciences* 4(2), 2012: p. 3-4.

³⁹ Akalonu, George I., Ify, L. Nwaogazie, and Ejikeme Ugwoha. "Awareness Assessment on Causes of Occupational Injuries, Illnesses and Fatalities for Selected Companies in Nigeria." *International Journal of Health, Safety and Environments* 3 (5), 2017: p. 4.

groups⁴⁰ which have been identified in the region such as: The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) etc. The NDA⁴¹ is currently active in the Niger Delta. Although it shares the same objectives as MEND, it distances itself from the latter, and calls for the autonomy of the region. The tactics of NDA mainly focus on attacks on oil and gas installations.

Human Security:

Ethno-religious and Sectarian Strife: In Nigeria, so much has gone into nation-building, but at the end of the day, what would have contributed to sustainable peace is destroyed as a result of excessive ethno-religious conflicts. In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, ethno-religious conflict⁴² 16 refers to a situation in which members of one ethnic or religious group interact with members of another ethnic or religious group, characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontation. Nigerians are divided into three religious groups namely; Christians, Muslims, and traditional worshippers. Traditional religions are the most politically inactive of the three groups, but on the other hand, Christian and Muslim identities have continued to be the backbone of religious disparity and conflict because they constitute the majority.

Religion has an important role in Nigerian society and has emerged as a powerful force in the country's geopolitical development. This same force that has brought Nigerians together has also brought the country to its knees in multiple conflicts. Between 1980 and 1994, Nigeria was engulfed in a series of religious crises⁴³ and conflicts. Ethnic-religious conflicts have been known as Nigeria's most violent crises due to their proclivity to spread to other areas after beginning in one. The majority of these disputes occur in the largely Muslim North's middle belt and along

⁴⁰ Ibid, 8.

⁴¹ Militant groups in the Niger Delta. <https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-nigeria/122-militant-groups-niger-delta>. Accessed 20 February, 2022.

⁴² Salawu, Beshiru. "Ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria: Causal analysis and proposals for new management strategies." *European Journal of Social Sciences*. 13(3), 2010, pp. 2-3.

⁴³ Warner, Zach. The sad rise of Boko Haram. *New African*, 2012, p. 38–40. <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-religious-crises-nigeria/> Accessed 20 February, 2022

culturally bordering regions, as well as in the South between Hausa-Fulani ethnic groupings and non-Muslim ethnic groups.⁴⁴

Notable among such ethno-religious conflicts⁴⁵ are the Maitatsine religious disturbances in parts of Kano and Maiduguri in the early 1980s; Jimeta-Yola religious disturbances (1984), and Zango Kataf crises in Kaduna State (1992). Others are Kafanchan College of Education Muslim-Christian riots; Kaduna Polytechnic Muslim-Christian skirmishes (1981-1982); and the cross vs the crescent conflict at the University of Ibadan (1981-1985). Yet other early ethno-religious conflicts include the Bulumkutu Christian-Muslim riots (1982); Usman Danfodio University Sokoto (1982); and the Muslim-Christian Clash during a Christian procession at Easter in Ilorin, Kwara State (1986).

Aside from these, other recent ethno-religious conflicts⁴⁶ include the July 1999 conflict among the Oro cultists in Sagamu in Ogun state who claimed that the Hausa women had come outside when the cultists were outside with their gnome. The result were arguments that finally turned into a full-scale crisis. Many Yoruba and Hausa people were killed before a dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on the Sagamu town. Another ethno-religious conflict that had far reaching impacts on the people of Nigeria was the October 2000 Lagos-Kano (Idi-Araba/Oko-Oba) conflict which was caused by a misperception between the Hausa inhabitants and the Yoruba living in Lagos over the use of a convenience by a man from Hausa. The mayhem resulted in the death of many Yoruba. As a consequence, the O'dua People Congress (a Yoruba militia) was formed and worsened the situation as the violence later spread southwards to Kano.

And finally, the Fulani herdsmen upheavals⁴⁷ is also one of those serious ethno-religious conflict. The Fulani herdsmen's clash with their host community has been recorded in all strata of the country. The clash of Fulani herdsmen with farmers in their host community date back to 2012 with the killing of one Mr Benjamin Chegue, Director of Personnel Management in Isoko North Local Government Area, Delta State. Since then, the spate of killings linked to these clashes has continued across the entire northern and southern zones of the country. Other attacks have also

⁴⁴ Osaghae, Eghosa E., and Rotimi T. Suberu. *A history of identities, violence and stability in Nigeria*. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford, 2005., Vol. 6. <http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/Inequality/wp6.pdf>> Accessed on February 22, 2022

⁴⁵ Ibid, 42.

⁴⁶ Çancı, Haldun, and Opeyemi Adedoyin Odukoya. "Ethnic and religious crises in Nigeria: A specific analysis upon identities (1999–2013)." *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 16 (1), 2016: p.10-11.

⁴⁷ Ngwoke, Peace N., and Ezichi A. Ituma. "Ethno-religious conflict and sustainable development in Nigeria." *HTS Theologise Studies/Theological Studies* 76.4 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v76i4.6090>

been recorded in north-west states, south-south states and south-east states. According to Amnesty International⁴⁸, the increase in killings by the Fulani herdsmen is alarming and has caused the death of 3641 people in 3 years, with 57% of these deaths occurring in 2018. Thus, this explains why the Fulani herdsmen are rated the fourth deadliest militant group in the world according to Global Terrorism Index 2019⁴⁹.

Human Trafficking: The practise of human trafficking is pervasive in the West African sub-region, and Nigeria plays a key role as a country of origin, transit, and destination for victims of trafficking for labour exploitation and forced labour. Men, women and children from Nigeria are trafficked to Western Europe, the Middle East, and West and Central African countries. Similarly, there are also cases of internal trafficking in Nigeria. Internal trafficking⁵⁰ from rural areas to urban centres is also pervasive, particularly among women and children trafficked for domestic labour, agricultural work, farming, manufacturing, begging and sexual purposes. Between 2012 and 2014, 58% of detected victims of human trafficking were children, while 42% were adults. In 2015, the Nigerian government identified 943 victims of trafficking, including 429 victims of sex trafficking and 514 of labor trafficking. Drivers of exploitation in Nigeria include high unemployment, economic issues such as devaluation of the local currency, and political unrest, each of which contribute to high rates of both internal and external migration. People are being trafficked in greater numbers from rural areas to cities like Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Kano, Kaduna, Calabar, and Port Harcourt. Domestic labour, farm labour, and prostitution are the most common reasons for trafficking to these areas.

The country remains a destination point for victims of human trafficking. Nigeria receives women and children from Togo, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Central African Republic, Benin, Liberia, Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana⁵¹. Boys are mainly forced to work in Nigeria's granite mines, work in farm plantations, quarrying while women and young girls are forced to prostitution or exploitative domestic work. Nigeria, as a transit country, is the focal point for the transfer of


⁴⁸ Amnesty International, Nigeria: Government failures fuel escalating conflict between farmers and herders as death toll nears 4,000, 2018. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/12/nigeria-government-failures-fuel-escalating-conflict-between-farmers-and-herders-as-death-toll-nears-4000/>. Accessed 22 February 2022

⁴⁹ Global Terrorism Index. 'Global terrorism index 2019: Measuring the impact of terrorism', Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019 <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf>. Accessed 22 February 2022.

⁵⁰ Human Trafficking, forced Labour and Slavery Corporate in Nigeria. <https://accountabilityhub.org/country/nigeria/> Accessed 22 February 2022,

⁵¹ Akpomera EI, "A Critical Evaluation Nigerian Policy on Human Trafficking". *Nig. J. Pol. Pub. Pol.*, 2009; 5(1&2): p. 48-63

trafficked people to West Africa, as well as Gabon and Cameroon. Nigeria also serves as a transit point for people trafficked from Benin and Togo to Europe and the Middle East. In conclusion, Nigeria experience human trafficking both internally and externally.



The figure above shows the total number of human trafficking cases reported and investigated⁵² in 2015.

Small Arms Proliferation: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) proliferation⁵³ is a key national security concern in Nigeria. Insurgency, banditry, militancy, kidnapping, armed robbery, ethno-religious and communal disputes have all contributed to insecurity in Nigeria. All these are carried out with small arms and light weapons that are easy to conceal and employ to perpetrate violence on society. This has also become a major threat to national security, peace and stability in Africa at large. It's important to note that it's not the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) themselves that generate conflicts or crimes; rather, it's the ease with which these weapons may be obtained, which allows for quick escalation. The security agencies are currently overburdened by the wave of criminality that exists in Nigeria. The presence of these weapons is undeniable in all of these crimes. It's also noteworthy that most of the countries that share a common border with Nigeria, particularly in the northern part, are dealing with one or more security issues, and the availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in these countries has made it very easy

⁵² Emma Kisa, Nigeria Human Trafficking Data Analysis 2015. <https://dc.sourceafrica.net/documents/118187-Nigeria-Human-Trafficking-Data-Analysis-2015.html> Accessed 22 February 2022.

⁵³ Umaru, Tsaku S., The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Challenges of National Security in Nigeria: A Case Study of Adamawa State. *Asian Research Journal of Arts & Social Sciences* 14(3): 2021; p.2-3. doi: 10.9734/arjass/2021/v14i330238

for criminals in Nigeria to obtain them, which are then used to wreak havoc in Nigerian communities. There is no gain saying the fact that Chad, Niger and Cameroon are countries in arms with different rebel groups, fighting to advance their interests, as Lake Chad region has become the fertile ground for Boko-Haram.⁵⁴

Furthermore, other experts attributed the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) to unwholesome behavior of some Nigerian security officials who sell or lease arms to individuals and groups for selfish purposes⁵⁵. These arms are either handed to young groups who are recruited to spread terror in the case of a group conflict, or they are leased to criminals who use them to carry out a wide range of illicit actions in society. In Nigeria, this has been the bane of national security. Politicians, too, play a role in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). The political class in Nigeria considers politics to be a large business. As a result, the political class goes to great lengths to equip youths in order to intimidate opposition and ensure electoral success at all costs⁵⁶. What happens to these arms after elections is not their business as their security is guaranteed by the state. The civil society is left to pay dearly from the carnage that is unleashed by the youths who bear arms in the community. This truism is a national security problem in every part of Nigeria. However, some experts have attributed the proliferation of SALWs to the porosity of Nigeria's borders which make it very easy to move arms into the country.

Organized Crime: There is no universal accepted definition of organized crime, but some scholars have been able to make attempt to define it. Organized crime⁵⁷ can define as any relatively permanent group of individuals that systematically engage in illegal activities with economic gain as its primary goal. It involves the coordination of numerous persons in the planning and execution of illegal acts or the pursuit of legitimate goals through unlawful means. Organized crime's existence is maintained through the use of threats, intimidation, force, monopoly control, and corruption. Political instability, social disintegration, and state fragility or failure are frequently

⁵⁴ International Crisis Group ICG. Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/246-fighting-boko-haram-chad-beyond-military-measures> Accessed 23 February 2022.

⁵⁵ Abiodun TF, Ifeoluwa A.A, Oluwasolape O, Chukwuyere N. Small arms proliferation and its threat to Nigeria internal security. *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Research* 6(3), 2018: p. 6-8.

⁵⁶ Bagaji, A. S., Achegbulu, J. O., Maji, A., & Yakubu, N. "Explaining the violent conflicts in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Is the rentier state theory and the resource-curse thesis relevant?". *Canadian Social Science*, 7(4), 2011. p. 34-43.

⁵⁷ Ortmeier, P.J. *Introduction to Security: Operations and Management*, 4th ed., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2013) p. 4.

associated with organised crime⁵⁸. Some of the characteristics⁵⁹ of organized crime are; a crime committed by two or more persons; they are usually armed with sophisticated weapons of violence; use of threat of violence; mainly with the motive of profit and power among others.

Fraudsters, bandits in northern Nigeria, farmer/herders' clashes, looting and kidnappings on major roads, drug traffickers, and racketeers are all part of Nigeria's organised crime, which has extended across Western Africa. Conceptually, banditry⁶⁰ is a derivative of the term bandit meaning an unlawful armed group terrorizing people and confiscating their properties. It is synonymous with the establishment of gang groups who use small and light weapons to carry out attacks against people.

Banditry, in the northwestern states of Zamfara, Kaduna and Katsina has reached alarming heights in recent years. Bandits terrorize villages with impunity. They have actually settled in Zamfara state, setting up fortified enclaves in the hinterland and on the frontiers, from where they plot and carry out their operations⁶¹. In most of Nigeria's rural communities, there are many opportunities for criminal activity. Some of these communities are located in remote areas where there is little or no government presence. More importantly, households are in some cases separated by and interspersed with forest areas⁶². This renders them vulnerable to banditry. The situation is made worse by the absence of effective community policing mechanisms capable of addressing the hinterlands peculiar security challenges. The prevailing socio-existential conditions in northwestern Nigeria have complicated the security situation.

⁵⁸ Patrick, S. *Weak links: Fragile states, global threats and international security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

⁵⁹ Adeyemi, Babatunde. Organised Crime and the Nigerian Criminal Enterprises: An Examination of Adolfo Beria Di Argentine's 'Mafia Issues - Analyses and Proposals for Combatting the Mafia of Today' (2016), 3. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2772800>

⁶⁰ Olapeju, Rosenje, and Adeniyi, Oluwatobi. The Impact of Banditry on Nigeria's Security in the Fourth Republic: AN Evaluation of Nigeria's Northwest. *Zamfara Journal of Politics and Development* 2 (1), 2021: 26-2

⁶¹ Abdulrasheed, Abdulyakeen. Armed Banditry and Human Security in North Western Nigeria: The Impacts and the Way Forward. (2021), Available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3881652>

⁶² Chikwuma, A. and Francis, N. Cattle rustling and diabetics of Security in Northern Nigeria. *International Journal of liberal Arts and Social Science*. 2 (3), 2014: p. 109-117.

This map illustrates the Northwest Banditry Crisis Map⁶³, depicting the region mostly affected.

Similarly, among the organized crimes in Nigeria is kidnapping. In recent time, apart from the Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen terrorism, attention has been turned to the issue of kidnapping and stringent measures have been taken to tackle the




menace. Both National and International bodies are coming together to see if the incidence can be curbed. Many engage in kidnapping business for different purposes and missions. Some are politically masterminded, especially among political opponents. Some do it for ritual sacrifice; that is, in situations where the kidnapped persons are never seen again even after huge ransoms are paid. Some engage in this heinous crime solely for the sake of money; in this case, the victims are released after the payment of the agreed ransom. In all, kidnapping can be grouped according to motives into: political kidnapping, kidnapping for marriage, ritual kidnapping and monetary kidnapping⁶⁴. The maps⁶⁵ below explains this menace:

⁶³ Map of Nigeria showing areas affected by Norwest Banditry Crisis – July 2020. ACAPS.

⁶⁴ Ekechukwu, Peter C., and S. D. Osaat. "Kidnapping in Nigeria: A Social threat to Educational Institutions, Human Existence and Unity." *Development* 4.1 (2020): p.46-58.


⁶⁵ ACLED. Mapping Nigeria's Kidnapping Crisis: Players, Targets, and Trends, 2021. <https://acleddata.com/2021/05/20/mapping-nigerias-kidnapping-crisis-players-targets-and-trends/> Accessed 23 February 2022.

Events Involving Identified Victims of Abductions/Forced Disappearance in Nigeria (1 January 2018 - 30 April 2021)



Roughly, 50% of all abductions in the country in 2020 took place in Northern and Central Nigeria. This implies that kidnapping is not spread across the country. Perpetrators in recent years have increasingly targeted political actors, women, Christian groups, health and aid workers etc., They have been able to gain local and international attention and negotiate with the government for significant ransoms that can then be used to purchase weapons and fund operations.

Abductions/Forced Disappearance Events in Nigeria (1 January 2018 - 30 April 2021)




In conclusion, Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from violent extremism, to farmer-herder conflict, banditry, kidnapping a revived secessionist movement, police repression, piracy, and attacks on oil infrastructure, among others. This will provide the basis for following chapter which will examine the insurgency and the Nigerian state. It will examine the connection between politics and insurgency and also the various formal and informal institutions. Finally, the emphasis of this research will be on non-traditional security, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER 2

Insurgency and the Nigerian State

Nigerian State Institutions

This figure shows the institutions of government⁶⁶ in Nigeria. The Local Government have always relied on the State Government and most often, they are helpless in their bid to tackle violent conflict at the grassroots level. The Federal Government is the central authority that represents the entire nation in external affairs and internal affairs of common interest. The State Government is the second tier of government which is headed by the Governor. While the Local Government is the third tier, headed by a Local Government Chairman. The Federal Government creates the State and Local Government based on constitutional provisions. Both the Federal government and State government have been playing an important role, unlike the Local government which mainly depend on the State government. An understanding of the different security challenges facing each state becomes paramount.



This figure indicates the array of the security challenges⁶⁷ of each States. It is important to recognize these threats and comprehend their socio-geographic contours in order to create customized responses by both the Federal and State government. For the purpose of the research, both the Federal and State government will be the point of discussion in order to examine the several



⁶⁶ Political Hierarchy of Nigeria <https://www.hierarchystructure.com/political-hierarchy-of-nigeria/> Accessed April 4, 2022

⁶⁷Mark, Duerksen. Nigeria's Diverse Security Threats. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/nigeria-diverse-security-threats/>. 2021. Accessed March 29, 2022.

steps taken to combat insurgency. Consequently, the government of Nigeria through its institutional break up has been waging wars on several fronts, including responding to the proliferation of militant groups in the Niger Delta, the war on terror against Boko Haram, religious and ethnic-based conflicts breaking out between communities, banditry, as well as the farmer-herder conflicts and kidnapping. Its main goal is to stem the tide of insurgency and instability caused by non-state groups across the country. It is therefore instructive to note that the Federal government plays a role in the current insurgent violence ravaging the country. In 2009, the Nigerian government under President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua intervened by launching a primarily military effort aimed at destroying the insurgents. The succeeding administration of President Goodluck Jonathan intensified these operations, pursuing the same goal of destroying the insurgents as well as regaining territory, stabilizing the region, and asserting state authority. Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in the Northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in May 2013. According to the Nigerian constitution, state governors will continue to serve as Chief Security Officers. But because they had no control or oversight over national security agencies, and the Nigerian military had unfettered authority in the theater of operations, their roles were severely weakened. In 2014, the state of emergency lapsed, and the Nigerian House of Representatives refused to renew it.⁶⁸ When President Buhari assumed office in 2015, he immediately ramped up military operations against Boko Haram as part of a strategy to provide security, safety, peace, and economic revival in Nigeria's Northeast. There was also a counterinsurgency operation led by the Nigerian military known as Operation Lafiya Dole, which was a follow-up to the Jonathan administration's Operation Zaman Lafiya and precursor offensives.⁶⁹ Due to the transnational nature of this insurgency, the Nigerian government also coordinated with neighboring countries' forces via the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJFT) in 2015, an anti-terrorist coalition with Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. Members of these task forces, who are usually drawn from the Nigerian Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, State Security Services (SSS), Department of State Security (DSS), and Immigration and Customs officials.

The Federal Government has also been able to establish different initiatives on the proliferation of small Arms in keeping with his pledge that Nigeria will work with the United

⁶⁸ VOA News, "Nigerian House Fails to Reauthorize State of Emergency," November 21, 2014, www.voanews.com/a/nigerian-house-fails-to-reauthorize-state-of-emergency/2528839.html. Accessed March 29, 2022.

⁶⁹ Ibrahim, Jibrin, and Saleh Bala. Civilian-led governance and security in Nigeria after Boko Haram. (*United States Institute of Peace Special Report* 2018) pp 4-5.

Nation and other countries to stem the worrisome proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their use in creating insecurity in Nigeria and other countries.⁷⁰ Some of the mechanism includes the National Committee on the Proliferation and illicit Trafficking of small arms and light Weapons. The committee was inaugurated in May 2000 in Abuja. The National Task Force to Combat illegal importation and Smuggling of Goods, Small Arms Ammunition and Light Weapons (NATFORCE): The task force was inaugurated in June 2009. Amnesty Programme was also introduced, a call to voluntary return of arms for freedom from prosecution. The crisis continues to aggravate with many sporadic attacks causing more deaths and destruction of property.

In addition, the Federal government was able to intervene in the herdsman-farmer conflict. For example, in Plateau state, in 2001, the government deployed a Special Task Force called Operation Safe Haven (STF-OSH) to check insecurity resulting from the herdsman-farmers clashes. In 2016, the National Assembly attempted to pass legislation to address conflicts between farmers and herders through the controversial National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill 2016, which ultimately was not passed. This is largely due to the fact that the Land Use Act of 1978 vests all powers related to the regulation of ownership, alienation, acquisition, administration, and management of Nigerian land with the State governors.⁷¹ Apart from the efforts of the Federal government through its agents to get rid of illegal weapons in circulation, the State governments are also working hard through state channels to checkmate the proliferation of small arms through legal means, operation war on terror, buy-back programme, arms destruction, and supporting security agents (at federal level) to combat the proliferation of arms in their states. States such as Imo, Rivers, Ondo and so on have organized amnesty exercise as a state-based programme to collect arms from illegal sources.

In the South West part of the country, governors of the six states launched Operation Amotekun, a security formation aimed at enhancing security in the region. Similarly in the Northeast, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was created in 2013 to support the Nigerian security forces in the fight against Boko Haram in Northeast and to protect local communities from

⁷⁰ Uzoigwe J. *The Constraints of Government Security Agencies in tackling Terrorism in Nigeria - a case study of Boko Haram*. Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Kwara State.

⁷¹ Kwaja, C. and Bukola, I. "*Responses to conflicts between farmers and herders in the middle belt of Nigeria: Mapping past efforts and opportunities for violence prevention.*" (Search for common ground 8, 2018), pp. 7-14.

attacks by Boko Haram. The other regions of the country don't have a recognize regional security groups, but some individual states have security outfit such as local hunters, vigilantes etc.

Some State government have also taken an innovative approach to augment efforts by the overwhelmed Federal government. Since 2016, Governors in Plateau, Kaduna and Adamawa states established peace agencies and commissions to address communal conflicts and the roots of insurgency. The Plateau Peace Building Agency, the Kaduna Peace Commission and the Adamawa's Peace Agency are the agencies created by these States. These peacebuilding bodies help local governments set up community-level responses to public grievances and conflicts⁷². These agencies have played a role in a bid to tackle the violent conflict in those States. For instance, The Plateau Peace Building Agency and the Kaduna Peace Commission have focused their efforts on farmer-herder conflicts in their respective states, collaborating with local and international civic organizations to hold community dialogues and train local activists in conflict resolution techniques. Additionally, Adamawa's peace agency worked with traditional rulers across the state, many of whom hold extensive influence in their communities, to create an early warning and response system against violent conflicts. This network helped prevent violence during the 2019 elections. The growing farmers and herder's crisis has also led some State government to initiate state-level legislations prohibiting open grazing. For instance, in Benue State, the State government in 2017 introduced the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, in response to this violent conflict. In the wake of the Benue State legislation, other states have considered similar legislation to respond to lingering conflicts between farmers and herders within their borders⁶. Similarly, the Taraba State Governor also signed the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Bill 2017 into law on July 24, 2017, to begin implementation on January 24, 2018. Pastoral crisis has also provided a cover for other forms of criminal activities such as cattle rustling, rural banditry, kidnapping and also exacerbates the existing ethno-religious hostilities.

Finally, without a coordinated state-federal effort one that improves security, tackles corruption, and addresses the root causes of this violent conflict already destabilizing parts of Africa's most populous country will only widen and intensify.

⁷²Darren, Kew. How to calm violent crises? Nigeria has an idea. June 2021. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/how-calm-violent-crises-nigeria-has-idea> Accessed March 30, 2022

Politics and Insurgency

The Nigerian politics is being occupied by elites, who are at the helm of affairs and who want to seek power. These elites, however, become separated in their political contestations into the two non-homogeneous colonial creations of Northern and Southern Nigeria. The elite constitute the superior minority with higher education, greater wealth, and possess easy access to culture, science and technology as well as embody the good qualities of a society⁷³. As a result, they invariably seize control of the people's political, economic, and socio-cultural lives. The struggle for political power defines elite politics in Nigeria. In this process and in many ways, the struggle for state power through elections in Nigeria is akin to war. It comprises each group, North and South, assembling a large number of people from their own region in order to win elections and gain control of the state. Following the death of President Yar'Adua, the Boko Haram group developed as a tool in the hands of the Northern elite in order to ascend to the national position of the President. Although it existed in Borno State before then, it was not used by the consensus of the Northern elite but utterances and comments from captured members of the sect suggest the support of the northern political elite⁷⁴. The intensification of attacks of the sect after Goodluck Jonathan assumed power also lends credence to this. These elite easily mobilize the youths, especially the poor and downtrodden who have been reduced to street urchins.

Through ingenious political engineering by the Nigerian power elites, a power sharing arrangement was devised which rotates central power between the North and South. After eight years in the South *via* Olusegun Obasanjo's presidency (1999–2007), power had returned to the North in May 2007 via the Umaru Musa Yar'Adua's presidency and was supposed to remain there for another eight years. Despite the constitutional provision that guarantees his succession by his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan, a Southerner, the North was sour for having 'lost' power again to the South by virtue of Yar'Adua's death in May 2010 barely three years into office. The sense of loss, which ensued from Yar'Adua's death manifested in the political tension in which Nigeria was embroiled in the pre-2011 General Elections period⁷⁵. Looking at the Boko Haram activities when Former President Goodluck took over power in 2010, there was a visible increase in Boko Haram's


⁷³ Nnoli, Okwudiba (2003) *Introduction to politics*. 2nd ed. Enugu: PACREP.

⁷⁴ Mbah, Peter, Chikodiri Nwangwu, and Herbert C. Edeh. "Elite Politics and the Emergence of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria." *Trames: A Journal of the Humanities & Social Sciences* 21 (2) 2017, p. 12

⁷⁵ Alozieuwa, Simeon "Contending theories on Nigeria's Security challenge in the era of Boko Haram Insurgence". *The Peace and Conflict Review* 7 (1) 2012, pp. 1–8.

violent attacks. The graph also indicated a sharp downturn in the trend of Boko Haram activities after President Muhammadu Buhari took over in 2015. This can be seen in the figure⁷⁶ below:

Despite the fact that Boko Haram assaults⁷⁷ had been ongoing since before the 2011 general election, they became more frequent and deadly afterward. To many, this did not come as a surprise, only the magnitude. They saw the new twist as the manifestation of a threat from a politician who contested against Goodluck Jonathan. They had threatened that they would make the country ungovernable



should Goodluck Jonathan stand for and win the Presidential election. Goodluck Jonathan refused to accept the People's Democratic Party's (PDP) zoning arrangement, which was the main point of contention. In essence, the rise of Boko Haram insurgent violence was preceded by a period of intense political bickering between some, mostly Muslim, political actors in the North and their counterparts in the South in the run-up to President Goodluck Jonathan's election victory, a Christian and a Southerner. As it was observed, Boko Haram originated from a power struggle between northern and southern political elites⁷⁸ over who controls power at the Federal level, notably following President Umar Yar'Adua's death. The victory of Jonathan Goodluck in 2011 at that point prompted the utilization of Boko Haram as a tool to weaken his government by the elites of Northern extraction.

The lack of political will in Nigeria has contribute largely to the sudden increase of different groups who are bent on perpetrating violence in the country. In accordance to that, the emergence and growth of radical groups⁷⁹ within the country can be connected to poor governance which is deep-rooted in corruption and economic marginalization. Fulani/Herders crisis for

⁷⁶Anatomy of Boko Haram: The Rise and Decline of a Violent Group in Nigeria. <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html#e11> Accessed 1 March, 2022.

⁷⁷ Olamilekan, Adefolarin. "A perusal analyses on Boko Haram crisis in Northern Nigeria and its implication on educational psychology of school children and teachers." *Journal of Education and Human Development* 3(2), 2014, pp.361-380.

⁷⁸ Mustapha, Mohammed, A. Fauzi, and A. Hamid. "Governance as the bane of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria." *International Journal of Recent Technology and Engineering (IJRTE)* 8(2), 2019, pp.3-4

⁷⁹ Ibid, 74.

instance is spreading like wild fire in the country, a serious and committed political will from the government could help ameliorate this menace. This could come in form of political commitment to pastoral policy development as well as engagement with pastoral groups in the creation of appropriate policies.

In Nigeria, politicians can go any length to influence the decision and results of elections. In doing so, they employed the services of some gangs, who later become threat to the country when they can no longer perpetrate their evil activities. For instance, in Gombe State, one of the states in the Northeast region in Nigeria, a group of boys known as 'Kalare' have proven 'easy prey for politicians who offer them small amount of money, drugs, alcohol and weapons in exchange for engaging in acts of intimidation and assaults or simply to accompany their campaign in a demonstration of muscle'⁸⁰. The Kalare, until recently were known to be hunters and always lived in the bush. They were hardly seen in towns or cities unless during their annual festivals. But with the highly tensed political rivalries in the 2003 General Elections, the politicians in Gombe state dragged them into their political rallies. They were used to harass opponents or protect themselves from attacks. As a result of this, some other jobless youths joined them and henceforth almost all of the said youths in Gombe state got involved in one form of political violence or the other⁸¹. Similarly, this was also seen in the Niger Delta election in 2003.

The political elite rivalries contributed immensely to the rise of armed militancy and inter-militant armed violence, which preceded the 2003 elections and became consolidated in the period between the 2003 and 2007 general elections in the Niger Delta⁸². In essence, these politicians employ the services of these radical groups to foster political violence in the country. This act has a long-time implication on not just the political scene, it also poses a larger threat of peace and security in the country. This is because elections are not held every year, so when there are no elections, these radical groups snowball into violence groups, by engaging in kidnapping, robbery etc. Despite the fact that these groups are frequently abandoned following elections, the weaponry and ammunition provided by politicians stay in the hands of their members. This leads to the formation of violent militia groups that resort to all kinds of illicit crimes against the state and its citizens

⁸⁰ Aniekwe, C.C. and Agbibo, D.E. 2014. Civic Engagement and its Role in Mitigating Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Implications for the 2015 General Elections.' Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, December 21.

⁸¹ Bashir, Mohammed U. "An Assessment of the activities of Kalare in political violence in Gombe State, Nigeria." *International Journal of Innovative Research and Development*, 2(5) 2013, p. 3.

⁸² Ibid, 80.

Political instability has a huge role to play towards the rise of violent insurgency in any country. It has often engendered terrorist activity, separatist movements and other violent crimes. Political instability is a common occurrence in Nigeria, and it always threatens the country's unity and peaceful coexistence. Political instability is believed to show itself in a variety of ways, including fraud, embezzlement, and misappropriation of public funds, contract inflation, a lack of accountability and transparency in governance, and wealth distribution prejudice, among others. In this context, political instability can also often lead communal violence, rural insurgency, urban riot, civil war, and coup d'etat. It is important to note that while political instability can breed insurgency, insurgency on the other hand can frustrate political stability.⁸³ The only way to make sense of the Niger Delta insurgency is to consider it as a blend of tactical and strategic endeavours. The insurgency is thus an attempt to confront societal injustice (a strategy) as well as a mode of production and a means of living (a tactic).

Institution and Insurgency: The Mutual Impact

Security

All organizations participating in actions and operations intended at protecting lives and property, as well as apprehending and prosecuting (directly or indirectly) any individual or group reasonably suspected of having committed or intending to commit a crime, are referred to as security agencies. The current situation in Nigeria could be described as overwhelming for the Nigeria Security agencies due to the multiplicity of violent conflicts, hence, this section focuses on the mutual impact between these agencies and violent insurgency. This research would therefore attempt to narrow down the discussion of security institutions according to two subdivisions namely; formal and informal institutions.

FORMAL INSTITUTIONS

Nigerian Armed Forces

The Nigerian armed forces have taken great strides in terms of capacity building in the last few years. The army has trained thousands of military and police personnel in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, established a canine-handling section to boost its forensic capabilities, and reorganized units and formations on the frontlines of the fight against Boko Haram in line with the Chief of Army Staff's vision of transforming the army into a force better able to deal with

⁸³ Rasheed, Aderemi. Trends of Political Instability in Nigeria: The Way Forward. *Nigerian Journal of Social Studies*, vol. xix (1), 2016, p. 3-9

contemporary challenges. While they have done all of the above mentioned, they are other accusations which have been levied against the Nigeria military forces in general. They have been accused of having committed serious human rights violations, war crimes and acts which may constitute crimes against humanity during counter-insurgency operations in the name of protecting Nigeria from Boko Haram in both Nigeria and Cameroon. Furthermore, there is consistent evidence that Nigerian security forces retreated from the line of fighting, leaving villages and civilians without any protection⁸⁴. Such scenarios are attributed to a lack of military equipment, proper pay for soldiers, and unfavourable working conditions. The Nigerian army's aggressive actions against Nigerian civilians, which have resulted in an unknown amount of 'collateral damage' have increased the Nigerian state's illegitimacy in the Northeast.

While the Nigerian Army may have committed the above atrocities, attention should also be given to their inability to subdue the series of violent conflicts in the country. The violent conflict in Kaduna, North West is gradually turning the State into the epicenter of violence. Kaduna's security crisis revolves farmer-herder conflict, armed gangs engaged in criminal activities, including kidnapping for ransom, arms dealing, cattle rustling, and highway robbery and most recently attacks on innocent civilians. There have been roughly 400 persons abducted for ransom and hundreds of communities destroyed causing the displacement of more than 50,000 people⁸⁵. Over the last year, Kaduna has recorded the highest number of episodes of political violence and fatalities in northern Nigeria. Kaduna has no fewer than thirteen (13) military establishments spread across the state. Kaduna is blessed with not only elite military establishments but is also home to the largest number of respectable military institutions, making the state the envy of other parts of Nigeria. In spite of this, violent conflict persists in the State.

The Nigerian Army Forces have also been trying to collaborate with other security agencies in order to join hands to combat insecurity in the country. One of such is the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) and the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS). They both recently agreed to synergize efforts towards strengthening border security and stemming the tide of banditry and smuggling activities around Nigerian borders and entry points. To this end, the NAF is expected to make available, on request, two of its pilots to assist with operation of NCS Bell-427 helicopters and by so doing

⁸⁴ Nigeria: Boko Haram and Nigerian military committing crimes under international law in north east Nigeria. Amnesty International, 2015. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/1756/2015/en/> Accessed March 9, 2022

⁸⁵ Olajumoke Ayandele. Confronting Nigeria's Kaduna Crisis. 2021. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/confronting-nigerias-kaduna-crisis/> Accessed April 9, 2022

complement the manpower of NCS Air-Wing. In addition, this partnership will also provide aircraft maintenance support by NAF so as to enhance the fight against all forms of insecurity in the country.

Nigerian Police Force

In 2018, the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) has deepened its role in the anti-terrorism war in the North east, with the deployment of 2000 men to join Operation Lafiya Dole. The men are made up of Police Mobile Force (PMF) and Counter Terrorism Units (CTU) Personnel of the Force and the Sniffer Dog Sections. The Counter Terrorism Units of the Force has deployments of over One Thousand, Two Hundred and Fifty (1,250) specially trained Counter Terrorism Police personnel. The Police Anti-Bomb Squad has about Three Hundred (300) personnel while over Hundred Sniffer Dogs are working with the Military in the fight against Insurgency in the North East. It is of significant note that the Police Mobile Force (PMF) Personnel, Counter Terrorism Units (CTU), Anti-Bomb Squad (EOD), Sniffer Dog Sections, and conventional Police personnel have been fighting along with the Military in the front line against Boko Haram insurgency and also providing security for restoration of law and order in the North East, security for all the liberated towns and villages in the North-East, escort of Foreign and Local Humanitarian workers and relief materials, protection of IDP camps and security of public and private infrastructures. The Police Air-wing Surveillance Helicopters and crews are also deployed to support most of the operations of Operation Lafiya Dole throughout the North East in the fight against insurgency in the North East. The Nigeria Police Force had in Borno State, 2961 policemen. There is also a Mobile Squadron also based in the state. In neighboring Yobe, the police stationed 1638 men under 26 mobile force units and there is another mobile Force squadron. There are 18 mobile Force units in Adamawa, comprising 1134 men Units, in addition to the Police⁸⁶ Mobile Force (PMF) Squadron.

Recently, Police launched an operation on in Southeast in 2021, to put a stop to rising violence and crime there, including a spate of attacks on police which have triggered fears of a return to war and state-sanctioned violence. The operation is named “Operation Restore Peace” which was launched to confront criminal elements and address crimes such as banditry, kidnapping and armed robbery. Although The Nigeria Police Force is fully committed to the fight against insurgency, there are some allegations levied against which has affected their credibility.

⁸⁶ Nigerian Police deepen role in anti-insurgency war <http://www.faapa.info/en/2018/12/03/nigerian-police-deepen-role-in-anti-insurgency-war/> Accessed April 10, 2022

Nigerians have expressed their displeasure through series of protest over one of the security agencies. One of such is the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). This squad⁸⁷ was a Nigerian police force unit that was part of the State Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department (SCIID). It was established in late 1992 as one of 14 divisions of the Force Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department, which was created to detain, investigate, and prosecute people accused of crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping, and other violent crimes. Additionally, extrajudicial murder, theft, rape, torture, unlawful arrests, humiliation, unlawful imprisonment, and extortion of Nigerian residents, as well as sexual harassment of women and brutalization of young male Nigerians, were all committed by SARS officials. This resulted in a violent protest in Nigeria in October 2020, which forced the Nigerian Police Force announced that it was dissolving the unit with immediate effect

Finally, tactics employed by government security agencies against Boko Haram have been consistently brutal and counterproductive.⁸⁸ The same can be said for other violent groups and conflicts such as the bandits, kidnappers, farmer-herder conflict etc. all efforts by the security agencies to ameliorate this menace have not yielded substantial results. In addition, based on the inability of Nigeria's security agencies to focus on multiple security challenges at the same time, the security agencies haven't been fully equipped for these multiple threats at the same time. From the foregoing, the Nigeria State require a holistic strategy to revamp the various institutions such as security in order to fully combat the series of insurgent violence posing existential danger to towards the growth of the country. The security agencies remain one the most important agencies which needs a totally overhauling, because they are the forefront of these insurgent violence.

INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS

In a bid to complement the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), certain informal security forces have been created in order to help confront the growing security challenges in the country. The expansion of informal security institutions is attributable to a number of factors, including a perceived increase in criminality and the insufficiency of established police services. The following informal security forces will be discussed bearing in mind their impact on the fight against insurgency in the country

⁸⁷ Paquette D. Nigeria abolishes special police squad after Nationwide Protest. (Washington Post, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/nigeria-sars-police-robbery-end-sars/2020/10/10/999e2400-0a48-11eb-991c-be6ead8c4018_story.html. Accessed 8 March, 2022.

⁸⁸ Walker, Andrew. *What is Boko Haram?*. Special Report. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2012, Vol. 17, p. 12.

- **Task Force:** The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a joint military effort created by countries of the Chad Basin - Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin which was mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC). This was created to fight Boko Haram and the ISIS affiliate - West African Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), which threaten the stability of these countries and the entire region. They also have the mandate of curbing arms smuggling around the border of Lake Chad and ensure cross border security. The MNJTF relies on the help of numerous international partners to conduct military operations against Boko Haram and other Islamic armed groups operating in the area, based on the premise of a "coalition of the willing." The European Union contributed 50 million euros to the Multinational Joint Task Force through the African Peace Facility (APF) between July 2016 and December 2019, covering the force's personnel, operational, and logistical costs. France, the UK and the US, gathered together in a coordination body headquartered in N'Djamena, the Center for Coordination and Liaison (CCL), provide the MNJTF with technical, financial and strategic support. The several large-scale trans-national operations that have been carried out by the MNJTF to limit the jihadi armed groups' military capabilities from late 2015 on have obtained diverse degrees of success. However, chronic budget constraints contribute to scaling back the effectiveness of its actions, while the competition between national interests and regional cooperation rationales are a major factor of weakness. In July 2020 the International Crisis Group reported that the joint force had carried out periodic operations and won victories, though most advances have been short-lived. Joint operations helped to stem Boko Haram's spread in 2015 and 2016, and in 2017 and 2018 reversed some of their gains through short offensives, with a more sustained operation in 2019. The force was also able to free some civilians captured or trapped by Boko Haram and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- **Vigilante:** Among the various informal security actors in Nigeria, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) is the oldest recognized actor. The group is thought to play a significant role in providing crucial policing services to Nigerians, particularly in rural areas. In some rural areas, where the majority of the population is excluded from mainstream security

providing, informal security mechanisms have grown.⁸⁹. Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano states etc. have long histories of ethnoreligious and political-related violence. A number of informal actors are active in these states, which have high rates of violence. One of such is the Vigilante group. These are some vigilante groups⁹⁰ across the six geo-political zones of the country, although this list is not exhaustive:

Zone	State	Name of Vigilant Group	Sponsor
South East	Abia	Abia State Vigilante Group	Abia State Government
		Neighbourhood Watch	Host Communities
	Anambra	Anambra State Vigilante Services	Anambra State Government
		Neighbourhood Watch	Host Communities
South-West Zone	Lagos State	Lagos Neighbourhood Safety Corps (LNSC)	Lagos State Government
		Oodua People's Congress	Private
	Osun State	Harmonized Vigilante Group	Osun State Government
		Oodua People's Congress	Private
South-South Zone	Rivers State	Neighbourhood Safety Agency of the Rivers State Government	Rivers State Government
	Bayelsa State	Bayelsa State Volunteer Service	Bayelsa State Government
North-Central Zone	Benue State	Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)	Benue State Government
		Neighbourhood Watch	Host Communities
	Nasarawa State	Neighbourhood Watch	Neighbourhood Watch
North-East Zone	Adamawa	Vigilante Group Adamawa State	Adamawa State Government
	Taraba State	The Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) also known as the Taraba State Vigilante Group (TSVG)	Taraba State Government
North-West Zone	Kano State	Kano State Vigilante Group of Nigeria (KVGN)	Kano State Government
	Kaduna State	Kaduna Vigilante Group of Nigeria (K-VGN)	Kaduna State Government

⁸⁹ Alemika, E. and Innocent C., “The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria”. Lagos: CLEEN, 2004.

⁹⁰ Ogbonnaya, U. M. (2020): Informal Security Sector and Security Provisioning in Nigeria: Trends, Issues and Challenge. In C Varin and F Onuoha (eds) Security in Nigeria: Contemporary Threats and Responses. United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.

The increasing incidence of crime since the end of the military regime has favoured the proliferation of heavily armed vigilante groups of various conditions and interests in nearly every corner of Nigeria. There is no pattern to define who creates them, what they fight for or the methods they employ, and most importantly, there is not a clear code of conduct binding them, nor an official register of legal vigilante groups⁹¹. Several state governments in Nigeria have raised the visibility of vigilante groups by implicitly or explicitly supporting them as part of a battle against crime. The validation of such groups has grown in popularity among a community that has been disheartened by the police's dismal track record in reducing crime. However, the position of the Federal government towards armed vigilante groups remains blurred, since they are often regarded as an internal matter of the states and not as a federal issue. In terms of ensuring local security, vigilante groups can be significantly more effective than state actors. Because of their familiarity with local languages, geography, and culture, they have a higher level of legitimacy and can be more effective in detecting, monitoring, and battling insurgents.

Amotekun:


In recent times, the recurring decimal of social crimes, like banditry, kidnapping among other violent acts, necessitated the reinvigoration of the informal approaches to the security of lives and properties. Amotekun is the operational code name for the new regional experiment conceived to secure the Southwest region in the face of gross insecurity in Nigeria. It also allows the region to harmonize the resources available in the region to bring to bear on the security of lives and property and thus, provide an environment conducive for productive economic, social, and political re-engineering. This strategic security initiative was reached in January 2020 at the regional security summit in Ibadan, Oyo State, by the governors of the Southwest states. Many have seen this initiative as a bold statement on the failure of the Nigerian Police Force to maintain general security in the country, while others believe that it is a precursor to the regional or state police that has been clamoured for by many in the country. Still, others see it as the first step into the journey into ethnic/regional autonomy.

The “Amotekun”, christened Western Nigeria Security Network (WNSN) means leopard in the Yoruba language, and is an operational nomenclature for the (WNSN). The leopard symbolizes strength, perseverance, ambition, independence, toughness, patience, wisdom and

⁹¹ Oyosoro, Felix I. “Alternative Security Sources in Nigeria: The Ambiguity of Vigilante Groups.” OSF Preprints, 1 Dec. 2021. <https://osf.io/c6ygk> Accessed April 4, 2022

fearlessness. The outfit consists of the vigilante group each of the states of the region, security experts and other Yoruba socio-cultural groups engage in local security, such as Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) and “Agbekoya” to complement the activities of conventional policing such as Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), among other state security establishments.⁹² This security outfit was formed to checkmate banditry, kidnapping, and wanton destruction of lives, properties, and other security challenges. Amotekun is regarded as a community policing strategy within the Southwestern Nigeria. This initiative is state-based, and it is meant to support the existing states’ security structures.

Aside from checkmating the security challenges in the region, the outfit would also reduce the problem of inadequate manpower in the Nigeria Police Force. They would complement the Nigeria Police Force in undertaking more robust routine patrols in every nook and cranny of the region. The initiative would serve as intelligent for conventional security.⁹³ They would serve as the Closed-circuit television (CCTV) in most of the rural areas by gathering information about the crimes and suspicious activities for



interpretation and proper action. The initiative would also serve as a process of building institutions in the region, and in the country at large. Moreso, the outfit also reflects the process of building regional integration, and true federalism which had been eluded the nation for decades. Lastly, it would also serve as employment opportunities for the teeming youths in the region which in turn would reduce their engagement in crime. The graph⁹⁴ shows that the killings recorded when the Police and the Army intervened in violent conflict between 2006 and 2014. In summary, the security forces in Nigeria have over the time exacerbated the violence conflicts in Nigeria. The intervention of the security forces in violent incidents involving religious groups and criminal

⁹² David, O. A., & Oyedele, L. K. Regionalization of Non-State Security Agencies in Southwest Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges of “Amotekun”. *European Scientific Journal*, 16 (20), 2020. pp. 2-3

⁹³ Ibid, 92. pp. 6-7

⁹⁴ Ibid, 85.

gangs. The interactions between the security forces and these groups are often characterized by violence and in most cases result in deaths.

Intelligence

The gathering, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information about areas of operations and potentially significant to planning is what intelligence is all about.⁹⁵ In terms of the military, intelligence can be strategic, tactical, or counterintelligence. Basically, intelligence involves the ability to identify or get information about potential security threats and to prevent them from occurring through the use of countermeasures. In all human endeavours, including academic, social, military, economic and political spheres, intelligence is vital to the realization of goals and targets.

Intelligence activities in post-colonial Nigeria took shape with the establishment of the Nigeria Security Organisation (NSO) via Decree No. 16 of 1976.⁹⁶ By 1984, a Directorate of Intelligence was set up in the office of the Chief of Staff. It had four directors within three years of existence.⁹⁷ Incidentally, within the same period, the Defence intelligence Agency (DIA) was also set up within the office of the Minister of Defence. Clearly, from the outset, it showed that a clash of interest was inescapable and could therefore rob off on efficiency. By 1986, Decree No. 19 (under Rtd. General Ibrahim Babagida Administration) formally abolished the NSO and created the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the State Security Service (SSS). By virtue of the provisions of this decree, it meant that the Intelligence Agency had become decentralized. The State Security Service became saddled with the duty of prevention and detection within Nigeria of any crime against internal security, protection and preservation of all non-military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria and such other responsibilities affecting internal security within the country, including the Armed Forces Ruling Council or the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as the case may be, may deem necessary.⁹⁸

Unfortunately, the country's security issues since the dawn of the twenty-first century, particularly since the escalation in terrorist operations by the Boko Haram sect since 2011, gives the impression that the Armed Forces' intelligence section has gone to 'sleep'. This is

⁹⁵ Hoffman, B, "The Emergence of the New Terrorism" in Andrew Tan and K. Ramakrishna (eds.) *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies*. (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), p. 45.

⁹⁶ Peters, J "Intelligence: Its Role and Future in Nigeria's External Relations" *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 12, Nos. 1 & 2, 1986, p. 152.

⁹⁷ Oladoyin, O.O "Management of Nigeria's Intelligence Community: An Alternative Option", *Defence Strategy Review*, Vol. 2, Nos. 2, 1985, p. viii.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*.

regrettable because the continuity of killings as has been experienced in the recent past portends nothing positive but grave danger to the Nigeria nation-state.⁹⁹

Conflicts, where unchecked could lead to threat of unimaginable dimension as happenings in other climes have shown. Security threats in Nigeria keeps increasing, both internally and externally, therefore, the intelligence agencies have a major to play. Since Boko Haram changed its strategy to clandestine insurgency attacks after the 2009 encounter with the Nigerian security agencies, the Nigerian security agencies have been playing “catch-up.” But the catch-up game has proven to be very challenging owing to the lack of an intelligence base to build on for conducting surgical operations aimed at neutralizing the various operational cells of the group. It is obvious that since colonial times and up until today, the reliance on the use of physical force remains a major cardinal approach to security provision in Nigeria. The various governments since independence, especially under military rule, utilized excessive force in their approach to extracting compliance from the Nigerian people. Worse still, given the obsession of some past rulers like General Sani Abacha on hounding opponents and critics, a highly personalized approach aimed at protecting the government and its officials formed the bedrock of Nigeria’s security architecture. In others words, rather than developing a proactive intelligence-based system for internal and external security provision in a way that strengthens the integrity of Nigeria’s security architecture, past rulers created physically forceful and reactive security architecture. The reactive nature of the military to attacks by Boko Haram illustrates this point. Some of the attacks carried out by the group have happened despite prior information and knowledge of the intending attacks.¹⁰⁰ The inability of the military and other security agencies to proactively process and act on such prior information and knowledge has caused the nation many valuable lives and properties.

Civilians have been unfairly harmed in both crossfire and air force bombardments since this violent insurgency began. Many of these mistakes are reported to be the consequence of conflicting directives caused by security agency rivalries. In 2017, the Nigeria Military Jet, belong to the Nigerian Air force, ‘mistakenly’ bombed the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camp near the Cameroon border in *Rann*, Borno State. Officials say the bombing was an accident and investigation will be carried out. It was reported that the Military jet dropped two bombs on a camp

⁹⁹ Oghi, Felix Ejukonemu, and Julius O. Unumen. "Military intelligence and the challenge of national security in contemporary Nigeria." *International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies* 1(2) 2014: pp. 7-13.

¹⁰⁰ Akinola, Olabanji. "Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: Between Islamic fundamentalism, politics, and poverty." *African Security* 8 (1), 2015: pp. 17-18

for displaced civilians, killing at least 165 persons. The President, in person of Muhammadu Buhari called the bombing a “regrettable operational mistake.”¹⁰¹ This act is apparently due to lack to proper intelligence and the civilians are meant to pay for it with their precious lives. Whether it was an accident or not, the right to life has been breached and the right of refugees to protection and safety has also been breached. An investigation found that the Air Force saw people massing in the area on satellite footage, assumed they were Boko Haram Islamist militants and launched the assault. “The main reason that caused the unfortunate air strike near the IDP (internally displaced person) camp at Rann, was lack of appropriate marking of the area,”¹⁰²

In summary, with the increase in violent conflicts in Nigeria, the importance of accurate intelligence cannot be overemphasized, in order to combat these various threats to peace and security of not just the Nigeria state, but the citizens. The intelligence agencies quickly need to curtail the activities of these violent insurgents. This is because these insurgents usually capitalize on the intelligence and operational lapses to ambush troops, which often leads to the death of gallant officers and innocent citizens.

Judiciary:

As is often remarked, the judiciary is the common man’s last hope. This claim is based on its role in protecting everyone’s rights, including those of individuals, groups, and organizations, from being violated by the powerful in society. Because the aforementioned function is at the heart of every judicial organization in the world, it serves as reason for its existence. The Nigerian Judiciary¹⁰³, whether at the federal or state level has, ever since it came into existence, struggled to assert its rights so as to perform this duty. Towards the last decade of the 20th century, it suffered emasculation and humiliation in the hands of successive military regimes. The judiciary is the branch of government that has the power to interpret and apply the law, to adjudicate legal disputes, and to administer justice in general. By the Nigerian Constitution (1999), the judiciary is charged with the interpretation of the law and adjudication in civil and criminal cases. In doing this, it ensures that rules are not broken and social order is maintained. The increasing impunity and dare devilry of sundry looting and embezzlement especially of public funds are enhanced by the

¹⁰¹ VOA news, “Death Toll in Nigeria IDP Camp Bombing Climbs to 236”, 2017. <https://www.voanews.com/a/nigeria-idp-camp-bombing-death-toll-adjusted/3689824.html>. Accessed March 9, 2022.

¹⁰² Reuters, “Nigerian refugee camp hit by air strike was not marked on maps: military” July 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/nigerian-refugee-camp-hit-by-air-strike-was-not-marked-on-maps-military-idUSKBN1A61HW> Accessed March 9, 2022.

¹⁰³ Lib, Lohya, and I. Lakai. "The Nigerian judiciary in the 21st century and the challenges in justice delivery." *KAS African Law Study Library* 4(3), 2017, p.1.

weakness of the Nigeria legal system. Justice and the rule of law do not just depend on the law but on the impartiality, astuteness and nobility of the judicial officers. Unfortunately, the Nigerian judicial system is weak and encourages criminality as many of the offenders easily find their way home even after being arrested and prosecuted¹⁰⁴. Nigeria is thus in trouble if the security personnel cannot prevent and detect crimes due to lack of basic equipment and training and the judiciary too, due to the flaws inherent in its system that hinders the dispense of justice. Furthermore, some scholars have attributed the weakness of the Nigeria judicial system to certain factors. It was observed that corruption by judicial officers, their subordinates and administrative staff, frivolous adjournment of cases, refusal to file proof of service after the service of a court process and undue devotion to technicality¹⁰⁵ are some of the challenges of the Nigeria judiciary. Not only in the war against insurgency, but also in the promotion of individual justice, national cohesion, and socioeconomic growth, fair and prompt administration of justice is critical. In 2012, the then Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, called for an urgent reform of the criminal justice sector in Nigeria, insisting that “efficient justice delivery is central to our national economic growth and development.”¹⁰⁶ He went further to assert that the Nigerian budding democracy depends heavily on the just resolution of our individual differences through an efficient criminal justice administration.

Many members, sponsors, and sympathizers of Boko Haram including serving members of parliament have been arrested during counter-terrorism operations against the sect in the past three years but few have been successfully prosecuted and convicted. The late Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf was arrested in 2006 and 2008 on allegations of incitement to violence and support for terrorism but was released without charges on both occasions. Hundreds of suspected Boko Haram members have been released from prison by well-orchestrated Boko Haram attacks on prisons while these suspects awaited trial.¹⁰⁷ Criminal justice reforms should focus on eliminating long periods of pre-trial detention, lengthy trials, duplication of prosecutorial functions, and corruption in the judiciary. Most importantly, the judiciary ought to play a

¹⁰⁴ Obarisiagbon, E. I. "Kidnapping and the administration of criminal justice in selected states in Nigeria." *Unpublished Ph. D dissertation, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria*, 2017.

¹⁰⁵ Obarisiagbon, E. I., and A. A. Aderinto. "Kidnapping and the challenges confronting the administration of criminal justice in selected states of Nigeria." *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS* 11(1), 2018, p. 8.

¹⁰⁶ Ikechukwu Nnochiri, "Adoke Calls for Urgent Reforms of Nigeria's Criminal Justice Sector", *Nigeria Tribune*, November 10, 2012. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/11/adoke-calls-for-urgent-reform-of-nigerias-criminal-justice-sector/>. Accessed 8 March, 2022.

¹⁰⁷ Udounwa, Solomon E. *Boko Haram: Developing new strategies to combat terrorism in Nigeria*. Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA, 2013.

significant role towards the prosecution of these unscrupulous element because if justice does not prevail and offenders are freed on grounds of amnesty or pardon will send the wrong signals to the society; these could even encourage more acts of terrorism or motivate more insurgent groups to emerge and strike at the country.

Sectarianism

Sectarianism can be utilized as an umbrella strategy of discrimination in different societal establishments such as religion, ethnicity, politics, culture, linguistics and so many other minor contexts. But for the purpose of the research, sectarianism will be discussed in the context on religion and ethnicity divide in Nigeria and it has fueled violent insurgent in the country. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria¹⁰⁸ 1999 as amended, Chapter 1 Section 10 states that “the government of the Federation or a State shall not adopt any religion as a state religion”. Furthermore, Section 38 (1) states that:

Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

Section 38 (2-4) provides further clarifications that make the rules guiding any religious practice unambiguous in Nigeria. Nonetheless, throughout the last three to four decades, inter and intra religious disputes have been one of Nigeria’s defining characteristics, particularly in the Northern part of the country. The series of religious violent conflicts in the country negates the provisions in the constitution.

A careful look at the political parties and their choice of candidates for electoral offices since Nigeria’s return to democratic practice in 1999 depicts a systematic adoption of the two foreign but dominant faiths as state religions. If for instance, a presidential candidate of a party is a Muslim, the running mate compulsorily will be a Christian and vice versa. Where the Senate President is a Christian, his deputy must be a Muslim. If the Senate President is a Muslim, the Speaker of the House of Representative must be a Christian.¹⁰⁹ The same unofficial political arrangement operates in the states with the exception of states from the extreme North and South-eastern Nigeria where these religions predominate. This whole idea provides the basis for sectarianism to spread among the two dominant religions in country. In as much as it brings about

¹⁰⁸ Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, with Amendments 2011.

¹⁰⁹ Samuel, Odoma, and Ngozi Obeta. "Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Between Secularism and State Preference for Religions." *Open Journal of Social Sciences* 9 (01), 2021: pp. 21-22.

the representation of the two major religions, it has also led to the religious division among the populace. Religion therefore can be used as a tool for political control. The table below is a summary of some violent religious conflicts in Nigeria from 1999-2015, although this data is not exhaustive:

SN	Date	State	Nature	Remarks
1	1 Jul. 1999	Ogun	Violent clashes between Yoruba traditional worshippers and Hausa groups in Sagamu, Ondo state.	The crisis originated from the killing of a Hausa woman by the Oro Masqueraders for violating traditional rites.
2	22 Jul. 1999	Kano	Reprisal to the Sagamu crisis above.	The casualty figure was not reported.
3	20 Dec. 1999	Kwara	Muslim fundamentalists attacked and destroyed over 14 churches in Ilorin.	Properties worth several millions of naira were destroyed and an unspecified casualty reported.
4	28 Feb. 2000	Abia	Religious riots in Aba, and minor disturbances in Umuahia.	Over 450 persons killed in Aba, Abia state, as reprisal for the Kaduna crisis.
5	8 Sept. 2000	Gombe	The Kaltungo religious crisis.	The crisis erupted over the implementation of Sharia in the state.
6	7–17 Sept. 2001	Jos	A religious riot between Muslims and Christians in Jos. Mosques, churches and several properties were damaged or torched.	The riot broke out when the Islamic Brigade attacked a Christian woman who attempted to cross a public high-way barricaded by Muslim worshippers on Friday. Over 300 people were killed.
7	16 Nov. 2002	Kaduna	The <i>Miss World</i> crisis in which Muslims attacked Christians and churches.	The crisis was triggered by an article authored by Isioma Daniel in <i>This Day</i> newspaper, alleging that Prophet Mohammed would have loved to have the girls. Over 250 people were killed and several churches destroyed.
8	18 Feb. 2006	Borno	Religious conflict between Christians and Muslims in Maiduguri.	The riot was caused by the Danish cartoon on Prophet Mohammed, in <i>Jyllands-Posten</i> newspaper. Over 50 persons killed and 30 churches destroyed; over 200 shops, 50 houses and 100 vehicles vandalised.
9	28 Nov. 2008	Plateau	Religious violence between Muslims and Christians in the city of Jos.	The crisis which was triggered by the controversial results of a local election later turned religious. Over 700 people killed and thousands internally displaced.
10	21 Feb. 2009	Bauchi	Ethno-religious conflict at the Makama New Extension.	Over 11 people were killed, more than 400 houses burnt, and over 1 600 families displaced.
11	26–30 Jul. 2009	Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Yobe	Religious violence unleashed by the radical <i>Boko Haram</i> sect on Christians.	Over 700 persons killed, 3500 persons internally displaced, 1264 children orphaned, over 392 women widowed, and several properties destroyed.

12	11 Apr. 2010	Plateau	Attack on a Christian village of Berom stock, some 30 kilometres South of Jos, by suspected Fulani herdsmen.	The attackers targeted the homes of some officials in Kura Jenta, in reprisal to the killing of about 150 Fulani Muslims, who were allegedly killed and dumped in wells on 19 January 2010. This violence was ethnoreligious.
14	5-6 Jan. 2012	Gombe, Gombe state	Gunmen stormed a Deeper life church in Gombe, shooting indiscriminately at worshippers. The <i>Boko Haram</i> Islamist sect claimed responsibility for the shooting.	6 persons were reportedly killed while many others were injured.
15	June 29th, 2014	Chibok, Maiduguri		At least, fifty-four people were massacred by Boko Haram in attacks targeting churches with grenades and guns.
16	Sept. 23rd, 2015	Yola		241 Women and Children Were Murdered by Boko Haram in two villages

As from the table above, religious motivated conflicts have become widespread in Nigeria, a nation considered by many to be one of the most religious nations of the world. Although it has been stressed that religion has the ability to bind people from different social backgrounds into a single moral community, the assertion came with a warning that, if not carefully handled, religion can equally disintegrate a society as much as it is believed to bind¹¹⁰. Fundamentally, religious intolerance, fundamentalism and extremism are co-pilots of the vehicle of religious conflicts. Religion has been become entrenched in the Nigerian politics; thus, it has led to violent conflicts. Every facet of religious violence in Nigeria is perpetrated by men who have grouped themselves as rebels, pastoralists, and bandits, among other violent groups. These events have fostered the seeds of animosity, suspicion, and strife between Christians and Muslims across Nigeria.

In addition to religious violence, ethnic violent conflict is another issue which is deeply ingrained in Nigerian politics. Nigeria is a country with diverse multi ethnic and religious identities¹¹¹ which have come to play significant roles in persistent ethnic conflict. These identities or nationalities finds expression in divide and rule politics in Nigeria coupled with the fact that political elites' manipulations of ethnic or tribal and religious sentiments as a means to achieved political power so easily. Before Colonialism, there have been in existence many types of

¹¹⁰ Demarest, Leila. "Religion, Violence, and Local Power-Sharing in Nigeria by Laura Thaut Vinson." *African Studies Review* 61 (3), 2018: pp. 245-246.

¹¹¹ Egwu, S, G. Contested Identities and the Crises of Citizenship in Nigeria: *Journal of Policy and Strategy*.14(1) 2004: pp. 40-65.

traditional state society and independent political entities operating at different level of development, civilization and administration locally.

A careful examination of Nigeria's political structure reveals that the Northern area is double the size of the West and East combined. One unfortunate phenomenon in Nigerian political system is that the "big three" are not willing to concede political rights to the minorities constitutionally. This has always led to conflicts of interests among the major and the minority groups. Ethnic conflict has become a household phenomenon in Nigeria not because of the nature of the socio-political differences of the ethnics wedged together by the colonialists but because of the inability of these ethnic groups to see and explore the socio-economic benefits in the diversity of Nigeria, coupled with the struggle to have perpetual control of the socio-economic and political affairs of the country by each ethnic group.¹¹² The political system in Nigeria in the 20th Century could also traced to be the foundation of ethnic rivalry. The major political parties in the republic had emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s as regional parties whose main aim was to control power in their regions. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the Action Group (AG), which controlled the Northern Region and the Western Region, respectively, clearly emerged in this way. The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), which controlled the Eastern Region. These regional parties were based upon, and derived their main support from, the major groups in their regions: NPC (Hausa/Fulani), AG (Yoruba), and NCNC (Igbo).

In an unhealthy rivalry, Nigeria's three largest ethnic groups compete for scarce resources. For instance, the minority ethnic groups¹¹³ in the oil producing Niger Delta region feel they are victims of a gang-up by the three major ethnic groups to share the nation's oil wealth among themselves. Everything in the country has its own ethnic tag i.e., allegation of ethnic discrimination in appointment into jobs, admission into schools, business transactions and sharing of amenities, cuts across and can be heard in every state of the federation. Nigeria within this period that is from 1999 to 2011 has also lost a lot to various militant ethnic youth movements which are majorly used as war tools by the elites and ethnic groups to press home their demands. Such militant ethnic youth movements include Odua People Congress (OPC), the Arewa People Congress, the Ijaw Youth Council, the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, the Bakassi Boys, the movement for the

¹¹² Adetiba, Toyin Cotties. *Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria: A challenge to inclusive social and political development*. Unpublished Ph. D dissertation, University of Fort Hare, 2013

¹¹³ Ambe-Uva, T.N. *Identity Politics and the Jos Crisis: Evidences, Lessons, and Challenges of Good Governance*"; School of International Studies, (National Open University of Nigeria Lagos, Nigeria, 2010) p. 18.

actualization of the sovereign state Biafra, the Hisba or Sharia vigilante groups in the Muslim North and the militias of the Tiv, Jukun and other ethnic groups in Nigeria's many conflict zones.¹¹⁴

In summary, insurgent violence has great influence on the politics and various security institutions in Nigeria. The ethnic rivalry among the three major ethnic tribes in Nigeria has also result to further disintegration. The spate of this violence recently has resulted in the use of different arms to foment violence at the expense of peace and security. These violent groups are in possession of weapons which sometimes the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) for instance are not equipped with. It is therefore pertinent to examine the political economy of insurgency, taking into considering the impact on insurgency on food insecurity and inflation, foreign direct investment, and tourism funding. In the next chapter, the aforementioned would be extensively discussed.

¹¹⁴ Helen Chapin Metz, (ed). *Nigeria: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. <http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/68.htm> Accessed March 10, 2022.

Chapter 3

Political Economy of Insurgency: Nigeria and West Africa Perspective

Introduction

Over the years, Nigeria has been confronted with a multiplicity of crises, political, ethnic, religious etc. However, the recent insurgency type of crises has become more devastating to its people and the economy. Insurgency in Nigeria's contemporary political economy has caused incalculable damage to every aspect of life in the country, primarily in the northern area and progressively expanding to other parts of the country. There is no gainsaying that, the upsurge of violent conflicts has slowed down national economic growth and development, since no investors would invest in a crisis ridden nation. The rates of terrorist bombings, kidnapping, armed robbery attacks as well as other violent crimes have culminated to massive loss of the nation's human resources. This dreadful trend endangers the country's agricultural output, private-sector investment, petroleum-sector growth, manpower, and overall economic development. There is therefore the urgent need to understand the political economy impact of this crisis.

Impact of Insurgency on Nigeria's Political Economy

Insurgency does not only pose threats to the lives and properties of citizen but it also discourages local businesses, scares away foreign investment and portrays a bad image of the country. Security challenges posed by insurgency have become a global phenomenon that needs to be tackled as a matter of seriousness to create an enabling environment for socio-economic development. For over a decade, Nigeria has continued to witness a tremendous setback in its socio-economic development fueled by the continuous resurgence of different kinds of security threats particularly armed banditry, kidnapping, organized crime, farmer-herder conflict, Boko Haram insurgency among others. For the purpose of the research, the impact of insurgency on Nigeria's political economy will focus on the foreign direct investment (FDI), food insecurity and inflation, tourism industry and disruption of economic activities in the country.

Foreign Direct Investment: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plays a major role in the economic development of emerging markets. This is important because FDI provides capital to finance domestic projects as well as expertise to undertake such projects. The competition for getting FDI

inflow has become stiffer as both advanced countries and developing countries are all showing growing interest in attracting FDI¹¹⁵.

Nigeria since independence, has witnessed series of social and violent unrest at different times and in different forms. The surge of insecurity in Nigeria is a major source of concern for both the government and the people, and it has drawn international attention to the country. Counting the cost of various security challenges featuring in the country, the statistics could be discouraging for any would-be investor as they portend danger. These would translate to high cost of risk management, increased spending on security in terms of diversion of scarce capital for the procurement of hi-tech equipment for the purpose of combating insecurity¹¹⁶. The primary objective of every investor is to maximize profit and this may not be achievable if so, much capital is invested to ensure security of lives and property.

It is natural to be concerned that insecurity will have a detrimental impact on FDI flows to any country affected. According to empirical studies, a loss of foreign investor trust caused by security concerns would result in massive capital outflows in the affected countries. Also, the fact that a country is branded a security risk because of high level of insecurity features like militancy, ethno-religious violence, terrorism and insurgency, would make it less attractive to FDI¹¹⁷. Several economic analyses proved that conflicts, such as terrorist incidents, ethno-religious violence, militancy and insurgency increase the level of insecurity and affect a country on the national level. The assertion is an affirmation to the steady decline in the patterns of investment in Nigeria both in the oil and non-oil sectors of the economy.

¹¹⁵ Lim, E. *Determinants of and Relationship between FDI and Growth: A Summary of Recent Literature*. IMF Working Paper No. 175, International Monetary Fund, 2001. <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451858754.001>

¹¹⁶ Ayoola, A.O. "Insecurity and Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria (1999-2014)." *Open Journal of Political Science* (12) 1, 2021: pp. 28-45.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

This statistic shows the Nigeria Foreign Direct Investment from 2010-2019¹¹⁸



From 2009, the foreign direct investment has been on steady decline, except for the increase in 2011 which was immediately followed by a decline from 2012 till 2018. There is no doubt that the foreign direct investment in the year 2020 would witness a sharp downturn, owing to the twin effect of violent conflicts and the general widespread of covid-19 pandemic. However, Nigeria needs to wake up in order to tackle these security challenges because it leaves the country in delicate position if it is not properly handled. Foreign investors are not expected to solve the challenges in their host communities, although the community should benefit from their presence, for instance it could in terms of job opportunities, but the larger challenges of the host community should be solved by the government because the investors pay their taxes to the government.

Due to the increase in insurgency in the country, some multinational companies have suffered adverse effect from different attacks. Most importantly, the patterns of foreign investment as dictated by the kind of services they or in their production of goods and services determine the extent at which they are affected by this violent conflict in different part of the country.

¹¹⁸ Nigeria Foreign Direct Investment 2010-2019. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/NGA/nigeria/foreign-direct-investment> Accessed April 12, 2022.

The table¹¹⁹ below portrays some of those companies and the also the nature of the attacks they have suffered.

SN	COMPANY	REPORTS
1	Chevron Nigeria represents the oil sector. As a multinational oil company, its operations have been restricted to the Niger Delta region. It carries out exploration and exploitation activities both in the upstream and downstream sectors.	The company's production and operations have been severally disrupted by the militant activities characterized by hostage taking, kidnapping, oil theft, and pipeline vandalism. This is not limited to Chevron but other oil companies in this region also suffer the same fate. They have all suffered loss of barrels of crude that have wasted or stolen due to bunkering pipelines vandalism.
2	MTN Nigeria is a telecommunication service provider. They have the head office in Lagos with regional offices in every region.	As a service providing company, virtually everybody subscribed to it including the militants and terrorists in their communication processes and strategies. Some of their installations in the North-East were destroyed by Boko Haram explosives in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively which caused total cut-off of network services in some parts of the region and affected the quality of services in some other areas. Some of the customer relations outlets in those areas were also closed down indefinitely for safety of the staff. Overall, the profitability of the company has not been really affected on the average.
3	Julius Berger Nigeria PLC is a construction company representing the construction sector of FDI in this study. The headquarters of the German company is located at Utako District, Abuja. The operations of the company cut across the entire country.	The company recorded the kidnap of two expatriates in South-South and one death in the North. The kidnapped victims were released after payment of ransom. These unfortunate incidents have not affected the pattern of investment of the company in Nigeria.
4	Shoprite Nigeria is a subsidiary of the Shoprite Group of companies. The South African retail outlet represents the retail sector of foreign investment in Nigeria.	Kano outlet suffered a major bomber attack in 2014 with a suicide bomber trying to gain entrance, but the bomb exploded right in front of the building before he could enter the shopping mall. There was no loss of life, but the outlet was closed down for renovation and this incident stalled the proposed Kaduna outlet. This was a major setback for the company whose desire is to spread across the entire region of the country. Security reports in some of the regions, especially the South-South and North-East in particular, are major constraints.

¹¹⁹ Ayoola, A.O, n.1, pp. 28-45.

5	The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) is the pioneer and leader of the petroleum industry in Nigeria.	In 2021, the company has been thinking of divestment owing to risks including sabotage attacks, crude thefts and litigations with host communities. The Anglo-Dutch energy giant, operational in Nigeria since 1936, has been gradually selling its onshore assets for over a decade in Nigeria. Shell's divestment could deal a fresh blow to the fiscal plan of the Nigerian government, about 90 per cent of whose revenue comes from oil, as it rebalances from the oil crash of 2020.
6	Lafarge Africa Group is a cement manufacturer headquartered in Lagos	Over 60 million USD was lost during the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast of Nigeria between November 2014 and April 2015
	Ashaka Cement Plc, a Subsidiary of Lafarge Africa. Based In Northeastern Nigeria.	In 2015 Ashaka Cement has reportedly lost more than 10 million USD. due to attacks on its cement plant in Gombe State by Boko Haram. The plant has been robbed and vandalised, losing personnel and machinery, as well as deliveries of ammonium sulfate. Market demand has naturally also fallen, given the unrest.

The implication of insurgency on foreign direct investment is that it could risk being concentrated at some regions considered as less-risky of attacks on investments. This will ultimately reduce the potential benefits of the country from the sector. The relocation of multinational companies to safer territories in Africa like Ghana could also pose a greater risk for the Nigeria's economic growth and development.

Food Insecurity and Inflation: The herdsmen/farmers' violence in Benue State, Nigeria has constituted security challenges and could have contributed to food insecurity as more than 2000 lives were lost in Nigeria and over 170,000 were internally displaced in Benue state, a state tagged "Food Basket of the Nation" because of its rich agricultural produce which include Yam, Rice, Beans, Cassava, Sweet-potato, Maize, Soybean, Sorghum, Millet, Sesame, cocoyam etc. The recent spike in herdsmen and native farmer violence, while national in scope, has been concentrated mostly in Nigeria's North Central Region and is linked to herders' migration, necessitating an investigation of the consequences on food security.¹²⁰ In some cases, armed bandits insist on payments before farmers can have access to farmlands in the planting season, only to return during the harvest season and extort farmers for further payments before any access is granted. This has led to scarcity and a surge in the prices of certain food commodities. More

¹²⁰ Alao, D.O, et al. "Herdsmen/native farmers' violence in Benue State and food security in Nigeria." *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* (10) 6, 2019: pp. 38-39.

than one million farmers¹²¹ in Nigeria's Benue state have been displaced because of the intercommunal violence between herders and farmers.

Nigerian food costs rise the fastest in 15 years, pushing up inflation



Source: National Bureau of Statistics

*Rising food in Nigeria*¹²²

In March 2021, food inflation rose to 22.95% caused by wide-ranging price increases across items such as cereals, yam, meat, fish and fruits. Those soaring costs have been in part blamed on a worsening conflict between farmers and herders in Nigeria. Rising inflation has adversely affected the profitability of producers and is a major contributor to the low export penetration of made-in-Nigeria goods in the international market¹²³.

Food costs have risen as a result of the unrest which has been compounded by the more than decade-long Boko Haram insurgency in the north. This is due to the fact that Northern Nigeria contributes to food production; the northern half of the country supplies a substantial share of the country's food. The security situations affected farmland production and that has led to some increase in food prices. The escalating violent conflict is forcing people to flee their homes, abandon their fields and their sources of income, exposing them to acute food insecurity in

¹²¹Hunger crisis looms in Nigeria's 'food basket' amid conflict. <https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2022/feb/02/hunger-crisis-looms-in-nigerias-food-basket-amid-conflict-2414381.html>. Accessed April 14, 2022

¹²² Anthony, O. and Ruth O. 'It is really bad': Nigerians go hungry as food inflation soars. <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/4/16/it-is-really-bad-nigerians-go-hungry-as-food-inflation-soars>. Accessed April 14, 2022

¹²³ Ibid.

Northern Nigeria. The insurgency in the northeast affected agricultural inputs, which account for a significant portion of Nigeria's national income. The security situation in the north has had an impact on agriculture productivity, which has resulted in an increase in food costs. Food prices surged 9.8% and inflation hit 8.2%, according to the Nigerian Central Bank (CBN), the highest levels in the few months since the sect's interruption.¹²⁴ Farm workers feared being attacked by insurgents while grazing animals, and agricultural sectors became targets for terrorists in need of supplies as a result of the fighting. The insurgent group steal cash, food, and other valuables. Nigeria spends approximately ten billion dollars per year on basic food imports such as sugar, wheat, and rice, according to the Nigeria's National Statistics Bureau.¹²⁵

Agricultural production has been hampered by the unprecedented rise in insecurity, which has displaced farming communities. As a result, many farmers have abandoned their farms, fled their towns, and either relocated to urban areas or sought refuge in IDP camps. As a result, the refugees in the camps are unable to contribute to economic activity. Food prices will remain elevated until the security crisis, which has prevented farmers from returning to their land, is resolved. To grow the economy and reduce high import bills, Nigeria must find and fight its way out of insecurity conundrum. The menace is no longer a security challenge but an economic catastrophe that must be tame within the shortest possible time. Trade deficit puts pressure on the nation's foreign exchange as little is earned with fewer export activities. In simple terms, a trade deficit means the country is importing more of what it needs. This generally results in loss of job or unemployment and a decline in economic growth. It can also affect income of workers pushing many below the poverty line.

Tourism: The deteriorating nature of Nigeria's economic activities is visible in numerous sectors of the economy, including the tourism sector. However, because of the potential for job creation, the tourism industry must be developed, and the Nigerian government must make significant efforts to diversify the economy away from oil extraction and into other viable industries in order to create wealth for the country. Widespread insecurity in some part of the nation and violent conflict can serve as an impediment to tourism development in Nigeria. No tourist would want to visit a country where their security cannot be guaranteed.

¹²⁴ Titus, U. M., Fadeyi, T.J and Aminu, I. "Political economy of insurgency in Nigeria: An analysis of Boko haram sect in the Northeast." *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences* (7) 11, 2017: pp. 38-39.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

The richness and diversity of Nigeria's culture has always been cited as strong reason why tourism should be a major foreign exchange earner for the country. From east to west, from north down to south, the country is naturally endowed with rich tourist sites. The Osun Osogbo Groove, Obudu Cattle Ranch, Ogbunike Cave, Oguta Lake, Yankari Game Reserve, Olumo Rock, Idorin Hills, Ikogosi Waterfall, Mambila Plateau. And when it comes to festivals, Nigeria is not lacking¹²⁶. From the Argungu Fishing Festival, to Osun Osogbo Festival, Abuja Carnival, Calabar Christmas Carnival, Cross Rivers State Carnival, Eyo Festival, Igue Festival, Ojude Oba Festival, Badagry Festival, Durba Festival. Almost every State in the country hosts one or two festivals yearly. However, the big question is, how much of these opportunities have been fully developed to attract tourists (locally and internationally) as well as earn revenue for respective states?

With the capacity to create massive employment, attract foreign investment and currency, the tourism sector relies largely on international tourists for its 20% contribution to the economy. However, widespread insecurity has left most parts of Nigeria unsafe.¹²⁷ Insecurity arising from insurgency, communal killings caused by herdsmen and farmers clashes, coupled with 'get-rich quick' mentality has increased kidnapping activities and ritual killings. Insecurity also threatens domestic tourism which has been lauded as 'the low hanging fruit' to boost the sector's growth post-pandemic. Nigerians are unwilling to travel within the country owing to increased insecurity activities. Although a host of factors affects the tourism industry in Nigeria such as Government funding of tourism sector, infrastructural challenge, absence of Political will among others.

In the year 2019, tourism contributed \$1.5 billion¹²⁸ to the Nigerian economy, which was scarcely 0.3% of the total GDP. In 2020 this value dropped, aside from rising insecurity, a major factor that led to this decline is the COVID-19 pandemic in the year. Tourism has been known to contribute to the growth of the Nigerian economy over the years, visible from its foreign exchange earnings potential. Economically, tourism serves as a channel for foreign reserves and investment in the economy, which by extension, leads to GDP growth and economic diversification.

¹²⁶ Chuks Nwanne, A look at Nigerian tourism industry in 2017. <https://guardian.ng/saturday-magazine/a-look-at-nigerian-tourism-industry-in-2017/>. Accessed April 15, 2022.

¹²⁷ Chinelo, Chikelu. Nigeria Tourism Struggles Amid Rising Insecurity, 2022. <https://allafrica.com/stories/202202230025.html> Accessed April 14, 2022.

¹²⁸ Tourism as a Source of Revenue for the Nigerian Economy. <https://www.proshareng.com/news/Travel%20&%20Tours/Tourism-as-a-Source-of-Revenue-for-the-Nigerian-Economy/59296#>. Accessed April 15, 2022

Disruption of Economic Activities

With Nigeria having six (6) geopolitical zones, economic activities have been crippled by some of this violence insurgence and this could retard the country's socio-economic development. Some States in Northeast (mostly Adamawa, Yobe and Borno) are known as the centre of the activities of the Boko Haram have crippled economically because the insurgency led to closure of business activities. Those in the business of logistics and transportation are affected as many are avoiding going to many zones due to insecurity. People are also reducing their travels due to the challenge. The aviation sector appears to be the ultimate beneficiary of the insecurity challenge¹²⁹ A lot of people who should ordinarily travel by road are now travelling by air. Recently, this violent extremists' gangs have taken their nefarious act to the railway station in Kaduna, one of the states in the North West. Commuters decided to use the railways station because of the risk in travelling by road, but there was an attack on the train by some armed gangs. Kaduna State has strategic and economic importance. It is Nigeria's centre of military education and security planning, and the gateway to the north that houses critical infrastructure such as airports and railway stations. The Abuja-Kaduna train generates at least \$700,000¹³⁰ for the country every month and has improved the country's investment potential. It promotes business, travel and cargo transport between the two major cities. Economic development has also been promoted along the railway line and in surrounding cities. The operations of these armed gangs pose a threat to Nigeria's public transportation system, as well as the economies of Kaduna State and neighbouring north-western states.

Insurgent violence has also caused migration of people from North to Southern part of the country. The mass emigration of Nigerians citizen, who are non-indigent to northern region of the major conflict affected cities posed a serious threat to political economy of Nigeria¹³¹. The rush to escaped from the north affecting the profitability of business establishment in the region. The employees of these institutions are increasingly demanding that they be posed to less volatile branches. Indeed, a mass departure from the northern region will not only constitute a depletion of economy but also caused those departing from the region into financial and psychological pressure.

¹²⁹ Femi A. Nigerians pay more for insecurity as economic impact hits N50tr. <https://guardian.ng/news/nigerians-pay-more-for-insecurity-as-economic-impact-hits-n50tr/> Accessed April 17, 2022.

¹³⁰ Oluwole O., Adewumi B., and Freedom O. "Kaduna's train attacks add to Nigeria's deep security problems", 2022. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kadunas-train-attacks-add-to-nigerias-deep-security-problems>

¹³¹ Ibid 124.

Violent conflict is a risk factor which business owners and managers dread and avoid by relocating their businesses elsewhere. In the case of Nigeria, there is evidence of some businessmen and manufacturing companies having to relocate particularly from the North in recent times to other peaceful parts of the country. Many Igbos and Yorubas from Southern Nigeria who work in various businesses in Northern Nigeria have been forced to return to their home states to flee the terrorist group Boko Haram's attacks. As a result, the Boko Haram insurgency, which began in Maiduguri, Borno State in 2009, has wreaked havoc on the North's economy, as major consumer goods and the industries that create them have fled the region. A good example are the telecommunication companies which have been forced to close down as their telecommunication apparatuses were repeatedly destroyed; media houses were equally attacked as well as having some of their staff killed; banks too were not spared from the destruction as some branches of the banks were attacked and robbed. Besides, the wave of kidnapping in some parts of Nigeria has forced investors, businessmen and manufacturing companies to relocate to other peaceful cities in Nigeria or even to leave the country entirely¹³². In Aba, a city in the southeast of Nigeria and the commercial center of Abia State, for example, the Nigeria Breweries Limited (NBL), Seven-Up PLC, UNILEVER PLC, Paterson Zochonis (PZ) PLC relocated to Enugu largely due to constant kidnapping of their expatriate staff. Aside from constant migration of businesses from one region to another, investment becomes unattractive to business people when they reflect on the various violent conflicts in the country. This is because it increases the cost of doing business either through direct loss of goods and properties or the cost of taking precaution against business risks and uncertainty. Furthermore, State internally generated will be affected with growing insurgency different regions of the country. By implication, the not only that violent insurgency leads to migration of people, it also affects the migration of business. Shutting of businesses and relocation of companies from unsafe to safe havens also have huge impact on the number of unemployed youths who may likely to available to all kinds of criminalities.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have a substantial impact on economic growth and development in developing countries and growing markets like Nigeria. Small businesses continue to save the economy and citizens in Nigeria, where unemployment is at an all-time high, by providing gainful employment, money generation, and marketable goods and services.

¹³² Nwagboso, C. I. (2012). "Security Challenges and Economy of the Nigerian State (2007- 2011)". *American International Journal of Contemporary Research* 2(6) 244-258.

According to a report by the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics in 2021, SMEs in Nigeria have contributed about 48% of the national GDP, accounted for 84% of employment and 96% of businesses in the last five years.¹³³ The migration and collapse of these businesses will only increase the unemployment rate in the country. None of this is good for the economic growth of a developing country.

In conclusion, while this insurgency may pose a significant impact on the political economy the country considering the negative impact on the nation's GDP viz-a-viz the various avenues to generate revenue for the country. Insurgency constitutes a serious threat to development of Nigerian state, the socio-economic impacts, human cost and displacement of the people from their homes. It is therefore important to assess the impact of this insurgency on the human security as opposed to that of the state. This is largely because of the migration of people to a safer environment, while some people are being transferred to a camp for internally displaced persons.

¹³³ "The role of retail banks in SMEs development, sustainability, growth". <https://guardian.ng/business-services/the-role-of-retail-banks-in-smes-development-sustainability-growth/> Accessed April 18, 2022.

Chapter 4

Insurgency and Human Security

Introduction

Before the end of the cold war, scholars have, for many several generations interpreted and restricted the understanding and meaning of the concept security to the security of the nation state and not the people¹³⁴. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the idea of human security gained traction in world politics as a result of various reports from many independent international commissions established by the United Nations and other regional bodies, prompted by growing dissatisfaction with the existing traditional idea of security. As a result, human security is a vague term with no commonly accepted definition; yet, researchers agree that it revolves around the safety of individuals first. It is essentially an emerging concept that aims to address fundamental concerns confronting human beings and develop long-term solutions to them, as its proponents argue that the individual, rather than the state, is the primary referent for security. Human security is a concept that has been defined in a broad and a narrow perspective. The broad perspective championed by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP). Human Development Report defines human security "as freedom from fear and freedom from want". It also elaborates the two aspects of human security: one, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression; and two, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life whether in homes, in jobs or in communities¹³⁵.

Insurgency has become a threat to global peace and security in the 21st century since it is the leading cause of humanitarian crises such as increased human casualties, internally displaced persons, refugee disasters, food insecurity, and disease spread. The analysis of the impacts of the insurgency on human security will be based on the broader perspective of human security with particular focus on livelihood crisis, internally displaced persons and human casualties. The impact of insurgency on the rise of humanitarian crisis will be discussed in the context of the Northern States in Nigeria because it is not all States within the country suffers from humanitarian challenges as a result of insurgency. Northern Nigeria consists of nineteen (19) out of thirty-six (36) states

¹³⁴ Danjibo, N. "The Imperative of National and Human Security as Panacea for Peace and Development: A Theoretical Discourse". In Isaac Olawale Albert et al (Eds.) The Security Sector and Conflict Management in Nigeria, 2013. Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.

¹³⁵ Adedoyin, A. "Human Security Factor in Agricultural Transformation in Nigeria". In Isaac Olawale Albert et al (Eds.) The Security Sector and Conflict Management in Nigeria. Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, 2013. University of Ibadan, Ibadan.

clustered into three (3) geo-political zones of North-West, North-East and North-Central. The regions have been characterized by ethno-religious and political conflicts, rising violent crimes and widespread corruption resulting into internal displacement of population largely due to bad governance, socio-economic imbalances, injustice and inequalities, as well as insensitivity to the plight of their citizens.¹³⁶

Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee Crisis

There has been an increase in the number of humanitarian crises classified as complex emergencies since the end of the Cold War. These are man-made disasters that occur as a result of armed conflict or insurgency, resulting in human deaths, forced displacements, diseases, and hunger. The rise of insurgency in any country is caused by a number of factors including poverty, social inequality, poor governance, state fragility, and food insecurity, with the main consequences being various forms of humanitarian crises such as forced displacement, high disease rates, and food shortages. This impact of this has been felt on human security in terms of displacement, refugee debacle and the livelihood of populace in the affected areas.

By definition, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are people or groups who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situation of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disaster, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border. In addition, there is a broad distinction between the internally displaced persons and refugees, the two concepts which are often mis-conceptualized.¹³⁷ Those who cross an internationally recognized State border in order to avoid the effect of armed conflict

KEY FIGURES

 **2,150,243**

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)

in Northeast, 92% due to insurgency, 7% communal clashes and 1% natural disaster. 1,956,055 in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states.

Source: DTM - RXXXV Dec. 2020.

 **728,688**

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)

IDPs, 419,457 are in North-West while 309,231 are in North-Central

Source: DTM - NCNW RV Jan. 2021.

 **303,963**

NIGERIAN REFUGEES REGISTERED IN CAMEROON, CHAD, AND NIGER


Source: UNHCR Mar. 2021.

¹³⁶ Adamu, A., & Rasheed, Z. H. Effects of insecurity on the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northern Nigeria: prognosis and diagnosis. *Global Journal of Human-Social Science: Political Science*, 16(1), 2016: pp. 10-21

¹³⁷ Ibid. p.2

are called refugee. The concept of Internally Displaced Person (IDP) has gained popularity in the last decade due to civil conflicts, war, human right abuses or natural disaster such as flood or earthquakes.

According to the 2021 UN Refugee Agency report¹³⁸, there are over 2.1 million people who are internally displaced in the Northeast part of the country due to insurgency. This figure indicates that 92% were displaced because of insurgency, 7% were displaced due to communal clashes and 1% are due to some other natural disaster. It was also recorded that 419,457 were internally displaced in Northwest while 309,231 were displaced in the North Central part of the country. About 303,963 Nigerian refugees have been registered in Cameroon, Chad and Niger because these are neighbouring countries with Nigeria and the spill over of any conflict are easily felt by any of the surrounding countries because of porous border management in the region.




¹³⁸ The UN Refugee Agency 2021 Report. Nigeria: All Population. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Nigeria%20%20All%20Population%20Snapshot%20March%202021.pdf> Accessed May 5, 2022.

Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of huge human population in the affected States. The number of the internally displaced persons and refugees associated with the insurgency has been enormous. The plight of these displaced persons in their numerous safe places can only be defined as life-threatening. This is especially true given that they have been separated from their family and social networks. In fact, the rising wave of Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria is largely to blame for the recent influx of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the country.

Furthermore, insecurity caused by the Herders-Farmers issue in Nigeria's north central states, particularly in Benue state, has resulted in a humanitarian disaster, with the resultant Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Benue state. The humanitarian catastrophe in Benue State is worse than in the North East, particularly in terms of food, shelter, sanitation, and medical treatment. Farmers/herders conflict in Benue State has also been a major push factor that has complicated the health status of many people especially the Benue child. This is in view of the fact that, many families with children are forced to leave their residence to internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. The incessant Fulani herders' invasion on several farming communities in Benue resulted in displacing hundreds of thousands of Benue people from their ancestral lands. The conflict has affected Guma, Makurdi, Gwer-East, Gwer-West, Logo, Buruku, Tarka, Kwande, Ukum, Agatu, and Okpokwu Local Government Areas in Benue State. With these conflict, thousands of lives, farmlands, houses and other valuable properties were reported to have been destroyed. This also brought about the establishment of several IDP camps by Benue State government around the state, as a way forward for the rising number of displaced persons affected by the crises. Notable among the camps were Tse-Ginde Camp, (Guma), Gbajimba Camp (Guma), Agan or Abagana camp (Makurdi), Anyiin Camp (Logo), Adeda camp (Logo) LGEA Primary School Ugba camp (Logo) as well as Abande and Imande-Agbatse camps both in Kwande Local Government area of Benue State. Benue State government has made some efforts to improve the health/living condition of those children, like initiation of the "one egg, one man" campaign at the Gbajimba IDP camp to combat malnutrition and stunted growth among Internally Displaced Children¹³⁹.

¹³⁹ Christopher A. Abari, T., & Margaret, B. "Living Condition and Health of Children in Internally Displaced Persons' (IDP) Camps in Benue State, Nigeria." *FUDMA Journal of Politics and International Affairs*, 2 (2), 2020: p.3.

There are various reasons which could be attributed displacement of citizens. For instance, the reason is largely due to the Boko Haram activities in the region, while the North Central and North West States¹⁴⁰ have different narratives.




Reason for Displacement in North Central and North West

As indicated above, communal clashes can be seen as the reason for displacement in North Central and North West Nigeria. This was followed by armed banditry and kidnapping. Natural disasters also contributed to people being displaced, but not to the same extent as communal confrontations, armed banditry, and kidnapping. Non-state armed groups’ insurgency in the Northeast also played a minor role in displacement in the two regions.

¹⁴⁰ International Organization for Migration (IOM) Report 2020 on Nigeria Displacement in North Central and North West Zones Displacement Report 5, 2021
<https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/Round%205%20North%20Central%20and%20North%20west%20Report%20.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=10910> Accessed May 6, 2022

The major reason for displacement in the North eastern Nigeria according to International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Report 2021¹⁴¹ can be seen below:



Reason for Displacement in the Northeast

Apart from lives and property which have been lost as a result of this conflicts, most victims of this conflict have been dislocated from their homelands and are now living in Internally Displaced Persons' camps across the state¹⁴². It's also worth noting that internally displaced people face a variety of challenges, including family separation, inadequate shelters, water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities, sexual abuse and violation of women and girls, food scarcity, inadequate access to health facilities, and child labour, to name a few. Internally displaced people die at a far higher rate than the overall population. IDPs face discrimination as a result of their displacement or for coming from a faraway place. They often lack identity cards, which makes it more difficult for them to access basic services and prevents them from exercising their political and civil rights.

¹⁴¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM) Report 2021 on Nigeria Displacement in North Central and North West Zones Displacement Report 5, 2021. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/northeast-nigeria-displacement-report-36-may-2021>. Accessed May 6, 2022

¹⁴² Inyang, E. B., & Effiong, E. N. Humanitarian Intervention in Nigeria: A Case of internally displaced People in Benue State, 2018–2021. *Humanus Discourse*, 2(2): 2022. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3998209>. Accessed April 20, 2022

They can struggle for years or even decades with psychological trauma experienced during displacement. The IDPs experience loss of economic opportunities. This is the inability to engage in any profitable venture or any money-yielding activity. The IDPs lose their social and family structure and experience breakdown of cultural identity due to rising insurgency. Poverty is another traumatic experience of the IDPs. Poverty causes lack of opportunities, lack of adequate means of subsistence, inadequate income, limited household possession, hunger, malnutrition and all kinds of diseases as a result insecurity.¹⁴³ The challenges of protecting the displaced are compounded by the deteriorating security situations as well as socio-economic fragility with communities in the Sahel region facing chronic poverty, a harsh climatic conditions, recurrent epidemic, poor infrastructure and limited access to basic services.

Similarly, because Borno state is the epicentre of the insurgency in North East Nigeria, many people have abandoned their rural homes to urban areas in search of security and humanitarian aid. As a result, the number of IDPs in urban areas expanded considerably, and camps were constructed, mostly in the LGAs of Maiduguri, Jere, and Konduga. As the insurgency grew stronger, more IDPs were forced to migrate to camps near Borno's urban centres. The major concern however of the insurgency in the north-eastern part of Nigeria is the profusion in the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arising from the conflict and scattered within and beyond the region into neighboring countries sharing boundaries with Nigeria¹⁴⁴.

The ongoing displacement crisis in Northeastern Nigeria and the socioeconomic impacts of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic generated significant protection needs in 2020, particularly among IDPs and refugees. While the displaced population in Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara grew by nearly 50 percent between July and December 2020, the overall internally displaced population in the three states remained relatively stable between December 2020 and February 2021. However, the number of Nigerians fleeing from Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara to neighboring Niger's Maradi Region has continued to increase.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Amoke, E. I. P. Internal Displacement in Northeastern Nigeria: Causes, Consequences and Remedies. *International Journal of Management, Social Sciences, Peace and Conflict Studies (IJMSSPCS)*, 4(4), 2021: pp. 13-24.

¹⁴⁴ Humanitarian Needs Overview Nigeria. Humanitarian Programme Cycle, 2022. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_nga_humanitarian_needs_overview_feb2022.pdf Accessed April 24, 2022

¹⁴⁵ USAID Factsheet on Nigeria – Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2 Fiscal Year (FY) 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-2-fiscal-year-fy-2022> Accessed May 6, 2022.

In conclusion, the causes of displacement in Nigeria are numerous, complex, and frequently overlapping. Since 2014, Boko Haram and other Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) have caused massive displacement in Nigeria's north-east. In the north central and north-west regions, crime, cattle rustling, land disputes, armed violence, and tensions between pastoralists and farmers increased. In the northwestern states of Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara, long-standing violence between Fulani pastoralists and Hausa farmers has increased, and rural banditry and criminal violence are on the rise. Communal violence has also been recorded in the country's southern states, though information on displacement is rare. Hundreds of thousands of people are displaced every year by flooding during the rainy season.

Livelihood Crisis

The repercussions of the sectarian violence as well as government's counter-violence on the livelihood conditions of the affected States have been disastrous. Owing to public security volatility in these states, normal productive, agricultural and commercial activities have often been constrained. The enforcement of curfews and emergency rule has restricted movement and communications in a manner that hampered economic activities. In addition, the fear of attacks by the insurgents has often driven community members into hiding. Furthermore, counter-insurgency measures, such as the ban on the use of motorcycles have resulted in loss of means of livelihood and subsistence for some households. In effect, the whole trend points to debilitating livelihood cum human security crises. Of course, the insurgency in the north has had a catastrophic impact on many economic groups' families and livelihoods. Massive infrastructure devastation, telecommunications facility destruction, regular attacks on marketplaces and businesses, and short business hours have forced many to flee to safer parts of the country, lowering incomes and raising poverty levels.

The impact of insurgency on agriculture, which is a key source of income for majority of these rural inhabitants, cannot be overstated, as their engagement in agriculture has been reduced in recent years due to fears of death. In essence, the insecure situation has had a significant impact on farming households whose primary source of income is farming. Households that engage in production do so at the danger of their lives, and as a result, they are unable to visit their fields frequently due to the threat of insurgents. The ongoing insurgency in Nigeria's northeastern region poses a major threat not just to people's lives, but also to their livelihoods. With farmers being afraid to go to their fields in Borno and Yobe States, rains that exceeded expectations failed to translate into a better harvest because most farmers were scared of being ambushed on the way to


their farms. The fear of being ambushed made many farmers avoid going to distant farms and also limited the frequency of visits to their farms. Even where farmers are still able to produce, they face difficulties moving their harvest to the towns and cities where they are in demand because transport infrastructures have been sabotaged by militants, and vehicles traveling on remote roads risk being ambushed. The ban on motorbikes which is a means of transportation for these rural dwellers has greatly limited the accessibility of their agricultural produce to markets and this their source of livelihood¹⁴⁶. Most households can no longer carter for the family needs. Basic necessities such as food and shelter cannot be provided by greater chunk of the community members due to the activities of the insurgents. Households who were food secured before the insurgency can no longer provide the family requirement. The activities of Boko-haram in the northeast have to a considerable degree rendered farm families vulnerable to poverty.

Conflict threatens agricultural communities' livelihood assets, particularly the assets of very poor farmers, because it directly impacts their principal source of income. Recurrent conflict between farmers and herders makes household income sources susceptible over time for both herders and farmers. The conflicts not only have a direct impact on the lives and livelihoods of those involved, they also disrupt and threaten the sustainability of their primary livelihood activity which is agricultural and pastoral production. Displacement of both user groups as a result of attacks from herdsmen and reprisal attacks from farmers deny farmers access to farmlands which has jeopardise the sustainability of household income and food supply. Violent conflicts between crop farmers and herdsmen have, for a long time, been a common feature of economic livelihood strategy in the region with consequences on human and animal lives, properties, peaceful coexistence, and orderliness in the region.¹⁴⁷ Of all the actors involved in the conflict, women suffer the most as their only source of income, apart from what they obtain from their husbands and children, is small-scale farming and husbandry. In pastoralist communities, women also sell dairy products such as milk and butter. The strained relations between the farmers and herders affected the sales of such products. Women farmers alleged that they have been denied farming due to incessant invasion, cattle rustling and the destruction of their crops. Additionally, the women were sometimes denied access to village markets or often subjected to mockery and

¹⁴⁶ Onwuaroh, A. S., Yusuf, R. O., Yusuf, O., & Akpu, B. Impact of Insurgency on income of Farmers in Northeastern Nigeria. *Dutse Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences (DUJOPAS)*. 3(2), 2017. pp 3-4

¹⁴⁷Shabu, T., Kile, T. I., & Ukula, M. K. *Effect of Herdsmen-farmers conflict on livelihood assets of farming communities in Benue State, Nigeria*. 2nd International African Conference on Current Studies of Science, Technology & Social Sciences, Abuja, Nigeria, 2020.

humiliation. Wives of the pastoralists in Batsari LGA, Kastina State were subjected to similar treatment; the conflict has prevented them from moving freely in the community to sell or buy goods. On their part, women farmers, especially in Benue and Nasarawa States resorted to manual labor at the Dangote Farm and selling of firewood to fend for their families due to the prevailing insecurity. According to the data collected by International Organization for Migration (IOM)¹⁴⁸ in the North West and North Central, the most common livelihood activity of IDPs was farming, followed by daily labour and petty trade. Despite the situation, the IDPs still have access to income generating activities.




Source of Livelihood in Northwest

The livelihood activities of displaced persons in Northeast Nigeria¹⁴⁹ as seen below, were quite different from what is obtainable in both the North West and the North Central part of the country. Petty trade was the main livelihood activity for displaced persons in followed by daily wage labourer and farming. But the similarity is that IDPs in the three Northern regions engage in daily labour as their source of livelihood.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid 140.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid 140.



Source of Livelihood in Northeast

Human Casualties/Fatalities

By far, the worst humanitarian consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency have been its tolls on human life and safety. The insurgency has led to loss of many lives, in addition to various degrees and dimension of human injury. During raids in communities, often in the aftermath of Boko Haram attacks, members of the security forces have executed men in front of their families; arbitrarily arrested or beaten members of the community; burned houses, shops, and cars; stolen money while searching homes.

According to a report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Insurgency-related conflicts claimed the lives of almost 350,000 lives in the North-eastern part of Nigeria up till the end 2020. The report said insurgency directly resulted to the death of 35,000 people in three states in the region, while an estimated 314,000 people died “from indirect causes” in the entire North-east region. Since 2009, the North-east has been the theatre of the violent campaigns of the Islamic extremist group, Boko Haram, its breakaway group, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), and counter-insurgency forces¹⁵⁰. Reliable data on the conflict in the North Central Belt are scarce, however, ACLED reported that there was a total of 2,004 civilian casualties in the North-Central zone between early 2018 and late 2020. In the whole of the North-West, there were 2,745 civilian casualties between the beginning of 2018 and the end of 2020.

As the conflict in north-east Nigeria enters its 13th year, the BAY (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe) states have been left to deal with tattered state economies, damaged infrastructure,

¹⁵⁰Kunle Sanni. Boko Haram: 350,000 dead in Nigeria - UN. <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/470476-insurgency-has-killed-almost-350000-in-north-east-undp.html>. Accessed May 6, 2022

widespread insecurity, loss of livelihood and freedom of movement for millions of people. During 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic and deteriorating food security exacerbated conditions, leaving millions of people who will be in severe need of humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian crisis in Northeast Nigeria remains one of the most complex humanitarian crises in the world. Humanitarian partners faced several challenges to reach the targeted population at full-scale. The shortfall in funding along with persistent insecurity or restriction of movement remained some of the main drivers. Also, certain areas remain inaccessible to humanitarian partners, diminishing the overall humanitarian footprint. The immediate impact of funding has pushed sectors to prioritize the communities and beneficiaries to be reached, often the ones highest on the severity scale. However, this prioritization of resources has left a large number of people still in acute need with limited or no humanitarian assistance, as life-saving programmes have either been scaled down or shut down completely.¹⁵¹

In conclusion, the multiplicity of violent conflicts has impacted human security in Nigeria, which has also conditioned the displacement of citizens while many are seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Consequently, the next chapter will examine the role of these neighbouring countries and contributions Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) towards violent insurgent in the country.

¹⁵¹OCHA 2021 Report on North-East Nigeria: Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states Humanitarian Dashboard. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/north-east-nigeria-borno-adamawa-and-yobe-states-humanitarian-dashboard-january-1> Accessed April 22, 2022

Chapter 5


Insurgency and Regional Actor Involvement

Introduction

Across the world, the existence of militant groups, organized criminal gangs, separatists, and the nexus between them is not a new phenomenon. In recent times, however, their manifestation and intricate linkages in Africa have become growing sources of concern at a national, regional and even international levels. Nigeria, which was previously well-regarded for its role in restoring stability in several West African conflict zones, now requires international and regional support to ensure peace and security on her own territory. Although Boko Haram has formed as a homegrown organization with local grievances, the characteristics of the group's terror campaign constitute a severe threat not just to Nigeria's domestic security, but also to regional stability in the West. In this chapter, attempt will be made to examine the role of regional actors such as Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), contribution for countries that Nigeria shares borders with and some other non-state actors in the country. Consequently, emphasis will be on Boko haram insurgency because other violent conflicts are more of internally and doesn't have transnational implication as such.

ECOWAS contribution to Peace and Stability

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is made up of fifteen member countries that are located in the Western African region. These countries have both cultural and geopolitical ties and shared common economic interest. Its mission is to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters.



ECOWAS Member States

ECOWAS members states¹⁵² can be seen in the diagram above. Although ECOWAS is an inter-governmental multilateral institution established to promote economic integration and development, its mandate and latitude of operations have over the years expanded to include security concerns, including counterterrorism. Peace, security, and stability are all necessary factors for effective regional integration and socioeconomic development. To that end, ECOWAS has developed a number of legally binding instruments, such as conventions and protocols on conflict prevention, management, and resolution; peacekeeping, combating corruption, small arms and light weapons; drug abuse, illicit drug trafficking, and organized crime prevention, the majority of which are also applicable to terrorism.

The threat of violent extremism in the Sahel has now become one of the biggest challenges for countries in West Africa. So far, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has failed to respond adequately. This is largely owing to the rapidly changing nature of the security threats in the region that have presented it with new difficulties. Since the rise of the jihadist threat, ECOWAS has developed a three-pronged counter-terrorism strategy to guide regional action to prevent, pursue and reconstruct violent extremist activities. Beyond the strategy, however, the existing response mechanisms are not as adaptable as the threats they are meant to address. This is particularly true of non-military responses.¹⁵³ Despite

¹⁵² ECOWAS Member States. <https://www.wahooas.org/web-ooas/en/pays-membres>. Accessed May 9, 2022.

¹⁵³ PSC Report 2019. ECOWAS struggles to address violent extremism. <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/ecowas-struggles-to-address-violent>

the existence of a regional framework, therefore, violent activities associated with extremist groups in the Sahel have continued to increase year by year since 2016.

A notable ECOWAS counterterrorism framework is its Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999). Article 3(4) calls for strengthening cooperation in peacekeeping operations, early warning, and in countering cross-border crime, international terrorism, and the proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines. Despite the Protocol's stipulations, a number of ECOWAS countries have been hesitant to prioritize counterterrorism. The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa (GIABA), established in 1999, is another ECOWAS counterterrorism project. Its mission is to improve member governments' ability to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The mandate of GIABA has since been broadened to include technical assistance to member governments as well as fostering collaboration in the fight against insurgency. GIABA's efforts have led to actions by most ECOWAS counties to enact counterterrorism legislation and establish counterterrorism institutions.¹⁵⁴ However, some member states have been inconsistent in submitting required reports.

The ECOWAS Counterterrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan is a third framework. Adopted in 2013, the strategy recommends member states use a three-pillar approach to countering terrorism - prevent, pursue, and reconstruct. The "prevent" pillar requires member states to adopt and implement effective legal regimes, eliminate root causes of terrorism, enhance early warning systems and operational intelligence, counter extremism and radicalization, and promote democratic values and human rights. The 'pursue' pillar is meant to enable members to undertake rapid action against terrorist attackers. The "reconstruct" pillar is aimed at rebuilding societies damaged by terrorism. The strategy further calls for creating several regional instruments: the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Unit, ECOWAS Arrest Warrant, ECOWAS Black List of Terrorist and Criminal Networks, and ECOWAS Counterterrorism Manual. Essentially, the ECOWAS Counterterrorism Strategy seeks to enhance the coordination of various regional, continental, and international counterterrorism instruments in West Africa, and to ensure a

extremism?utm_source=BenchmarkEmail&utm_campaign=PSC_Report&utm_medium=email. Accessed May 9, 2022.

¹⁵⁴ Osei, B.F. Violent Extremism in West Africa: Are Current Responses Enough? The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding. (*Research Paper* No. 28, 2020). p.3

common framework for counterterrorism interventions.¹⁵⁵ While the strategy provides a pro-active framework for countering terrorism in the region, implementation remains a challenge. Most ECOWAS countries are yet to adequately operationalize the strategy within their borders.

Following ECOWAS's 2013 policy, member nations have prioritized pursuing criminals, with little investment in tackling the ideological and political causes of violence. There are also significant shortcomings in the organization's military unit. Corruption and a lack of consistent and effective training are the most urgent issues. ECOWAS also faces the major challenge of resource shortage, despite its measured progress. There is also a lack of will to carry out procedures, non-compliance with protocols, a lack of leadership on the part of members, state force violence, and a general disconnect with the realities of people on the ground.

Concerned about the threat that Boko Haram poses to regional security, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism in 2013, which establishes a regional Counter Terrorism Strategy and an implementation plan to assist member states in combating terrorism. The strategy aims to make regional, continental, and international counter-terrorism measures easier to implement, as well as providing a single operational framework for community-wide efforts to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related acts. The strategy is intended to enhance coordination among member states, strengthen national and regional capacities to detect, deter, intercept and prevent terrorism; promote criminal justice approach, prevent and combat violent religious extremism, harmonize responses and promote regional and international cooperation on terrorism. However, it lacks a soft approach which would put an emphasis on the provision of state services, humanitarian aid and the protection of citizens as measures to prevent further appeal of the insurgents.¹⁵⁶ Yet, ECOWAS faces several limitations in contributing to the suppression of the Boko haram threat. Tactically and operationally, there is very little the ECOWAS can do, since it is only strong as its members states. It lacks both intelligence architecture and an operational standby force it could use in counter-terrorism operations. Its programmes and activities are largely influenced by donor funding and priorities, further limiting what it can do regarding combating Boko Haram.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 3

¹⁵⁶ Freedom, C. O. A Danger Not to Nigeria alone - Boko Haram's Transnational Reach and Regional Responses. *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Peace and Security Series*, 2014. p. 10.

Additionally, another reason that could be attributed to ECOWAS little involvement is because Nigeria has not requested any military support from ECOWAS. This is partly due to Nigeria being by far the most powerful ECOWAS member state militarily, something that makes ECOWAS military assistance less vital. Partly, the reason is linked to Nigeria's national pride and preponderant role in the region and reluctance to accept help from smaller member states. Another reason why ECOWAS is not involved in the fight against Boko Haram is that the violence has spread to neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Chad and Niger), partly outside of ECOWAS. Given that Nigeria's neighbours, such as Chad and Cameroon, are not members of the regional organization, the regional organization cannot effectively 'ring fence' Nigeria in order to curb Boko Haram's transnational operations. This development made it evident that a trans-regional response was required.

The 2020-2024 Action Plan, adopted by ECOWAS in 2019, has a budget of US\$2.3 billion. Its eight priority areas range from pooling of efforts and coordination of counter-terrorism initiatives to promoting inter-community dialogue and preventing violent extremism. It's a step in the right direction. The strategy allows ECOWAS to take the lead on an issue where it has been competing for years with the UN, African Union, and Group of Five Sahel countries (G5 Sahel). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has made little progress more than a year after announcing an action plan to "eradicate" terrorism in West Africa. Despite member states' support, the regional agency confronts a number of obstacles. Key among them is whether member states are really committed to a regional approach to counter-terrorism¹⁵⁷. Considering that a regional counter-terrorism strategy and implementation plan passed by ECOWAS in 2013 was never implemented, the apparent lack of enthusiasm for the latest action plan raises questions about its prospects for success.

Several challenges are obstructing implementation. First, for countries affected by terrorism, existing counter-terrorism initiatives such as the Multinational Joint Task Force, G5 Sahel and Accra Initiative are the preferred vehicles for addressing specific vulnerabilities within their borders. For some of these states, ECOWAS seems ill-equipped to confront developing threats and adapt in a timely manner. ECOWAS also has the familiar problem of inadequate

¹⁵⁷Sampson Kwarkye. Slow progress for West Africa's latest counter-terrorism plan. Institute for Security Studies - ISS. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/slow-progress-for-west-africas-latest-counter-terrorism-plan> Accessed May 9, 2022.

resources¹⁵⁸. Some have opted to not put funds in the common pot, instead allocating them to activities in line with their national counter-terrorism initiatives, which aren't necessarily inspired by the plan.

An allocation by the West African Economic and Monetary Union is reportedly disbursed directly to its member states. While Nigeria and Ghana have pledged a total of US\$400 million, they are yet to make significant deposits to the pot. This may reflect countries' economic difficulties, in Nigeria's case brought on by the substantial declines in oil prices. But it could also indicate a tacit lack of confidence in ECOWAS as an effective mechanism for regional counter-terrorism.¹⁵⁹

Neighbouring Countries Involvement

The threat of regional peace, security and development posed by insurgency in Nigeria is becoming increasingly clear to neighbouring countries. To this end, efforts are being made by these countries to effectively contain the expanding insurgency. These neighbouring countries have made effort to ameliorate this menace, individually and collectively,

Cameroon

Aware of the threat that Boko Haram poses to French interests in West and Central Africa, as indicated by the abduction of a French family in northern Cameroon by Boko Haram, the French President organized a security meeting in Paris in May 2014 with some African leaders (The Paris Summit). The event brought together the presidents of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, as well as delegates from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, to discuss measures for dealing with the security threat posed by Boko Haram and other groups in West and Central Africa. The Paris summit decided on a set of bilateral and multi-lateral measures, such as a plan to enable them to share intelligence, coordinate actions and monitor borders, as well as assembling a team to fashion how to implement the agreed action plan. They also agreed on a number of initiatives to curtail the excesses of the insurgents as well as mobilize funds in support of women and girls in affected areas. As part of the agreement which was reached at the Paris summit on terrorism, the US, UK, France, Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic set up an External Intelligence Response Unit (EIRU) on Terrorism in June 2014. The new structure will serve the purpose of building up comprehensive records of information and pooling

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, 5

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

together the intelligence gathered by the different countries in a system of easy sharing for the various countries. The objective of this intelligence centre is to enable the different parties involved in the EIRU to come up with an effective security response to the threat¹⁶⁰.

Since the May 2014 Paris Summit, Cameroon has shifted from quiet containment to active confrontation with Boko Haram. In late May, in response to Boko Haram fighter incursions into Cameroon and criticism from the Nigerian government for its weak response to the threat, Cameroon deployed about 1000 soldiers from its elite Rapid Intervention Battalion to the far north, particularly to border towns such as Fotokol, Dabanga, and Amchide.

Niger

Nigeria's neighbours have adopted unilateral security steps to counter Boko Haram infiltration and operations on their soil, while also cooperating with Nigeria in some places. Rather of confronting Boko Haram publicly, Niger's aim has been to prevent them from infiltrating into its country. It has also launched out limited raids in some Diffa region communities suspected of harbouring Boko Haram members.¹⁶¹ For example, Niger's security forces raided a house in the Dubai neighbourhood of Diffa in December 2013 where three Boko Haram suspects were based. The militants fled but were arrested the next morning when they were cornered by security forces.¹⁶² Aside from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Niger doesn't have any other strategies to curb the spread of violent insurgency. They focus more on keeping these groups away from their territory.

In December 2016, Niger's Minister of Interior established a deradicalization campaign. Around 150 repentant ex-militants were accommodated in a Goudoumaria camp by mid-2017, where deradicalization sessions were conducted. To further increase defections, the governor of Diffa region, where most of Niger's Boko Haram members have come from, issued a deadline for others to come forward by the end of 2017.

Chad

Chad has also stepped-up efforts to combat Boko Haram's transnational activities. In addition to participating in MNJTF, Chad has assisted by offering its territory for major

¹⁶⁰ Freedom, C. O. A Danger Not to Nigeria alone - Boko Haram's Transnational Reach and Regional Responses. *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Peace and Security Series*, 2014. p. 10.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² The Soufan Group (2014), "Niger's Security Strategy in Boko Haram's Badlands", IntelBrief, 12 February 2014, <http://soufangroup.com/tsgintelbrief-nigers-security-strategy-in-boko-harams-badlands/>

reconnaissance operations led by the US and French military. Their jets and soldiers have been stationed there as part of the growing global efforts to free the abducted girls. In mid-August 2014, Chad's troops carried out a military operation against the sect to rescue some of the 100 people kidnapped by the Boko Haram sect in DoronBaga in the Kukawa area near the border with Chad. Some of the insurgents were killed as they attempted to cross the Chadian border, and their captives were rescued. Further, Chad reportedly facilitated the negotiations between alleged members of the insurgency group and the Nigerian government which include talks on the release of the Chibok girls and a possible ceasefire.¹⁶³

Due to the presence of the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Chad's territory, the country has a significant role to play. ISWAP, a Boko Haram offshoot, is gaining power and influence. This jihadist group is fighting a guerrilla battle across northern Nigeria and the lake's periphery from its territorial base on the banks and islands of Lake Chad. It has developed a mostly symbiotic connection with the people of the Lake Chad region.

In April 2020 the Chadian government's "Wrath of Boma" military offensive, which stretched across Niger's and Nigeria's borders, repulsed the Boko Haram fighters but failed to establish security in areas bordering Lake Chad. Porous borders, particularly across Lake Chad, provided easy passage for terrorists and criminal entities. Border security remained a shared task of the Gendarmes, Army, Customs, and the National and Nomadic Guard (GNNT), none of which was resourced sufficiently. The Army and GNNT comprised the front line in nearly all major incidents involving Boko Haram and ISWAP. Chad maintains close working relationships with France, and the French Operation *Barkhane* launches Counter Terrorism missions throughout the Sahel from its base in N'Djamena. Operation *Barkhane* is France's largest overseas operation. The force, with approximately 4,500 soldiers, is spread out between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. Several other European nations engaged militarily with Chad in 2020 as well, and the Chadian government also sought security support from near-peer competitors.¹⁶⁴

The Multinational Joint Task Force - MNJTF

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), headquartered in the Chadian capital of N'djamena, is made up of more than 10,000 troops from Benin, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and

¹⁶³ Ibid, 9.

¹⁶⁴Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Chad. U.S Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/chad/> Accessed May 10, 2022.

Nigeria. It is joint effort by those neighbouring countries to combat violent insurgency within the region. The Joint Task Force comprises of over 8,000 troops, and they receive technical, financial, and strategic support from international partners, including the European Union, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Cooperation amongst the countries of the Lake Chad region was poor until the election of Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari in early 2015. Indeed, Buhari's election was a clear turning point. The Nigerian president made it a priority to resurrect relations with Nigeria's neighbours, visiting Niger and Chad on his first foreign trips to galvanize support for a collaborative response to the Boko Haram menace¹⁶⁵. After his victory in 2015, the MNJTF, a regional force tasked with degrading Boko Haram, went into existence and has been instrumental in halting the group's expansion across the region. However, much of the regional reaction to far has been on better military coordination. Despite the region's interconnections and the common threat, little in the way of a regional strategy on non-military issues has emerged.

The line between national military action and the MNJTF can also be blurred, with national armies in each country conducting anti-Boko Haram operations outside the confines of the MNJTF as well.¹⁶⁶ But overall cooperation has vastly improved in the region, including cross-border operations. In this sense, the MNJTF has had a demonstrable impact on the regional battle against Boko Haram, paving the way for cooperation around military activities, and eventually perhaps beyond. In 2016, the MNJTF recorded several consecutive victories in battles against Boko Haram. A continuous and significant attack was carried out from June to November 2016 around Lake Chad and in the state of Borno - an operation known as Operation Gama Aiki ('finish the work' in Hausa dialect). The military operation included simultaneous collaboration in all four sectors (Baga in Nigeria, Baga-Sola in Chad, Dipafa in Niger and at Mura in Cameroon). At the end, the operation was declared a notable success in the fight against Boko Haram since many hostages were released, certain areas controlled by Boko Haram were liberated, and considerable loss of weapons was inflicted on Boko Haram who also suffered from a wave of defections from its ranks. Another military success was recorded in early November 2016 by the Baga-Sola 2 Battalion, based in western Chad. The attack resulted in the surrender of at least 240 Boko Haram fighters. Between February and May 2016, operations in the 2nd sector based at Mura in Cameroon

¹⁶⁵ Mahmood, Omar S., and Ndubuisi, C. Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region: Policies, cooperation and livelihoods. (*Institute for Security Studies Research Report*, 2018) p. 10-13.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

neutralized many Boko Haram fighters. The force secured the release of hostages, destroyed some of the organization's training camps and seized many weapons.¹⁶⁷

Under the MNJTF, Nigeria invited Cameroonian troops to serve on Nigerian soil alongside Operation Lafiya Dole, its internal military operation against Boko Haram. In early 2018, Cameroonian troops were present in the Gwoza area, while the Nigerian army also credited the support of Cameroonian forces in the re-opening of the road to Banki. This cooperation has extended elsewhere, especially with regards to regional troops operating within Nigeria, a dramatic change from just a few years ago.¹⁶⁸ For example, the Nigerian Air Force conducted a bombing raid in northern Borno state that was based on intel from a Nigerian reconnaissance craft in April 2018, while three Chadian soldiers were killed on Nigerian soil in Abadam LGA the same month, demonstrating the burgeoning coordination.

In early January 2020, however, Chad announced the withdrawal of its forces from Borno, ending the Yancin Tafki operation. Chadian authorities reportedly did not discuss the withdrawal beforehand with their MNJTF partners, or at least senior MNJTF officials were unaware of it. According to one Chadian official, N'Djamena was motivated in part by the need to redeploy the units to the Chadian side of the lake, where many had previously been stationed and which has also suffered a spike in attacks, and in part by the mission's ongoing costs. Reportedly, N'Djamena was also unhappy with the weak support its forces received from the Nigerian army. ISWAP reacted by immediately attacking the Nigerian base at Monguno where some Chadian forces had been based. Militants failed to take the base, but the attack demonstrated their tactical awareness and ability to exploit the MNJTF's weaknesses

The MNJTF has made modest progress in degrading Boko Haram, arresting militants, rescuing hostages, and reclaiming areas previously controlled by Boko Haram and ISWAP. However, there have been concerns about flagrant human rights abuses and other violations against civilians in areas where MNJTF military operations have taken place. Extremist groups have leveraged these abuses to develop narratives that tap into the local population's resentment against the military in particular and the state in general. Working together has enabled forces from different countries to learn from each other, promoted the idea of cross-border cooperation and improved tactical coordination. Joint operations, mainly involving Chadian troops deploying into

¹⁶⁷ David, D. Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram — Reflections. *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)*, 2020: p. 5-8.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 14.

the other countries, helped stem Boko Haram's spread in 2015 and 2016 and squeezed the group, resulting in its split into at least three factions.

The contribution of the multinational force to its goals is controversial. Along with several military successes against Boko Haram, who lost a large area and bases, suffered many casualties and loss of weapons, Boko Haram, as a learning organization, seems to have strengthened again. In general, it can be evaluated that the MNJTF, from the very beginning, suffers from structural limitations. The chain of command is weak, even by the standards of multinational forces, because it includes units of national forces that are limited in operating specifically in a cell/sector belonging to their countries as agreed in the force mandate. Each force operates in its sector and may operate outside the borders of the sector, in case of a hot pursuit, up to 25 km beyond the border of the neighboring state.¹⁶⁹

In conclusion, the frequency of regional spillovers of internal conflicts in West Africa highlights the close level of interconnectivity between countries, where localized conflicts can trigger region wide conflict systems and destabilize neighboring countries. The conflicts that emerge from a single conflict system may have diverse causes and varying durations, with some more lethal than others. They are interlinked, however, and therefore necessitate region wide approaches to conflict resolution and management. Regional involvement should also include non-military approach and should look into combating of small arms and light weapons which is one of the factors that engenders insurgency of different kinds. Although ECOWAS has initiated some strategies to reduce violent conflicts in West Africa, it hasn't yet produced the needed result due to lack of commitment from members' state. As observed in this chapter, countries that shares border with Nigeria are actively engaging in order to control violent conflict except for Benin, who has probably passive owing to their little effect of the violent conflict in their country and the strength of the country in terms of the size. Other West African countries have not really get involved in this fight about the spread of violent conflict in the region, because they haven't been directly affected.

¹⁶⁹ Babatunde F. Obamamoye, "Counterterrorism, Multinational Joint Task Force and the missing components," *African Identities*, 15 (4) ,2017: pp. 1-13.

Chapter 6

Summary and Conclusion

This dissertation examined the threat of insurgency to peace and security in West Africa, taking into consideration the perspective from Nigeria. As revealed from the dissertation, insurgent induced violence has remained a conundrum for the Nigeria government and appears intractable due largely to its predisposing factors such as unemployment, poverty, porous borders, inequality, unequal distribution of resources, desperation of political leader to win and remain in office, lopsided development and weak security and judicial system.

In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. Insurgency in Nigeria has both internal and external dimensions. It doesn't just impact the country but also the neighbouring countries. Both the human security and state security has been compromised as a result of insurgent violent. It has introduced socio-economic upheaval, human cost and displacement of the people from their homes and most importantly, continued political instability in the country.

Nigeria's threat to peace and security is not just the scourge of Boko Haram, but it also includes the farmer's and herders' conflict, a revived separatist fomenting violence in some part of the country, sectarianism, banditry and kidnapping. Although these threats exist, different administrations have played a huge role toward to tackle this crisis. Aside from the Federal government approaches to tackle the insurgent induce violent, state governments have also played a major role and responding to these threats. For instance, the Southwestern governors came up with Amotekun in order to enhance security in the region, while some other states in the Northern part of the country came with up the Vigilante Groups and Task force alongside the existing formal security institutions in the country.

Nigeria's is geopolitically divided into six (6) zones, each of them have peculiar security challenges, but mostly, the Northern part of the country has witnessed different violent unrest. As a regional economic power, Nigeria's stability and security are of strategic interest as much as her safety and stability are crucial to the survival of Western Africa. As revealed from this dissertation, the following can serve as the summation of the conclusions:

- i. The threat of insurgency in the West African sub-region is gradually growing to become a regional security challenge. This is evident in the activities of ISWAP across national borders in the region. Tackling such challenge of growing insurgency therefore would

require both military and diplomatic cooperation among the countries in West Africa. Such military cooperation would include consolidating different countries military capabilities toward effectively combating the menace of violent insurgency in the region.

- ii. Individual West African countries would have to be urged to set up border security teams. To prevent militants from crossing international boundaries, such units must work together, particularly in terms of information exchange and intelligence gathering. The goal of such a policy should be to improve security operations in the West African sub-region. There is therefore the need to enhance the regional cooperation of the West African countries by addressing matters of interest during meetings of ECOWAS Head of States and Governments. Other neighbouring countries of the West African sub-region must be integrated into the MNJTF in order to create such cooperation among countries within the region. This could assist the MNJTF improve its manpower capability to combat terrorism and insurgency in West Africa and the Sahel region.
- iii. The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which consists of five states, should be given the necessary human and material resources to manage the insurgency. The MNJTF countries of Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Benin, and Nigeria must demonstrate political will to adhere to the MNJTF agreement's rules of participation, as this is critical to the task force's success. The MNJTF should also be sustained to prevent Boko Haram from regenerating itself.
- iv. Furthermore, the availability of arms has warped the urge to foster peace and its benefits, making it a mirage throughout the country. As a result, in order to maintain peace, arms should be effectively managed in order to decrease their excessive availability in the country. By increasing the number of arms in circulation, a positive atmosphere will be created, encouraging peace and ensuring its long-term sustainability in the country. Arms control coupled with good governance, justice, respect for law and order, human rights, equitable distribution of resources, provision of effective channels of communication and conflict management will restore peace and encourage its institutionalization in the country. Strict arms control should also apply to herders because they are always in possession on arms. Herdsmen find it easy to procure arms and incubate terror cells in the forests without challenge by security agencies. As an interim measure, government should set up an effective grievance address mechanism to deal with farmer-herder conflict in a satisfactory and sustainable manner.

- v. In Nigeria's North central states, particularly Benue, there has been a repeated violent confrontation between Fulani herdsmen and farmers, leading in large-scale displacement and the establishment of Internally Displaced Persons' camps. This is indicative of the country's various security crises. The federal government must now take the lead and ensure that nationwide grazing laws are enacted. The state governments can also make complementary laws, and local governments, complementary by-laws. These laws will clearly provide for ranches and define grazing lands, and must mark out grazing routes across the country. The federal government should also develop the legal structure and framework for restorative justice, to complement the extant criminal justice system in the country and encourage farmers and herdsmen to bring their misgivings to the constituted authority.
- vi. There is need for the development of a media code for reporting issues of farmer-herder conflict and associated cases of banditry and kidnapping. The code can be used on sensitizing the media on the relevant international standards of reporting. This should involve conflict sensitivity and strict journalistic standards.
- vii. Again, the North and South, and Christian versus Muslim divide in the country has plunged the country further into violent conflict, regardless of the fact that Nigeria by constitution is a secular state. The use of ethnicity, religious and politics should rather unite us as Nigerians in order to promote peace, harmonious peaceful co-existence and unity. These can be by the society and political elites as a tool to unite the country which can foster rapid development.
- viii. Finally, the stability of Nigeria reflects on the stability of other West Africa countries. Nigeria needs to wake up as it is gradually losing its capacity to effectively exercise regional political and security leadership within West Africa. The various institutions in the country consisting of the security, intelligence and judiciary should undergo a reform that would allow a synergy between all of them.

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